Alignment of Aristotle's Categories

grc

Ὁμώνυμα λέγεται ὧν ὄνομα μόνον κοινόν, ὁ δὲ κατὰ

eng

Things are said to be named 'equivocally' when, though they have a common name, the definition corresponding

grc

τοὔνομα λόγος τῆς οὐσίας ἕτερος, οἷον ζῷον ὅ τε ἄνθρω

eng

with the name differs for each. Thus, a real man and a figure in a picture can both

grc

πος καὶ τὸ γεγραμμένον· τούτων γὰρ ὄνομα μόνον κοινόν,

eng

lay claim to the name 'animal'; yet these are equivocally so named, for, though they have

grc

ὁ δὲ κατὰ τοὔνομα λόγος τῆς οὐσίας ἕτερος· ἐὰν γὰρ

eng

a common name, the definition corresponding with the name differs for each. For should any

grc

ἀποδιδῷ τις τί ἐστιν αὐτῶν ἑκατέρῳ τὸ ζῴῳ εἶναι, ἴδιον

eng

one define in what sense each is an animal, his definition in the one case will

grc

ἑκατέρου λόγον ἀποδώσει. συνώνυμα δὲ λέγεται ὧν τό τε

eng

be appropriate to that case only. On the other hand, things are said to be

grc

ὄνομα κοινὸν καὶ ὁ κατὰ τοὔνομα λόγος τῆς οὐσίας ὁ αὐτός,

eng

named 'univocally' which have both the name and the definition answering to the name in common.

grc

οἷον ζῷον ὅ τε ἄνθρωπος καὶ ὁ βοῦς· τούτων γὰρ ἑκάτερον

eng

A man and an ox are both 'animal', and these are univocally so named,

grc

κοινῷ ὀνόματι προσαγορεύεται ζῷον, καὶ ὁ λόγος δὲ

eng

inasmuch as not only the name, but also the definition, is the

grc

τῆς οὐσίας ὁ αὐτός· ἐὰν γὰρ ἀποδιδῷ τις τὸν ἑκατέρου

eng

same in both cases: for if a man should state in what sense each

grc

λόγον τί ἐστιν αὐτῶν ἑκατέρῳ τὸ ζῴῳ εἶναι, τὸν αὐτὸν

eng

is an animal, the statement in the one case would be identical with that

grc

λόγον ἀποδώσει. παρώνυμα δὲ λέγεται ὅσα ἀπό τινος δια

eng

in the other. Things are said to be named 'derivatively', which derive their

grc

φέροντα τῇ πτώσει τὴν κατὰ τοὔνομα προσηγορίαν ἔχει,

eng

name from some other name, but differ from it in termination. Thus the

grc

οἷον ἀπὸ τῆς γραμματικῆς ὁ γραμματικὸς καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς

eng

grammarian derives his name from the word 'grammar', and the courageous man

grc

ἀνδρείας ὁ ἀνδρεῖος.

eng

from the word 'courage'.

grc

Τῶν λεγομένων τὰ μὲν κατὰ συμπλοκὴν λέγεται, τὰ

eng

Forms of speech are either simple or

grc

δὲ ἄνευ συμπλοκῆς. τὰ μὲν οὖν κατὰ συμπλοκήν, οἷον

eng

composite. Examples of the latter are such expressions as

grc

ἄνθρωπος τρέχει, ἄνθρωπος νικᾷ· τὰ δὲ ἄνευ συμπλοκῆς,

eng

the man runs', 'the man wins'; of the former 'man',

grc

οἷον ἄνθρωπος, βοῦς, τρέχει, νικᾷ.

eng

ox', 'runs', 'wins'.

grc

Τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν καθ’ ὑποκειμένου τινὸς λέγεται, ἐν

eng

Of things themselves some are predicable of a subject, and

grc

ὑποκειμένῳ δὲ οὐδενί ἐστιν, οἷον ἄνθρωπος καθ’ ὑποκειμένου

eng

are never present in a subject. Thus 'man' is predicable of

grc

μὲν λέγεται τοῦ τινὸς ἀνθρώπου, ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ δὲ οὐδενί ἐστιν·

eng

the individual man, and is never present in a subject.

grc

τὰ δὲ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ μέν ἐστι, καθ’ ὑποκειμένου δὲ οὐδενὸς

eng

By being 'present in a subject' I do not mean present as parts are

grc

λέγεται, —ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ δὲ λέγω ὃ ἔν τινι μὴ ὡς μέρος

eng

present in a whole, but being incapable of existence apart from the said subject.

grc

ὑπάρχον ἀδύνατον χωρὶς εἶναι τοῦ ἐν ᾧ ἐστίν,— οἷον ἡ τὶς

eng

Some things, again, are present in a subject, but are never predicable of

grc

γραμματικὴ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ μέν ἐστι τῇ ψυχῇ, καθ’ ὑπο

eng

a subject. For instance, a certain point of grammatical knowledge is present in

grc

κειμένου δὲ οὐδενὸς λέγεται, καὶ τὸ τὶ λευκὸν ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ

eng

the mind, but is not predicable of any subject; or again, a certain whiteness

grc

μέν ἐστι τῷ σώματι, —ἅπαν γὰρ χρῶμα ἐν σώματι,— καθ’

eng

may be present in the body (for colour requires a material basis), yet

grc

ὑποκειμένου δὲ οὐδενὸς λέγεται· τὰ δὲ καθ’ ὑποκειμένου τε

eng

it is never predicable of anything. Other things, again, are both

grc

λέγεται καὶ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἐστίν, οἷον ἡ ἐπιστήμη ἐν ὑπο

eng

predicable of a subject and present in a subject. Thus while

grc

κειμένῳ μέν ἐστι τῇ ψυχῇ, καθ’ ὑποκειμένου δὲ λέγεται

eng

knowledge is present in the human mind, it is predicable

grc

τῆς γραμματικῆς· τὰ δὲ οὔτε ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἐστὶν οὔτε καθ’

eng

of grammar. There is, lastly, a class of things

grc

ὑποκειμένου λέγεται, οἷον ὁ τὶς ἄνθρωπος ἢ ὁ τὶς ἵπ

eng

which are neither present in a subject nor predicable

grc

πος, —οὐδὲν γὰρ τῶν τοιούτων οὔτε ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἐστὶν

eng

of a subject, such as the individual man or

grc

οὔτε καθ’ ὑποκειμένου λέγεται·— ἁπλῶς δὲ τὰ ἄτομα καὶ ἓν

eng

the individual horse. But, to speak more generally, that which is individual and

grc

ἀριθμῷ κατ’ οὐδενὸς ὑποκειμένου λέγεται, ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ δὲ

eng

has the character of a unit is never predicable of a subject. Yet in some cases there is nothing to

grc

ἔνια οὐδὲν κωλύει εἶναι· ἡ γὰρ τὶς γραμματικὴ τῶν ἐν ὑπο

eng

prevent such being present in a subject. Thus a certain point of grammatical knowledge is present

grc

κειμένῳ ἐστίν.

eng

in a subject.

grc

Ὅταν ἕτερον καθ’ ἑτέρου κατηγορῆται ὡς καθ’ ὑποκει

eng

When one thing is predicated of another, all that

grc

μένου, ὅσα κατὰ τοῦ κατηγορουμένου λέγεται, πάντα καὶ

eng

which is predicable of the predicate will be predicable

grc

κατὰ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου ῥηθήσεται· οἷον ἄνθρωπος κατὰ τοῦ τι

eng

also of the subject. Thus, 'man' is predicated of

grc

νὸς ἀνθρώπου κατηγορεῖται, τὸ δὲ ζῷον κατὰ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου·

eng

the individual man; but 'animal' is predicated of 'man';

grc

οὐκοῦν καὶ κατὰ τοῦ τινὸς ἀνθρώπου τὸ ζῷον κατηγορηθήσε

eng

it will, therefore, be predicable of the individual man also:

grc

ται· ὁ γὰρ τὶς ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἄνθρωπός ἐστι καὶ ζῷον.

eng

for the individual man is both 'man' and 'animal'.

grc

τῶν ἑτερογενῶν καὶ μὴ ὑπ’ ἄλληλα τεταγμένων ἕτεραι

eng

If genera are different and co-ordinate, their differentiae are themselves different in kind.

grc

τῷ εἴδει καὶ αἱ διαφοραί, οἷον ζῴου καὶ ἐπιστήμης·

eng

Take as an instance the genus 'animal' and the genus 'knowledge'.

grc

ζῴου μὲν γὰρ διαφοραὶ τό τε πεζὸν καὶ τὸ πτηνὸν καὶ τὸ

eng

With feet', 'two-footed', 'winged', 'aquatic', are differentiae of 'animal'; the species

grc

ἔνυδρον καὶ τὸ δίπουν, ἐπιστήμης δὲ οὐδεμία τούτων· οὐ γὰρ

eng

of knowledge are not distinguished by the same differentiae. One species

grc

διαφέρει ἐπιστήμη ἐπιστήμης τῷ δίπους εἶναι. τῶν δέ γε

eng

of knowledge does not differ from another in being 'two-footed'. But where one

grc

ὑπ’ ἄλληλα γενῶν οὐδὲν κωλύει τὰς αὐτὰς διαφορὰς εἶναι·

eng

genus is subordinate to another, there is nothing to prevent their having the same differentiae:

grc

τὰ γὰρ ἐπάνω τῶν ὑπ’ αὐτὰ γενῶν κατηγορεῖται, ὥστε

eng

for the greater class is predicated of the lesser, so that

grc

ὅσαι τοῦ κατηγορουμένου διαφοραί εἰσι τοσαῦται καὶ τοῦ

eng

all the differentiae of the predicate will be differentiae also

grc

ὑποκειμένου ἔσονται.

eng

of the subject.

grc

Τῶν κατὰ μηδεμίαν συμπλοκὴν λεγομένων ἕκαστον ἤτοι

eng

Expressions which are in no way composite signify

grc

οὐσίαν σημαίνει ἢ ποσὸν ἢ ποιὸν ἢ πρός τι ἢ ποὺ ἢ ποτὲ ἢ

eng

substance, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position,

grc

κεῖσθαι ἢ ἔχειν ἢ ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν. ἔστι δὲ οὐσία μὲν ὡς

eng

state, action, or affection. To sketch my meaning roughly, examples

grc

τύπῳ εἰπεῖν οἷον ἄνθρωπος, ἵππος· ποσὸν δὲ οἷον δίπηχυ,

eng

of substance are 'man' or 'the horse', of quantity, such terms as 'two cubits long' or 'three

grc

τρίπηχυ· ποιὸν δὲ οἷον λευκόν, γραμματικόν· πρός τι δὲ

eng

cubits long', of quality, such attributes as 'white', 'grammatical'. 'Double', 'half', 'greater',

grc

οἷον διπλάσιον, ἥμισυ, μεῖζον· ποὺ δὲ οἷον ἐν Λυκείῳ, ἐν

eng

fall under the category of relation; 'in a the market place', 'in the Lyceum', under that of

grc

ἀγορᾷ· ποτὲ δὲ οἷον χθές, πέρυσιν· κεῖσθαι δὲ οἷον ἀνάκειται,

eng

place; 'yesterday', 'last year', under that of time. 'Lying', 'sitting', are terms indicating position,

grc

κάθηται· ἔχειν δὲ οἷον ὑποδέδεται, ὥπλισται· ποιεῖν δὲ οἷον

eng

shod', 'armed', state; 'to lance', 'to

grc

τέμνειν, καίειν· πάσχειν δὲ οἷον τέμνεσθαι, καίεσθαι. ἕκα

eng

cauterize', action; 'to be lanced', 'to be cauterized', affection. No

grc

στον δὲ τῶν εἰρημένων αὐτὸ μὲν καθ’ αὑτὸ ἐν οὐδεμιᾷ κατα

eng

one of these terms, in and by itself, involves an affirmation; it

grc

φάσει λέγεται, τῇ δὲ πρὸς ἄλληλα τούτων συμπλοκῇ

eng

is by the combination of such terms that positive or

grc

κατάφασις γίγνεται· ἅπασα γὰρ δοκεῖ κατάφασις ἤτοι

eng

negative statements arise. For every assertion must, as is admitted,

grc

ἀληθὴς ἢ ψευδὴς εἶναι, τῶν δὲ κατὰ μηδεμίαν συμ

eng

be either true or false, whereas expressions which are

grc

πλοκὴν λεγομένων οὐδὲν οὔτε ἀληθὲς οὔτε ψεῦδός ἐστιν,

eng

not in any way composite such as 'man', 'white', 'runs', 'wins',

grc

οἷον ἄνθρωπος, λευκόν, τρέχει, νικᾷ.

eng

cannot be either true or false.

grc

Οὐσία δέ ἐστιν ἡ κυριώτατά τε καὶ πρώτως καὶ μάλι

eng

Substance, in the truest and primary and most definite sense of

grc

στα λεγομένη, ἣ μήτε καθ’ ὑποκειμένου τινὸς λέγεται

eng

the word, is that which is neither predicable of a subject

grc

μήτε ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ τινί ἐστιν, οἷον ὁ τὶς ἄνθρωπος ἢ ὁ τὶς

eng

nor present in a subject; for instance, the individual man or horse.

grc

ἵππος. δεύτεραι δὲ οὐσίαι λέγονται, ἐν οἷς εἴδεσιν αἱ πρώ

eng

But in a secondary sense those things are called substances within which,

grc

τως οὐσίαι λεγόμεναι ὑπάρχουσιν, ταῦτά τε καὶ τὰ τῶν

eng

as species, the primary substances are included; also those which, as genera,

grc

εἰδῶν τούτων γένη· οἷον ὁ τὶς ἄνθρωπος ἐν εἴδει μὲν ὑπάρ

eng

include the species. For instance, the individual man is included in the species

grc

χει τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, γένος δὲ τοῦ εἴδους ἐστὶ τὸ ζῷον· δεύ

eng

man', and the genus to which the species belongs is 'animal'; these,

grc

τεραι οὖν αὗται λέγονται οὐσίαι, οἷον ὅ τε ἄνθρωπος καὶ

eng

therefore-that is to say, the species 'man' and the genus 'animal,-are termed secondary

grc

τὸ ζῷον. —φανερὸν δὲ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ὅτι τῶν καθ’ ὑπο

eng

substances. It is plain from what has been said that

grc

κειμένου λεγομένων ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τοὔνομα καὶ τὸν λόγον

eng

both the name and the definition of the predicate must be

grc

κατηγορεῖσθαι τοῦ ὑποκειμένου· οἷον ἄνθρωπος καθ’ ὑπο

eng

predicable of the subject. For instance, 'man' is predicted of

grc

κειμένου λέγεται τοῦ τινὸς ἀνθρώπου, καὶ κατηγορεῖταί γε

eng

the individual man. Now in this case the name of the species man' is

grc

τοὔνομα, —τὸν γὰρ ἄνθρωπον κατὰ τοῦ τινὸς ἀνθρώπου κατηγο

eng

applied to the individual, for we use the term 'man' in describing the individual;

grc

ρήσεις·— καὶ ὁ λόγος δὲ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου κατὰ τοῦ τινὸς ἀν

eng

and the definition of 'man' will also be predicated of

grc

θρώπου κατηγορηθήσεται, —ὁ γὰρ τὶς ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἄνθρω

eng

the individual man, for the individual man is both man and

grc

πός ἐστιν·— ὥστε καὶ τοὔνομα καὶ ὁ λόγος κατὰ τοῦ

eng

animal. Thus, both the name and the definition of the species

grc

ὑποκειμένου κατηγορηθήσεται. τῶν δ’ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ὄντων

eng

are predicable of the individual. With regard, on the other hand, to those things which

grc

ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν πλείστων οὔτε τοὔνομα οὔτε ὁ λόγος κατηγο

eng

are present in a subject, it is generally the case that neither their name nor their definition is predicable

grc

ρεῖται τοῦ ὑποκειμένου· ἐπ’ ἐνίων δὲ τοὔνομα μὲν οὐδὲν κω

eng

of that in which they are present. Though, however, the definition is never predicable, there

grc

λύει κατηγορεῖσθαι τοῦ ὑποκειμένου, τὸν δὲ λόγον ἀδύ

eng

is nothing in certain cases to prevent the name being used.

grc

νατον· οἷον τὸ λευκὸν ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ὂν τῷ σώματι κατη

eng

For instance, 'white' being present in a body is predicated of

grc

γορεῖται τοῦ ὑποκειμένου, —λευκὸν γὰρ σῶμα λέγεται,— ὁ

eng

that in which it is present, for a body is called white:

grc

δὲ λόγος τοῦ λευκοῦ οὐδέποτε κατὰ τοῦ σώματος κατηγορη

eng

the definition, however, of the colour white' is never predicable of the

grc

θήσεται. —τὰ δ’ ἄλλα πάντα ἤτοι καθ’ ὑποκειμένων λέγε

eng

body. Everything except primary substances is either predicable of a

grc

ται τῶν πρώτων οὐσιῶν ἢ ἐν ὑποκειμέναις αὐταῖς ἐστίν. τοῦτο

eng

primary substance or present in a primary substance. This becomes

grc

δὲ φανερὸν ἐκ τῶν καθ’ ἕκαστα προχειριζομένων· οἷον τὸ

eng

evident by reference to particular instances which occur. 'Animal' is predicated

grc

ζῷον κατὰ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου κατηγορεῖται, οὐκοῦν καὶ κατὰ

eng

of the species 'man', therefore of the individual man, for if there were

grc

τοῦ τινὸς ἀνθρώπου, —εἰ γὰρ κατὰ μηδενὸς τῶν τινῶν

eng

no individual man of whom it could be predicated, it could not be

grc

ἀνθρώπων, οὐδὲ κατὰ ἀνθρώπου ὅλως·— πάλιν τὸ χρῶμα

eng

predicated of the species 'man' at all. Again, colour is present

grc

ἐν σώματι, οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐν τινὶ σώματι· εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἐν

eng

in body, therefore in individual bodies, for if there were no individual

grc

τινὶ τῶν καθ’ ἕκαστα, οὐδὲ ἐν σώματι ὅλως· ὥστε τὰ

eng

body in which it was present, it could not be present in body at all. Thus everything

grc

ἄλλα πάντα ἤτοι καθ’ ὑποκειμένων τῶν πρώτων οὐσιῶν

eng

except primary substances is either predicated of primary substances,

grc

λέγεται ἢ ἐν ὑποκειμέναις αὐταῖς ἐστίν. μὴ οὐσῶν οὖν

eng

or is present in them, and if these last

grc

τῶν πρώτων οὐσιῶν ἀδύνατον τῶν ἄλλων τι εἶναι· πάντα

eng

did not exist, it would be impossible for anything else to exist.

grc

γὰρ τὰ ἄλλα ἤτοι καθ’ ὑποκειμένων τούτων λέγεται ἢ ἐν

grc

ὑποκειμέναις αὐταῖς ἐστίν· ὥστε μὴ οὐσῶν τῶν πρώτων οὐ

grc

σιῶν ἀδύνατον τῶν ἄλλων τι εἶναι.

grc

Τῶν δὲ δευτέρων οὐσιῶν μᾶλλον οὐσία τὸ εἶδος τοῦ

eng

Of secondary substances, the species is more truly substance than the genus,

grc

γένους· ἔγγιον γὰρ τῆς πρώτης οὐσίας ἐστίν. ἐὰν γὰρ ἀπο

eng

being more nearly related to primary substance. For if any one

grc

διδῷ τις τὴν πρώτην οὐσίαν τί ἐστι, γνωριμώτερον καὶ οἰ

eng

should render an account of what a primary substance is, he would render a more instructive account, and

grc

κειότερον ἀποδώσει τὸ εἶδος ἀποδιδοὺς ἢ τὸ γένος· οἷ

eng

one more proper to the subject, by stating the species than by stating the genus. Thus,

grc

ον τὸν τινὰ ἄνθρωπον γνωριμώτερον ἂν ἀποδοίη ἄνθρω

eng

he would give a more instructive account of an individual man by stating that he was man than

grc

πον ἀποδιδοὺς ἢ ζῷον, —τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἴδιον μᾶλλον τοῦ

eng

by stating that he was animal, for the former description is peculiar to the individual in a greater

grc

τινὸς ἀνθρώπου, τὸ δὲ κοινότερον,— καὶ τὸ τὶ δένδρον ἀποδι

eng

degree, while the latter is too general. Again, the man who gives an account of the nature of an individual

grc

δοὺς γνωριμώτερον ἀποδώσει δένδρον ἀποδιδοὺς ἢ φυτόν.

eng

tree will give a more instructive account by mentioning the species 'tree' than by mentioning the genus 'plant'.

grc

ἔτι αἱ πρῶται οὐσίαι διὰ τὸ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν ὑποκεῖ

eng

Moreover, primary substances are most properly called substances in virtue of the fact

grc

σθαι καὶ πάντα τὰ ἄλλα κατὰ τούτων κατηγορεῖσθαι ἢ

eng

that they are the entities which underlie everything else, and that everything

grc

ἐν ταύταις εἶναι διὰ τοῦτο μάλιστα οὐσίαι λέγονται· ὡς δέ

eng

else is either predicated of them or present in them. Now the

grc

γε αἱ πρῶται οὐσίαι πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα ἔχουσιν, οὕτω καὶ

eng

same relation which subsists between primary substance and everything else subsists also

grc

τὸ εἶδος πρὸς τὸ γένος ἔχει· —ὑπόκειται γὰρ τὸ εἶδος

eng

between the species and the genus: for the species is to the genus as subject is

grc

τῷ γένει· τὰ μὲν γὰρ γένη κατὰ τῶν εἰδῶν κατηγορεῖται,

eng

to predicate, since the genus is predicated of the species, whereas the

grc

τὰ δὲ εἴδη κατὰ τῶν γενῶν οὐκ ἀντιστρέφει·— ὥστε καὶ ἐκ

eng

species cannot be predicated of the genus. Thus we have a second

grc

τούτων τὸ εἶδος τοῦ γένους μᾶλλον οὐσία. —αὐτῶν δὲ τῶν εἰ

eng

ground for asserting that the species is more truly substance than the genus. Of species themselves, except in

grc

δῶν ὅσα μή ἐστι γένη, οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἕτερον ἑτέρου οὐσία

eng

the case of such as are genera, no one is more truly substance than another.

grc

ἐστίν· οὐδὲν γὰρ οἰκειότερον ἀποδώσει κατὰ τοῦ τινὸς ἀν

eng

We should not give a more appropriate account of the individual man by stating the

grc

θρώπου τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἀποδιδοὺς ἢ κατὰ τοῦ τινὸς ἵππου

eng

species to which he belonged, than we should of an individual horse by adopting the same method

grc

τὸν ἵππον. ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τῶν πρώτων οὐσιῶν οὐδὲν μᾶλλον

eng

of definition. In the same way, of primary substances, no one is more

grc

ἕτερον ἑτέρου οὐσία ἐστίν· οὐδὲν γὰρ μᾶλλον ὁ τὶς ἄνθρω

eng

truly substance than another; an individual man is not more truly substance

grc

πος οὐσία ἢ ὁ τὶς βοῦς.

eng

than an individual ox.

grc

Εἰκότως δὲ μετὰ τὰς πρώτας οὐσίας μόνα τῶν ἄλλων

eng

It is, then, with good reason that of all that remains, when we exclude primary

grc

τὰ εἴδη καὶ τὰ γένη δεύτεραι οὐσίαι λέγονται· μόνα γὰρ

eng

substances, we concede to species and genera alone the name 'secondary substance', for these alone

grc

δηλοῖ τὴν πρώτην οὐσίαν τῶν κατηγορουμένων· τὸν γὰρ

eng

of all the predicates convey a knowledge of primary substance. For it

grc

τινὰ ἄνθρωπον ἐὰν ἀποδιδῷ τις τί ἐστιν, τὸ μὲν εἶδος ἢ τὸ

eng

is by stating the species or the genus that we appropriately define any individual

grc

γένος ἀποδιδοὺς οἰκείως ἀποδώσει, —καὶ γνωριμώτερον ποιήσει

eng

man; and we shall make our definition more exact by stating the former than

grc

ἄνθρωπον ἢ ζῷον ἀποδιδούς·— τῶν δ’ ἄλλων ὅ τι ἂν

eng

by stating the latter. All other things that we

grc

ἀποδιδῷ τις, ἀλλοτρίως ἔσται ἀποδεδωκώς, οἷον λευκὸν ἢ

eng

state, such as that he is white, that he runs, and

grc

τρέχει ἢ ὁτιοῦν τῶν τοιούτων ἀποδιδούς· ὥστε εἰκότως ταῦτα

eng

so on, are irrelevant to the definition. Thus it is just that these

grc

μόνα τῶν ἄλλων οὐσίαι λέγονται. ἔτι αἱ πρῶται οὐσίαι

eng

alone, apart from primary substances, should be called substances. Further, primary substances are most

grc

διὰ τὸ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν ὑποκεῖσθαι κυριώτατα οὐσίαι

eng

properly so called, because they underlie and are the subjects of everything

grc

λέγονται· ὡς δέ γε αἱ πρῶται οὐσίαι πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα πάντα

eng

else. Now the same relation that subsists between primary substance and everything else subsists also between the

grc

ἔχουσιν, οὕτω τὰ εἴδη καὶ τὰ γένη τῶν πρώτων οὐσιῶν πρὸς

eng

species and the genus to which the primary substance belongs, on the one hand, and every attribute which is not

grc

τὰ λοιπὰ πάντα ἔχει· κατὰ τούτων γὰρ πάντα τὰ λοιπὰ

eng

included within these, on the other. For these are the subjects of all

grc

κατηγορεῖται· τὸν γὰρ τινὰ ἄνθρωπον ἐρεῖς γραμματικόν,

eng

such. If we call an individual man 'skilled in grammar', the predicate is

grc

οὐκοῦν καὶ ἄνθρωπον καὶ ζῷον γραμματικὸν ἐρεῖς· ὡσαύ

eng

applicable also to the species and to the genus to which he belongs. This law

grc

τως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων.

eng

holds good in all cases.

grc

Κοινὸν δὲ κατὰ πάσης οὐσίας τὸ μὴ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ

eng

It is a common characteristic of all substance that it is never present in a

grc

εἶναι. ἡ μὲν γὰρ πρώτη οὐσία οὔτε καθ’ ὑποκειμένου λέγε

eng

subject. For primary substance is neither present in a subject nor

grc

ται οὔτε ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἐστίν. τῶν δὲ δευτέρων οὐσιῶν

eng

predicated of a subject; while, with regard to secondary substances, it is

grc

φανερὸν μὲν καὶ οὕτως ὅτι οὐκ εἰσὶν ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ· ὁ γὰρ

eng

clear from the following arguments (apart from others) that they are not present in a subject. For 'man'

grc

ἄνθρωπος καθ’ ὑποκειμένου μὲν τοῦ τινὸς ἀνθρώπου λέγεται,

eng

is predicated of the individual man, but is not present

grc

ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν, —οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ τινὶ ἀνθρώπῳ ὁ

eng

in any subject: for manhood is not present in the individual

grc

ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν·— ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τὸ ζῷον καθ’ ὑποκειμένου

eng

man. In the same way, 'animal' is also

grc

μὲν λέγεται τοῦ τινὸς ἀνθρώπου, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ τὸ ζῷον ἐν

eng

predicated of the individual man, but is not present in

grc

τῷ τινὶ ἀνθρώπῳ. ἔτι δὲ τῶν ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ὄντων τὸ μὲν

eng

him. Again, when a thing is present in a subject, though

grc

ὄνομα οὐδὲν κωλύει κατηγορεῖσθαί ποτε τοῦ ὑποκειμένου,

eng

the name may quite well be applied to that in which it is present, the

grc

τὸν δὲ λόγον ἀδύνατον· τῶν δὲ δευτέρων οὐσιῶν κατηγορεῖ

eng

definition cannot be applied. Yet of secondary substances, not only the name,

grc

ται καὶ ὁ λόγος κατὰ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου καὶ τοὔνομα, —τὸν

eng

but also the definition, applies to the subject: we should use both

grc

γὰρ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου λόγον κατὰ τοῦ τινὸς ἀνθρώπου κατη

eng

the definition of the species and that of the genus with reference

grc

γορήσεις καὶ τὸν τοῦ ζῴου.— ὥστε οὐκ ἂν εἴη οὐσία

eng

to the individual man. Thus substance cannot be present in

grc

τῶν ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ. —οὐκ ἴδιον δὲ οὐσίας τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ

eng

a subject. Yet this is not peculiar to substance, for it is

grc

καὶ ἡ διαφορὰ τῶν μὴ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἐστίν· τὸ γὰρ

eng

also the case that differentiae cannot be present in subjects. The characteristics

grc

πεζὸν καὶ τὸ δίπουν καθ’ ὑποκειμένου μὲν λέγεται τοῦ ἀν

eng

terrestrial' and 'two-footed' are predicated of the species

grc

θρώπου, ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν, —οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ

eng

man', but not present in it. For they are

grc

ἐστὶ τὸ δίπουν οὐδὲ τὸ πεζόν.— καὶ ὁ λόγος δὲ κατηγορεῖται ὁ

eng

not in man. Moreover, the definition of the differentia may be predicated

grc

τῆς διαφορᾶς καθ’ οὗ ἂν λέγηται ἡ διαφορά· οἷον εἰ τὸ

eng

of that of which the differentia itself is predicated. For instance, if the

grc

πεζὸν κατὰ ἀνθρώπου λέγεται, καὶ ὁ λόγος τοῦ πεζοῦ

eng

characteristic 'terrestrial' is predicated of the species 'man', the definition also of that characteristic

grc

κατηγορηθήσεται τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, —πεζὸν γάρ ἐστιν ὁ ἄνθρωπος.

eng

may be used to form the predicate of the species 'man': for 'man' is terrestrial.

grc

μὴ ταραττέτω δὲ ἡμᾶς τὰ μέρη τῶν οὐσιῶν ὡς ἐν ὑπο

eng

The fact that the parts of substances appear to be present in the whole,

grc

κειμένοις ὄντα τοῖς ὅλοις, μή ποτε ἀναγκασθῶμεν οὐκ οὐ

eng

as in a subject, should not make us apprehensive lest we should have to admit that

grc

σίας αὐτὰ φάσκειν εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ οὕτω τὰ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ

eng

such parts are not substances: for in explaining the phrase 'being present in a subject',

grc

ἐλέγετο τὰ ὡς μέρη ὑπάρχοντα ἔν τινι.

eng

we stated' that we meant 'otherwise than as parts in a whole'.

grc

Ὑπάρχει δὲ ταῖς οὐσίαις καὶ ταῖς διαφοραῖς τὸ πάντα

eng

It is the mark of substances and of differentiae that, in all propositions of which they

grc

συνωνύμως ἀπ’ αὐτῶν λέγεσθαι· πᾶσαι γὰρ αἱ ἀπὸ τούτων

eng

form the predicate, they are predicated univocally. For all such propositions have

grc

κατηγορίαι ἤτοι κατὰ τῶν ἀτόμων κατηγοροῦνται ἢ κατὰ

eng

for their subject either the individual or the species.

grc

τῶν εἰδῶν. ἀπὸ μὲν γὰρ τῆς πρώτης οὐσίας οὐδεμία ἐστὶ

eng

It is true that, inasmuch as primary substance is not predicable

grc

κατηγορία, —κατ’ οὐδενὸς γὰρ ὑποκειμένου λέγεται·— τῶν δὲ

eng

of anything, it can never form the predicate of any proposition. But of

grc

δευτέρων οὐσιῶν τὸ μὲν εἶδος κατὰ τοῦ ἀτόμου κατηγο

eng

secondary substances, the species is predicated of the individual,

grc

ρεῖται, τὸ δὲ γένος καὶ κατὰ τοῦ εἴδους καὶ κατὰ τοῦ ἀτόμου·

eng

the genus both of the species and of the individual.

grc

ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ αἱ διαφοραὶ καὶ κατὰ τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ κατὰ

eng

Similarly the differentiae are predicated of the species and

grc

τῶν ἀτόμων κατηγοροῦνται. καὶ τὸν λόγον δὲ ἐπιδέχονται

eng

of the individuals. Moreover, the definition of the species and

grc

αἱ πρῶται οὐσίαι τὸν τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ τὸν τῶν γενῶν, καὶ τὸ

eng

that of the genus are applicable to the primary substance, and that of the

grc

εἶδος δὲ τὸν τοῦ γένους. —ὅσα γὰρ κατὰ τοῦ κατηγορουμένου

eng

genus to the species. For all that is predicated of the

grc

λέγεται, καὶ κατὰ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου ῥηθήσεται·— ὡσαύτως

eng

predicate will be predicated also of the subject. Similarly, the definition

grc

δὲ καὶ τὸν τῶν διαφορῶν λόγον ἐπιδέχεται τά τε εἴδη

eng

of the differentiae will be applicable to the species and to

grc

καὶ τὰ ἄτομα· συνώνυμα δέ γε ἦν ὧν καὶ τοὔνομα κοινὸν

eng

the individuals. But it was stated above that the word 'univocal' was applied to those things which had

grc

καὶ ὁ λόγος ὁ αὐτός. ὥστε πάντα τὰ ἀπὸ τῶν οὐσιῶν καὶ

eng

both name and definition in common. It is, therefore, established that in every proposition, of which either substance

grc

τῶν διαφορῶν συνωνύμως λέγεται.

eng

or a differentia forms the predicate, these are predicated univocally.

grc

Πᾶσα δὲ οὐσία δοκεῖ τόδε τι σημαίνειν. ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν

eng

All substance appears to signify that which is individual. In the

grc

τῶν πρώτων οὐσιῶν ἀναμφισβήτητον καὶ ἀληθές ἐστιν ὅτι

eng

case of primary substance this is indisputably

grc

τόδε τι σημαίνει· ἄτομον γὰρ καὶ ἓν ἀριθμῷ τὸ δηλούμε

eng

true, for the thing is a unit.

grc

νόν ἐστιν. ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν δευτέρων οὐσιῶν φαίνεται μὲν ὁμοίως

eng

In the case of secondary substances, when we speak, for instance, of 'man'

grc

τῷ σχήματι τῆς προσηγορίας τόδε τι σημαίνειν, ὅταν εἴπῃ

eng

or 'animal', our form of speech gives the impression that we are here also indicating that

grc

ἄνθρωπον ἢ ζῷον· οὐ μὴν ἀληθές γε, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ποιόν

eng

which is individual, but the impression is not strictly true; for a secondary substance is

grc

τι σημαίνει, —οὐ γὰρ ἕν ἐστι τὸ ὑποκείμενον ὥσπερ ἡ πρώτη

eng

not an individual, but a class with a certain qualification; for it is not one and single as

grc

οὐσία, ἀλλὰ κατὰ πολλῶν ὁ ἄνθρωπος λέγεται καὶ τὸ

eng

a primary substance is; the words 'man', 'animal', are predicable of more than one subject.

grc

ζῷον·— οὐχ ἁπλῶς δὲ ποιόν τι σημαίνει, ὥσπερ τὸ λευκόν·

eng

Yet species and genus do not merely indicate quality, like the term 'white';

grc

οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο σημαίνει τὸ λευκὸν ἀλλ’ ἢ ποιόν, τὸ δὲ

eng

white' indicates quality and nothing further, but species and genus

grc

εἶδος καὶ τὸ γένος περὶ οὐσίαν τὸ ποιὸν ἀφορίζει, —ποιὰν

eng

determine the quality with reference to a substance: they signify

grc

γάρ τινα οὐσίαν σημαίνει.— ἐπὶ πλεῖον δὲ τῷ γένει ἢ τῷ εἴ

eng

substance qualitatively differentiated. The determinate qualification covers a larger field in the case of

grc

δει τὸν ἀφορισμὸν ποιεῖται· ὁ γὰρ ζῷον εἰπὼν ἐπὶ πλεῖον περι

eng

the genus that in that of the species: he who uses the word 'animal' is herein using a word of

grc

λαμβάνει ἢ ὁ τὸν ἄνθρωπον.

eng

wider extension than he who uses the word 'man'.

grc

Ὑπάρχει δὲ ταῖς οὐσίαις καὶ τὸ μηδὲν αὐταῖς ἐναντίον

eng

Another mark of substance is that it has no contrary.

grc

εἶναι. τῇ γὰρ πρώτῃ οὐσίᾳ τί ἂν εἴη ἐναντίον; οἷον τῷ

eng

What could be the contrary of any primary substance, such as the individual man or animal? It has

grc

τινὶ ἀνθρώπῳ οὐδέν ἐστιν ἐναντίον, οὐδέ γε τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἢ τῷ

eng

none. Nor can the species or the genus have

grc

ζῴῳ οὐδέν ἐστιν ἐναντίον. οὐκ ἴδιον δὲ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ καὶ

eng

a contrary. Yet this characteristic is not peculiar to substance, but is

grc

ἐπ’ ἄλλων πολλῶν οἷον ἐπὶ τοῦ ποσοῦ· τῷ γὰρ διπήχει οὐδέν ἐστιν

eng

true of many other things, such as quantity. There is nothing that forms the contrary of

grc

ἐναντίον, οὐδὲ τοῖς δέκα, οὐδὲ τῶν τοιούτων οὐδενί, εἰ μή τις

eng

two cubits long' or of 'three cubits long', or of 'ten', or of any such term. A

grc

τὸ πολὺ τῷ ὀλίγῳ φαίη ἐναντίον εἶναι ἢ τὸ μέγα τῷ μικρῷ· τῶν

eng

man may contend that 'much' is the contrary of 'little', or 'great' of 'small', but

grc

δὲ ἀφωρισμένων ποσῶν οὐδὲν οὐδενὶ ἐναντίον ἐστίν.

eng

of definite quantitative terms no contrary exists.

grc

Δοκεῖ δὲ ἡ οὐσία οὐκ ἐπιδέχεσθαι τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ

eng

Substance, again, does not appear to admit of variation of degree.

grc

ἧττον· λέγω δὲ οὐχ ὅτι οὐσία οὐσίας οὐκ ἔστι μᾶλλον οὐσία,

eng

I do not mean by this that one substance cannot be more or less

grc

τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ εἴρηται ὅτι ἔστιν,— ἀλλ’ ὅτι ἑκάστη

eng

truly substance than another, for it has already been stated' that this is the

grc

οὐσία τοῦθ’ ὅπερ ἐστὶν οὐ λέγεται μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον·

eng

case; but that no single substance admits of varying degrees within itself.

grc

οἷον εἰ ἔστιν αὕτη ἡ οὐσία ἄνθρωπος, οὐκ ἔσται μᾶλλον

eng

For instance, one particular substance, 'man', cannot be more or less man either

grc

καὶ ἧττον ἄνθρωπος, οὔτε αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ οὔτε ἕτερος ἑτέ

eng

than himself at some other time or than some other man.

grc

ρου. οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἕτερος ἑτέρου μᾶλλον ἄνθρωπος, ὥσπερ

eng

One man cannot be more man than another, as that which is white may be more or

grc

τὸ λευκόν ἐστιν ἕτερον ἑτέρου μᾶλλον λευκόν, καὶ κα

eng

less white than some other white object, or as that which is beautiful may be more or

grc

λὸν ἕτερον ἑτέρου μᾶλλον· καὶ αὐτὸ δὲ αὑτοῦ μᾶλλον

eng

less beautiful than some other beautiful object. The same quality, moreover, is said to subsist in

grc

καὶ ἧττον λέγεται, οἷον τὸ σῶμα λευκὸν ὂν μᾶλλον

eng

a thing in varying degrees at different times. A body, being white, is said to be

grc

λευκὸν λέγεται νῦν ἢ πρότερον, καὶ θερμὸν ὂν μᾶλ

eng

whiter at one time than it was before, or, being warm, is said to be warmer

grc

λον θερμὸν καὶ ἧττον λέγεται· ἡ δέ γε οὐσία οὐδὲν

eng

or less warm than at some other time. But substance is not said to be

grc

λέγεται, —οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος μᾶλλον νῦν ἄνθρωπος ἢ

eng

more or less that which it is: a man is not more truly a man at one

grc

πρότερον λέγεται, οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδέν, ὅσα ἐστὶν

eng

time than he was before, nor is anything, if it is substance, more or less what it

grc

οὐσία·— ὥστε οὐκ ἂν ἐπιδέχοιτο ἡ οὐσία τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ

eng

is. Substance, then, does not admit of variation of degree.

grc

ἧττον.

grc

Μάλιστα δὲ ἴδιον τῆς οὐσίας δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ ταὐτὸν καὶ

eng

The most distinctive mark of substance appears to be that, while remaining numerically one and

grc

ἓν ἀριθμῷ ὂν τῶν ἐναντίων εἶναι δεκτικόν· οἷον ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν

eng

the same, it is capable of admitting contrary qualities. From among things

grc

ἄλλων οὐδενὸς ἂν ἔχοι τις προενεγκεῖν [ὅσα μή ἐστιν

eng

other than substance, we should find ourselves unable to

grc

οὐσία], ὃ ἓν ἀριθμῷ ὂν τῶν ἐναντίων δεκτικόν ἐστιν·

eng

bring forward any which possessed this mark.

grc

οἷον τὸ χρῶμα, ὅ ἐστιν ἓν καὶ ταὐτὸν ἀριθμῷ, οὐκ ἔσται

eng

Thus, one and the same colour cannot be white and

grc

λευκὸν καὶ μέλαν, οὐδὲ ἡ αὐτὴ πρᾶξις καὶ μία τῷ ἀριθμῷ

eng

black. Nor can the same one action be good

grc

οὐκ ἔσται φαύλη καὶ σπουδαία, ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν

eng

and bad: this law holds good with everything that

grc

ἄλλων, ὅσα μή ἐστιν οὐσία. ἡ δέ γε οὐσία ἓν καὶ

eng

is not substance. But one and the selfsame substance,

grc

ταὐτὸν ἀριθμῷ ὂν δεκτικὸν τῶν ἐναντίων ἐστίν· οἷον ὁ τὶς

eng

while retaining its identity, is yet capable of admitting contrary qualities. The same individual

grc

ἄνθρωπος, εἷς καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς ὤν, ὁτὲ μὲν λευκὸς ὁτὲ δὲ μέ

eng

person is at one time white, at another black, at one

grc

λας γίγνεται, καὶ θερμὸς καὶ ψυχρός, καὶ φαῦλος καὶ

eng

time warm, at another cold, at one time good, at another

grc

σπουδαῖος. ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδενὸς φαίνεται τὸ τοιοῦ

eng

bad. This capacity is found nowhere else, though it might

grc

τον, εἰ μή τις ἐνίσταιτο τὸν λόγον καὶ τὴν δόξαν φά

eng

be maintained that a statement or opinion was an exception

grc

σκων τῶν τοιούτων εἶναι· ὁ γὰρ αὐτὸς λόγος ἀληθής τε

eng

to the rule. The same statement, it is agreed, can be

grc

καὶ ψευδὴς εἶναι δοκεῖ, οἷον εἰ ἀληθὴς εἴη ὁ λόγος τὸ κα

eng

both true and false. For if the statement 'he is sitting' is true, yet,

grc

θῆσθαί τινα, ἀναστάντος αὐτοῦ ὁ αὐτὸς οὗτος ψευ

eng

when the person in question has risen, the same statement will be

grc

δὴς ἔσται· ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς δόξης· εἰ γάρ τις ἀληθῶς

eng

false. The same applies to opinions. For if any one thinks

grc

δοξάζοι τὸ καθῆσθαί τινα, ἀναστάντος αὐτοῦ ψευδῶς δοξάσει

eng

truly that a person is sitting, yet, when that person has risen, this same

grc

τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχων περὶ αὐτοῦ δόξαν. εἰ δέ τις καὶ τοῦτο πα

eng

opinion, if still held, will be false. Yet although this exception may be allowed, there is,

grc

ραδέχοιτο, ἀλλὰ τῷ γε τρόπῳ διαφέρει· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ

eng

nevertheless, a difference in the manner in which the thing takes place. It is by themselves

grc

τῶν οὐσιῶν αὐτὰ μεταβάλλοντα δεκτικὰ τῶν ἐναντίων ἐστίν, —

eng

changing that substances admit contrary qualities. It is thus that that which was hot becomes

grc

ψυχρὸν γὰρ ἐκ θερμοῦ γενόμενον μετέβαλεν (ἠλλοίωται

eng

cold, for it has entered into a different state. Similarly that which was white

grc

γάρ), καὶ μέλαν ἐκ λευκοῦ καὶ σπουδαῖον ἐκ φαύλου, ὡσ

eng

becomes black, and that which was bad good, by a process of change;

grc

αύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον αὐτὸ μεταβολὴν

eng

and in the same way in all other cases it is by changing

grc

δεχόμενον τῶν ἐναντίων δεκτικόν ἐστιν·— ὁ δὲ λόγος καὶ ἡ

eng

that substances are capable of admitting contrary qualities. But statements and opinions themselves

grc

δόξα αὐτὰ μὲν ἀκίνητα πάντῃ πάντως διαμένει, τοῦ δὲ

eng

remain unaltered in all respects: it is by the alteration in the facts

grc

πράγματος κινουμένου τὸ ἐναντίον περὶ αὐτὰ γίγνεται· ὁ μὲν

eng

of the case that the contrary quality comes to be theirs. The statement

grc

γὰρ λόγος διαμένει ὁ αὐτὸς τὸ καθῆσθαί τινα, τοῦ δὲ πρά

eng

he is sitting' remains unaltered, but it is at

grc

γματος κινηθέντος ὁτὲ μὲν ἀληθὴς ὁτὲ δὲ ψευδὴς γίγνεται·

eng

one time true, at another false, according to circumstances.

grc

ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς δόξης. ὥστε τῷ τρόπῳ γε ἴδιον

eng

What has been said of statements applies also to opinions. Thus, in respect of the manner in which

grc

ἂν εἴη τῆς οὐσίας τὸ κατὰ τὴν αὑτῆς μεταβολὴν δεκτικὴν

eng

the thing takes place, it is the peculiar mark of substance that it should be capable of admitting

grc

τῶν ἐναντίων εἶναι, —εἰ δή τις καὶ ταῦτα παραδέχοιτο, τὴν

eng

contrary qualities; for it is by itself changing that it does so. If, then, a man should make

grc

δόξαν καὶ τὸν λόγον δεκτικὰ τῶν ἐναντίων εἶναι. οὐκ ἔστι

eng

this exception and contend that statements and opinions are capable of admitting contrary qualities, his contention

grc

δὲ ἀληθὲς τοῦτο· ὁ γὰρ λόγος καὶ ἡ δόξα οὐ τῷ αὐτὰ δέχε

eng

is unsound. For statements and opinions are said to have this

grc

σθαί τι τῶν ἐναντίων εἶναι δεκτικὰ λέγεται, ἀλλὰ τῷ περὶ

eng

capacity, not because they themselves undergo modification, but because this modification occurs in

grc

ἕτερόν τι τὸ πάθος γεγενῆσθαι· —τῷ γὰρ τὸ πρᾶγμα εἶναι

eng

the case of something else. The truth or falsity of a

grc

ἢ μὴ εἶναι, τούτῳ καὶ ὁ λόγος ἀληθὴς ἢ ψευδὴς εἶναι λέ

eng

statement depends on facts, and not on any power on the

grc

γεται, οὐ τῷ αὐτὸν δεκτικὸν εἶναι τῶν ἐναντίων· ἁπλῶς γὰρ

eng

part of the statement itself of admitting contrary qualities. In short, there

grc

οὐδὲν ὑπ’ οὐδενὸς οὔτε ὁ λόγος κινεῖται οὔτε ἡ δόξα, ὥστε

eng

is nothing which can alter the nature of statements and opinions. As, then, no change

grc

οὐκ ἂν εἴη δεκτικὰ τῶν ἐναντίων μηδενὸς ἐν αὐτοῖς γιγνο

eng

takes place in themselves, these cannot be said to be capable of admitting contrary qualities.

grc

μένου·— ἡ δέ γε οὐσία τῷ αὐτὴν τὰ ἐναντία δέχεσθαι, τούτῳ

eng

But it is by reason of the modification which takes place within the substance itself that a substance

grc

δεκτικὴ τῶν ἐναντίων λέγεται· νόσον γὰρ καὶ ὑγίειαν

eng

is said to be capable of admitting contrary qualities; for a substance admits within

grc

δέχεται, καὶ λευκότητα καὶ μελανίαν, καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν

eng

itself either disease or health, whiteness or blackness. It is in this

grc

τοιούτων αὐτὴ δεχομένη τῶν ἐναντίων εἶναι δεκτικὴ λέγεται.

eng

sense that it is said to be capable of admitting contrary qualities.

grc

ὥστε ἴδιον ἂν οὐσίας εἴη τὸ ταὐτὸν καὶ ἓν ἀριθμῷ ὂν δεκτι

eng

To sum up, it is a distinctive mark of substance, that, while remaining numerically one and the same, it is capable of admitting contrary qualities, the modification

grc

κὸν εἶναι τῶν ἐναντίων. περὶ μὲν οὖν οὐσίας τοσαῦτα εἰ

eng

taking place through a change in the substance itself. Let these remarks suffice on the subject of

grc

ρήσθω.

eng

substance.

grc

Τοῦ δὲ ποσοῦ τὸ μέν ἐστι διωρισμένον, τὸ δὲ συνεχές·

eng

Quantity is either discrete or continuous.

grc

καὶ τὸ μὲν ἐκ θέσιν ἐχόντων πρὸς ἄλληλα τῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς

eng

Moreover, some quantities are such that each part of the whole has a relative position to the

grc

μορίων συνέστηκε, τὸ δὲ οὐκ ἐξ ἐχόντων θέσιν. ἔστι δὲ διω

eng

other parts: others have within them no such relation of part to part. Instances of

grc

ρισμένον μὲν οἷον ἀριθμὸς καὶ λόγος, συνεχὲς δὲ γραμμή,

eng

discrete quantities are number and speech; of continuous, lines, surfaces,

grc

ἐπιφάνεια, σῶμα, ἔτι δὲ παρὰ ταῦτα χρόνος καὶ τό

eng

solids, and, besides these, time and place.

grc

πος. —τῶν μὲν γὰρ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ μορίων οὐδείς ἐστι κοινὸς

eng

In the case of the parts of a number, there is

grc

ὅρος, πρὸς ὃν συνάπτει τὰ μόρια αὐτοῦ· οἷον τὰ πέντε εἰ

eng

no common boundary at which they join. For example: two

grc

ἔστι τῶν δέκα μόριον, πρὸς οὐδένα κοινὸν ὅρον συνάπτει τὰ

eng

fives make ten, but the two fives have no common

grc

πέντε καὶ τὰ πέντε, ἀλλὰ διώρισται· καὶ τὰ τρία γε καὶ

eng

boundary, but are separate; the parts three and seven

grc

τὰ ἑπτὰ πρὸς οὐδένα κοινὸν ὅρον συνάπτει· οὐδ’ ὅλως ἂν

eng

also do not join at any boundary. Nor, to generalize, would it

grc

ἔχοις ἐπ’ ἀριθμοῦ λαβεῖν κοινὸν ὅρον τῶν μορίων, ἀλλ’

eng

ever be possible in the case of number that there should be a common boundary among the parts;

grc

ἀεὶ διώρισται· ὥστε ὁ μὲν ἀριθμὸς τῶν διωρισμένων ἐστίν.

eng

they are always separate. Number, therefore, is a discrete quantity.

grc

ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ὁ λόγος τῶν διωρισμένων ἐστίν· (ὅτι μὲν

eng

The same is true of speech. That speech

grc

γὰρ ποσόν ἐστιν ὁ λόγος φανερόν· καταμετρεῖται γὰρ συλλαβῇ

eng

is a quantity is evident: for it is measured in long

grc

μακρᾷ καὶ βραχείᾳ· λέγω δὲ αὐτὸν τὸν μετὰ φωνῆς λό

eng

and short syllables. I mean here that speech which

grc

γον γιγνόμενον)· πρὸς οὐδένα γὰρ κοινὸν ὅρον αὐτοῦ τὰ

eng

is vocal. Moreover, it is a discrete quantity for its parts have

grc

μόρια συνάπτει· οὐ γὰρ ἔστι κοινὸς ὅρος πρὸς ὃν αἱ συλλαβαὶ

eng

no common boundary. There is no common boundary at which the syllables join,

grc

συνάπτουσιν, ἀλλ’ ἑκάστη διώρισται αὐτὴ καθ’ αὑτήν.

eng

but each is separate and distinct from the rest.

grc

ἡ δὲ γραμμὴ συνεχές ἐστιν· ἔστι γὰρ λαβεῖν κοινὸν ὅρον

eng

A line, on the other hand, is a continuous quantity, for it is possible to find

grc

πρὸς ὃν τὰ μόρια αὐτῆς συνάπτει, στιγμήν· καὶ τῆς ἐπι

eng

a common boundary at which its parts join. In the case of the

grc

φανείας γραμμήν, —τὰ γὰρ τοῦ ἐπιπέδου μόρια πρός τινα

eng

line, this common boundary is the point; in the case of the plane, it is the line: for the parts of

grc

κοινὸν ὅρον συνάπτει.— ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ σώματος

eng

the plane have also a common boundary. Similarly you can find a common boundary

grc

ἔχοις ἂν λαβεῖν κοινὸν ὅρον, γραμμὴν ἢ ἐπιφάνειαν, πρὸς

eng

in the case of the parts of a solid, namely either

grc

ἣν τὰ τοῦ σώματος μόρια συνάπτει. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ὁ χρόνος

eng

a line or a plane. Space and time also belong

grc

καὶ ὁ τόπος τῶν τοιούτων· ὁ γὰρ νῦν χρόνος συνάπτει πρός

eng

to this class of quantities. Time, past, present, and future,

grc

τε τὸν παρεληλυθότα καὶ τὸν μέλλοντα. πάλιν ὁ τόπος τῶν

eng

forms a continuous whole. Space, likewise, is a

grc

συνεχῶν ἐστιν· τόπον γάρ τινα τὰ τοῦ σώματος μόρια κατ

eng

continuous quantity; for the parts of a solid occupy a certain

grc

έχει, ἃ πρός τινα κοινὸν ὅρον συνάπτει· οὐκοῦν καὶ τὰ τοῦ

eng

space, and these have a common boundary; it follows that the

grc

τόπου μόρια, ἃ κατέχει ἕκαστον τῶν τοῦ σώματος μορίων,

eng

parts of space also, which are occupied by the parts of the

grc

πρὸς τὸν αὐτὸν ὅρον συνάπτει πρὸς ὃν καὶ τὰ τοῦ σώμα

eng

solid, have the same common boundary as the parts of the

grc

τος μόρια· ὥστε συνεχὲς ἂν εἴη καὶ ὁ τόπος· πρὸς γὰρ

eng

solid. Thus, not only time, but space also, is a continuous quantity, for its

grc

ἕνα κοινὸν ὅρον αὐτοῦ τὰ μόρια συνάπτει.

eng

parts have a common boundary.

grc

Ἔτι τὰ μὲν ἐκ θέσιν ἐχόντων πρὸς ἄλληλα τῶν ἐν

eng

Quantities consist either of parts which bear a relative position

grc

αὐτοῖς μορίων συνέστηκεν, τὰ δὲ οὐκ ἐξ ἐχόντων θέσιν·

eng

each to each, or of parts which do not.

grc

οἷον τὰ μὲν τῆς γραμμῆς μόρια θέσιν ἔχει πρὸς ἄλληλα, —

eng

The parts of a line bear a relative position to each other, for each

grc

ἕκαστον γὰρ αὐτῶν κεῖταί που, καὶ ἔχοις ἂν διαλαβεῖν καὶ

eng

lies somewhere, and it would be possible to distinguish each, and to state the position

grc

ἀποδοῦναι οὗ ἕκαστον κεῖται ἐν τῷ ἐπιπέδῳ καὶ πρὸς

eng

of each on the plane and to explain to what sort of

grc

ποῖον μόριον τῶν λοιπῶν συνάπτει·— ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τὰ

eng

part among the rest each was contiguous. Similarly the parts of a

grc

τοῦ ἐπιπέδου μόρια θέσιν ἔχει τινά, —ὁμοίως γὰρ ἂν ἀπο

eng

plane have position, for it could similarly be stated what was

grc

δοθείη ἕκαστον οὗ κεῖται, καὶ ποῖα συνάπτει πρὸς ἄλληλα.—

eng

the position of each and what sort of parts were contiguous. The

grc

καὶ τὰ τοῦ στερεοῦ δὲ ὡσαύτως καὶ τὰ τοῦ τόπου. ἐπὶ δέ

eng

same is true with regard to the solid and to space. But it

grc

γε τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ οὐκ ἂν ἔχοι τις ἐπιβλέψαι ὡς τὰ μόρια

eng

would be impossible to show that the parts of a number had

grc

θέσιν τινὰ ἔχει πρὸς ἄλληλα ἢ κεῖταί που, ἢ ποῖά γε

eng

a relative position each to each, or a particular position, or

grc

πρὸς ἄλληλα συνάπτει τῶν μορίων· οὐδὲ τὰ τοῦ χρόνου·

eng

to state what parts were contiguous. Nor could this be done in the case of time,

grc

ὑπομένει γὰρ οὐδὲν τῶν τοῦ χρόνου μορίων, ὃ δὲ μή ἐστιν

eng

for none of the parts of time has an abiding existence, and that

grc

ὑπομένον, πῶς ἂν τοῦτο θέσιν τινὰ ἔχοι; ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον

eng

which does not abide can hardly have position. It would be

grc

τάξιν τινὰ εἴποις ἂν ἔχειν τῷ τὸ μὲν πρότερον εἶναι τοῦ

eng

better to say that such parts had a relative order, in virtue of one

grc

χρόνου τὸ δ’ ὕστερον. καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ δὲ ὡσαύτως, τῷ

eng

being prior to another. Similarly with number: in counting, 'one'

grc

πρότερον ἀριθμεῖσθαι τὸ ἓν τῶν δύο καὶ τὰ δύο τῶν τριῶν·

eng

is prior to 'two', and 'two' to 'three',

grc

καὶ οὕτω τάξιν ἄν τινα ἔχοι, θέσιν δὲ οὐ πάνυ λάβοις

eng

and thus the parts of number may be said to possess a relative order, though it would be impossible to discover any distinct position for each.

grc

ἄν. καὶ ὁ λόγος δὲ ὡσαύτως· οὐδὲν γὰρ ὑπομένει τῶν

eng

This holds good also in the case of speech. None of its parts has an

grc

μορίων αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ’ εἴρηταί τε καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἔτι τοῦτο

eng

abiding existence: when once a syllable is pronounced, it is not possible to

grc

λαβεῖν, ὥστε οὐκ ἂν εἴη θέσις τῶν μορίων αὐτοῦ, εἴγε μηδὲν

eng

retain it, so that, naturally, as the parts do not abide, they cannot have

grc

ὑπομένει. —τὰ μὲν οὖν ἐκ θέσιν ἐχόντων τῶν μορίων συν

eng

position. Thus, some quantities consist of parts which have position, and

grc

έστηκε, τὰ δὲ οὐκ ἐξ ἐχόντων θέσιν.

eng

some of those which have not.

grc

Κυρίως δὲ ποσὰ ταῦτα μόνα λέγεται τὰ εἰρημένα,

eng

Strictly speaking, only the things which I have mentioned belong to the category of quantity: everything else

grc

τὰ δὲ ἄλλα πάντα κατὰ συμβεβηκός· εἰς ταῦτα γὰρ

eng

that is called quantitative is a quantity in a secondary sense. It is because we have

grc

βλέποντες καὶ τἆλλα ποσὰ λέγομεν, οἷον πολὺ τὸ λευκὸν

eng

in mind some one of these quantities, properly so called, that we apply quantitative terms to other things.

grc

λέγεται τῷ τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν πολλὴν εἶναι, καὶ ἡ πρᾶξις μακρὰ

eng

We speak of what is white as large, because the surface over which the white extends is large; we

grc

τῷ γε τὸν χρόνον πολὺν εἶναι, καὶ ἡ κίνησις πολλή· οὐ γὰρ

eng

speak of an action or a process as lengthy, because the time covered is long; these things

grc

καθ’ αὑτὸ ἕκαστον τούτων ποσὸν λέγεται· οἷον ἐὰν ἀποδιδῷ

eng

cannot in their own right claim the quantitative epithet. For instance, should any one explain

grc

τις πόση τις ἡ πρᾶξίς ἐστι, τῷ χρόνῳ ὁριεῖ ἐνιαυσίαν ἢ

eng

how long an action was, his statement would be made in terms of the time taken,

grc

οὕτω πως ἀποδιδούς, καὶ τὸ λευκὸν ποσόν τι ἀποδιδοὺς τῇ

eng

to the effect that it lasted a year, or something of that sort. In the same way,

grc

ἐπιφανείᾳ ὁριεῖ, —ὅση γὰρ ἂν ἡ ἐπιφάνεια ᾖ, τοσοῦτον καὶ

eng

he would explain the size of a white object in terms of surface, for he would state

grc

τὸ λευκὸν φήσει εἶναι·— ὥστε μόνα κυρίως καὶ καθ’ αὑτὰ

eng

the area which it covered. Thus the things already mentioned, and these alone, are in

grc

ποσὰ λέγεται τὰ εἰρημένα, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων οὐδὲν αὐτὸ καθ’ αὑτό,

eng

their intrinsic nature quantities; nothing else can claim the name in its own right, but, if

grc

ἀλλ’ εἰ ἄρα κατὰ συμβεβηκός.

eng

at all, only in a secondary sense.

grc

Ἔτι τῷ ποσῷ οὐδέν ἐστιν ἐναντίον, (ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τῶν

eng

Quantities have no contraries. In the case of definite quantities this is

grc

ἀφωρισμένων φανερὸν ὅτι οὐδέν ἐστιν ἐναντίον, οἷον τῷ

eng

obvious; thus, there is nothing that is the contrary of 'two cubits

grc

διπήχει ἢ τριπήχει ἢ τῇ ἐπιφανείᾳ ἢ τῶν τοιούτων τινί,

eng

long' or of 'three cubits long', or of a surface, or of

grc

οὐδὲν γάρ ἐστιν ἐναντίον), εἰ μὴ τὸ πολὺ τῷ ὀλίγῳ

eng

any such quantities. A man might, indeed, argue that 'much' was

grc

φαίη τις εἶναι ἐναντίον ἢ τὸ μέγα τῷ μικρῷ. τούτων δὲ

eng

the contrary of 'little', and 'great' of 'small'. But these

grc

οὐδέν ἐστι ποσὸν ἀλλὰ τῶν πρός τι· οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐτὸ καθ’

eng

are not quantitative, but relative; things are not great or small

grc

αὑτὸ μέγα λέγεται ἢ μικρόν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἕτερον ἀναφέ

eng

absolutely, they are so called rather as the result of an act

grc

ρεται, οἷον ὄρος μὲν μικρὸν λέγεται, κέγχρος δὲ με

eng

of comparison. For instance, a mountain is called small, a grain large, in

grc

γάλη τῷ τὴν μὲν τῶν ὁμογενῶν μεῖζον εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ἔλατ

eng

virtue of the fact that the latter is greater than others of its kind,

grc

τον τῶν ὁμογενῶν· οὐκοῦν πρὸς ἕτερον ἡ ἀναφορά, ἐπεὶ εἴγε

eng

the former less. Thus there is a reference here to an external standard,

grc

καθ’ αὑτὸ μικρὸν ἢ μέγα ἐλέγετο, οὐκ ἄν ποτε τὸ μὲν

eng

for if the terms 'great' and 'small' were used absolutely, a mountain

grc

ὄρος μικρὸν ἐλέγετο, ἡ δὲ κέγχρος μεγάλη. πάλιν ἐν μὲν

eng

would never be called small or a grain large. Again, we say that there

grc

τῇ κώμῃ πολλούς φαμεν ἀνθρώπους εἶναι, ἐν Ἀθήναις δὲ

eng

are many people in a village, and few in Athens, although those in the city are many

grc

ὀλίγους πολλαπλασίους αὐτῶν ὄντας, καὶ ἐν μὲν τῇ οἰκίᾳ

eng

times as numerous as those in the village: or we say that a house has many in

grc

πολλούς, ἐν δὲ τῷ θεάτρῳ ὀλίγους πολλῷ πλείους ὄντας.—

eng

it, and a theatre few, though those in the theatre far outnumber those in the house. The

grc

ἔτι τὸ μὲν δίπηχυ καὶ τρίπηχυ καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν τοιούτων

eng

terms 'two cubits long, "three cubits long,' and so

grc

ποσὸν σημαίνει, τὸ δὲ μέγα ἢ μικρὸν οὐ σημαίνει ποσὸν

eng

on indicate quantity, the terms 'great' and 'small'

grc

ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον πρός τι· πρὸς γὰρ ἕτερον θεωρεῖται τὸ μέγα

eng

indicate relation, for they have reference to an external

grc

καὶ τὸ μικρόν· ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι ταῦτα τῶν πρός τί ἐστιν.—

eng

standard. It is, therefore, plain that these are to be classed as relative. Again,

grc

ἔτι ἐάν τε τιθῇ τις αὐτὰ ποσὰ εἶναι ἐάν τε μὴ τιθῇ, οὐκ

eng

whether we define them as quantitative or not, they

grc

ἔστιν αὐτοῖς ἐναντίον οὐδέν· ὃ γὰρ μὴ ἔστιν αὐτὸ καθ’ αὑτὸ

eng

have no contraries: for how can there be a contrary of an

grc

λαβεῖν ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἕτερον ἀναφέροντα, πῶς ἂν εἴη τού

eng

attribute which is not to be apprehended in or by itself, but only by reference

grc

τῳ τι ἐναντίον; —ἔτι εἰ ἔσται τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ μικρὸν

eng

to something external? Again, if 'great' and 'small' are contraries, it will come about

grc

ἐναντία, συμβήσεται τὸ αὐτὸ ἅμα τὰ ἐναντία ἐπιδέχεσθαι

eng

that the same subject can admit contrary qualities at one and the same time, and that

grc

καὶ αὐτὰ αὑτοῖς εἶναι ἐναντία. συμβαίνει γὰρ ἅμα τὸ

eng

things will themselves be contrary to themselves. For it happens at times that

grc

αὐτὸ μέγα τε καὶ μικρὸν εἶναι, —ἔστι γὰρ πρὸς μὲν τοῦτο

eng

the same thing is both small and great. For the same thing may be small in

grc

μικρόν, πρὸς ἕτερον δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο μέγα·— ὥστε τὸ αὐ

eng

comparison with one thing, and great in comparison with another, so that the

grc

τὸ καὶ μέγα καὶ μικρὸν κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον εἶναι συμβαί

eng

same thing comes to be both small and great at

grc

νει, ὥστε ἅμα τὰ ἐναντία ἐπιδέχεσθαι· ἀλλ’ οὐδὲν δοκεῖ

eng

one and the same time, and is of such a nature as

grc

ἅμα τὰ ἐναντία ἐπιδέχεσθαι· οἷον ἐπὶ τῆς οὐσίας, δεκτι

eng

to admit contrary qualities at one and the same moment. Yet it was agreed, when substance was being discussed, that

grc

κὴ μὲν τῶν ἐναντίων δοκεῖ εἶναι, ἀλλ’ οὔτι γε ἅμα νοσεῖ

eng

nothing admits contrary qualities at one and the same moment. For though substance is capable of admitting contrary qualities, yet no one

grc

καὶ ὑγιαίνει, οὐδὲ λευκὸν καὶ μέλαν ἐστὶν ἅμα, οὐδὲ

eng

is at the same time both sick and healthy, nothing is at the same time both white and black. Nor

grc

τῶν ἄλλων οὐδὲν ἅμα τὰ ἐναντία ἐπιδέχεται. καὶ

eng

is there anything which is qualified in contrary ways at one and the same time. Moreover, if

grc

αὐτὰ δ’ αὑτοῖς συμβαίνει ἐναντία εἶναι· εἰ γάρ ἐστι τὸ

eng

these were contraries, they would themselves be contrary to themselves. For if 'great' is the

grc

μέγα τῷ μικρῷ ἐναντίον, τὸ δ’ αὐτό ἐστιν ἅμα μέγα καὶ

eng

contrary of 'small', and the same thing is both great and small at the same time,

grc

μικρόν, αὐτὸ αὑτῷ ἂν εἴη ἐναντίον· ἀλλὰ τῶν ἀδυνάτων

eng

then 'small' or 'great' is the contrary of itself. But this

grc

ἐστὶν αὐτὸ αὑτῷ εἶναι ἐναντίον. —οὐκ ἔστιν ἄρα τὸ μέγα

eng

is impossible. The term 'great', therefore, is not

grc

τῷ μικρῷ ἐναντίον, οὐδὲ τὸ πολὺ τῷ ὀλίγῳ, ὥστε κἂν

eng

the contrary of the term 'small', nor 'much' of 'little'. And even though

grc

μὴ τῶν πρός τι ταῦτά τις ἐρεῖ ἀλλὰ τοῦ ποσοῦ, οὐδὲν

eng

a man should call these terms not relative but quantitative, they would not

grc

ἐναντίον ἕξει. —μάλιστα δὲ ἡ ἐναντιότης τοῦ ποσοῦ περὶ τὸν τό

eng

have contraries. It is in the case of space that quantity most plausibly appears to

grc

πον δοκεῖ ὑπάρχειν· τὸ γὰρ ἄνω τῷ κάτω ἐναντίον τιθέασι, τὴν

eng

admit of a contrary. For men define the term 'above' as the contrary of 'below', when it

grc

πρὸς τὸ μέσον χώραν κάτω λέγοντες, διὰ τὸ πλείστην τῷ

eng

is the region at the centre they mean by 'below'; and this is so, because nothing is

grc

μέσῳ διάστασιν πρὸς τὰ πέρατα τοῦ κόσμου εἶναι. ἐοίκασι

eng

farther from the extremities of the universe than the region at the centre. Indeed, it seems

grc

δὲ καὶ τὸν τῶν ἄλλων ἐναντίων ὁρισμὸν ἀπὸ τούτων ἐπιφέρειν·

eng

that in defining contraries of every kind men have recourse to a spatial metaphor,

grc

τὰ γὰρ πλεῖστον ἀλλήλων διεστηκότα τῶν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ

eng

for they say that those things are contraries which, within the same class, are separated

grc

γένει ἐναντία ὁρίζονται.

eng

by the greatest possible distance.

grc

Οὐ δοκεῖ δὲ τὸ ποσὸν ἐπιδέχεσθαι τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ

eng

Quantity does not, it appears, admit of variation of degree. One

grc

ἧττον, οἷον τὸ δίπηχυ, —οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἕτερον ἑτέρου μᾶλλον

eng

thing cannot be two cubits long in a greater degree than another.

grc

δίπηχυ·— οὐδ’ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ, οἷον τὰ τρία τῶν πέντε οὐδὲν

eng

Similarly with regard to number: what is 'three' is not more truly three than what is

grc

μᾶλλον [πέντε ἢ] τρία λέγεται, οὐδὲ τὰ τρία τῶν τριῶν· οὐδέ γε

eng

five' is five; nor is one set of three more truly three than another set. Again, one period

grc

ὁ χρόνος ἕτερος ἑτέρου μᾶλλον χρόνος λέγεται· οὐδ’ ἐπὶ τῶν

eng

of time is not said to be more truly time than another. Nor is there any other

grc

εἰρημένων ὅλως οὐδενὸς τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον λέγεται· ὥστε

eng

kind of quantity, of all that have been mentioned, with regard to which variation of degree can be predicated. The category

grc

τὸ ποσὸν οὐκ ἐπιδέχεται τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον.

eng

of quantity, therefore, does not admit of variation of degree.

grc

Ἴδιον δὲ μάλιστα τοῦ ποσοῦ τὸ ἴσον τε καὶ ἄνισον λέγε

eng

The most distinctive mark of quantity is that equality and inequality are predicated of it.

grc

σθαι. ἕκαστον γὰρ τῶν εἰρημένων ποσῶν καὶ ἴσον καὶ

eng

Each of the aforesaid quantities is said to be equal

grc

ἄνισον λέγεται, οἷον σῶμα καὶ ἴσον καὶ ἄνισον λέγεται,

eng

or unequal. For instance, one solid is said to be equal or

grc

καὶ ἀριθμὸς καὶ ἴσος καὶ ἄνισος λέγεται, καὶ χρό

eng

unequal to another; number, too, and time can have these

grc

νος καὶ ἴσος καὶ ἄνισος· ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων

eng

terms applied to them, indeed can all those kinds

grc

τῶν ῥηθέντων ἕκαστον ἴσον τε καὶ ἄνισον λέγεται. τῶν

eng

of quantity that have been mentioned. That which

grc

δὲ λοιπῶν ὅσα μή ἐστι ποσόν, οὐ πάνυ ἂν δόξαι ἴσον

eng

is not a quantity can by no means, it would seem, be

grc

τε καὶ ἄνισον λέγεσθαι, οἷον ἡ διάθεσις ἴση τε καὶ ἄνι

eng

termed equal or unequal to anything else. One particular disposition or one particular quality,

grc

σος οὐ πάνυ λέγεται ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ὁμοία, καὶ τὸ λευκὸν ἴσον

eng

such as whiteness, is by no means compared with another in terms of equality

grc

τε καὶ ἄνισον οὐ πάνυ, ἀλλ’ ὅμοιον. ὥστε τοῦ ποσοῦ μάλιστα

eng

and inequality but rather in terms of similarity. Thus it is the distinctive mark

grc

ἂν εἴη ἴδιον τὸ ἴσον τε καὶ ἄνισον λέγεσθαι.

eng

of quantity that it can be called equal and unequal.

grc

Πρός τι δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγεται, ὅσα αὐτὰ ἅπερ ἐστὶν

eng

Those things are called relative, which, being either said to be of something else or

grc

ἑτέρων εἶναι λέγεται ἢ ὁπωσοῦν ἄλλως πρὸς ἕτερον· οἷον

eng

related to something else, are explained by reference to that other thing. For instance,

grc

τὸ μεῖζον τοῦθ’ ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἑτέρου λέγεται, —τινὸς γὰρ μεῖ

eng

the word 'superior' is explained by reference to something else, for it is superiority over

grc

ζον λέγεται,— καὶ τὸ διπλάσιον ἑτέρου λέγεται τοῦθ’ ὅπερ ἐ

eng

something else that is meant. Similarly, the expression 'double' has this external reference, for it is

grc

στίν, —τινὸς γὰρ διπλάσιον λέγεται·— ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα

eng

the double of something else that is meant. So it is with everything else of this

grc

τοιαῦτα. ἔστι δὲ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν πρός τι οἷον ἕξις, διά

eng

kind. There are, moreover, other relatives, e.g. habit, disposition,

grc

θεσις, αἴσθησις, ἐπιστήμη, θέσις· πάντα γὰρ τὰ εἰρημένα

eng

perception, knowledge, and attitude. The significance of all these is

grc

τοῦθ’ ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἑτέρων λέγεται καὶ οὐκ ἄλλο τι· ἡ

eng

explained by a reference to something else and in no other way. Thus,

grc

γὰρ ἕξις τινὸς ἕξις λέγεται καὶ ἡ ἐπιστήμη τινὸς ἐπιστήμη

eng

a habit is a habit of something, knowledge is knowledge of something, attitude is the attitude of

grc

καὶ ἡ θέσις τινὸς θέσις, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα δὲ ὡσαύτως. πρός τι

eng

something. So it is with all other relatives that have been mentioned. Those terms, then,

grc

οὖν ἐστὶν ὅσα αὐτὰ ἅπερ ἐστὶν ἑτέρων λέγεται, ἢ ὁπωσ

eng

are called relative, the nature of which is explained by reference to something else, the preposition 'of' or some other

grc

οῦν ἄλλως πρὸς ἕτερον· οἷον ὄρος μέγα λέγεται πρὸς ἕτερον,

eng

preposition being used to indicate the relation. Thus, one mountain is called great in comparison with son with

grc

πρός τι γὰρ μέγα λέγεται τὸ ὄρος,— καὶ τὸ ὅμοιον τινὶ ὅμοιον

eng

another; for the mountain claims this attribute by comparison with something. Again, that which is called similar

grc

λέγεται, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὡσαύτως πρός τι λέ

eng

must be similar to something else, and all other such attributes have this external reference.

grc

γεται. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀνάκλισις καὶ ἡ στάσις καὶ ἡ καθέ

eng

It is to be noted that lying and standing and sitting are

grc

δρα θέσεις τινές, ἡ δὲ θέσις τῶν πρός τι· τὸ δὲ ἀνακε<κλ>ίσθαι

eng

particular attitudes, but attitude is itself a relative term. To lie, to stand,

grc

ἢ ἑστάναι ἢ καθῆσθαι αὐτὰ μὲν οὐκ εἰσὶ θέσεις, παρωνύ

eng

to be seated, are not themselves attitudes, but take

grc

μως δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν εἰρημένων θέσεων λέγεται.

eng

their name from the aforesaid attitudes.

grc

Ὑπάρχει δὲ καὶ ἐναντιότης ἐν τοῖς πρός τι, οἷον

eng

It is possible for relatives to have contraries. Thus virtue has

grc

ἀρετὴ κακίᾳ ἐναντίον, ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν πρός τι ὄν, καὶ ἐπι

eng

a contrary, vice, these both being relatives; knowledge, too, has a contrary,

grc

στήμη ἀγνοίᾳ. οὐ πᾶσι δὲ τοῖς πρός τι ὑπάρχει ἐναντίον·

eng

ignorance. But this is not the mark of all relatives;

grc

τῷ γὰρ διπλασίῳ οὐδέν ἐστιν ἐναντίον οὐδὲ τῷ τρι

eng

double' and 'triple' have no contrary, nor indeed

grc

πλασίῳ οὐδὲ τῶν τοιούτων οὐδενί. —δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ τὸ μᾶλ

eng

has any such term. It also appears that

grc

λον καὶ τὸ ἧττον ἐπιδέχεσθαι τὰ πρός τι· ὅμοιον γὰρ

eng

relatives can admit of variation of degree. For 'like' and

grc

μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον λέγεται, καὶ ἄνισον μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον

eng

unlike', 'equal' and 'unequal', have the modifications 'more' and 'less' applied to them, and

grc

λέγεται, ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν πρός τι ὄν· τό τε γὰρ ὅμοιον

eng

each of these is relative in character: for the terms 'like'

grc

τινὶ ὅμοιον λέγεται καὶ τὸ ἄνισον τινὶ ἄνισον. οὐ πάντα

eng

and 'unequal' bear a reference to something external. Yet, again, it is

grc

δὲ ἐπιδέχεται τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον· τὸ γὰρ διπλάσιον

eng

not every relative term that admits of variation of degree. No term such

grc

οὐ λέγεται μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον διπλάσιον οὐδὲ τῶν τοι

eng

as 'double' admits of this

grc

ούτων οὐδέν.

eng

modification.

grc

Πάντα δὲ τὰ πρός τι πρὸς ἀντιστρέφοντα λέγεται, οἷον

eng

All relatives have correlatives: by the term 'slave' we mean the slave

grc

ὁ δοῦλος δεσπότου λέγεται δοῦλος καὶ ὁ δεσπότης δού

eng

of a master, by the term 'master', the master of a

grc

λου δεσπότης λέγεται, καὶ τὸ διπλάσιον ἡμίσεος διπλάσιον

eng

slave; by 'double', the double of its hall; by 'half', the half

grc

καὶ τὸ ἥμισυ διπλασίου ἥμισυ, καὶ τὸ μεῖζον ἐλάττονος μεῖζον

eng

of its double; by 'greater', greater than that which is less; by 'less,'

grc

καὶ τὸ ἔλαττον μείζονος ἔλαττον· ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν

eng

less than that which is greater. So it is with every other relative

grc

ἄλλων· πλὴν τῇ πτώσει ἐνίοτε διοίσει κατὰ τὴν λέξιν, οἷον

eng

term; but the case we use to express the correlation differs in some instances.

grc

ἡ ἐπιστήμη ἐπιστητοῦ λέγεται ἐπιστήμη καὶ τὸ ἐπιστητὸν

eng

Thus, by knowledge we mean knowledge the knowable; by the knowable, that which is

grc

ἐπιστήμῃ ἐπιστητόν, καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις αἰσθητοῦ αἴσθησις καὶ

eng

to be apprehended by knowledge; by perception, perception of the perceptible; by the perceptible,

grc

τὸ αἰσθητὸν αἰσθήσει αἰσθητόν. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ’ ἐνίοτε οὐ δόξει

eng

that which is apprehended by perception. Sometimes, however, reciprocity of correlation does not appear to

grc

ἀντιστρέφειν, ἐὰν μὴ οἰκείως πρὸς ὃ λέγεται ἀποδοθῇ

eng

exist. This comes about when a blunder is made, and that to which the relative

grc

ἀλλὰ διαμάρτῃ ὁ ἀποδιδούς· οἷον τὸ πτερὸν ἐὰν ἀποδοθῇ

eng

is related is not accurately stated. If a man states that a wing is necessarily relative

grc

ὄρνιθος, οὐκ ἀντιστρέφει ὄρνις πτεροῦ· οὐ γὰρ οἰκείως τὸ

eng

to a bird, the connexion between these two will not be reciprocal, for it will not be possible to

grc

πρῶτον ἀποδέδοται πτερὸν ὄρνιθος, —οὐ γὰρ ᾗ ὄρνις, ταύτῃ

eng

say that a bird is a bird by reason of its wings. The reason is that the original statement was

grc

τὸ πτερὸν αὐτῆς λέγεται, ἀλλ’ ᾗ πτερωτόν ἐστιν· πολλῶν

eng

inaccurate, for the wing is not said to be relative to the bird qua bird,

grc

γὰρ καὶ ἄλλων πτερά ἐστιν ἃ οὐκ εἰσὶν ὄρνιθες·— ὥστε ἐὰν

eng

since many creatures besides birds have wings, but qua winged creature. If, then, the statement

grc

ἀποδοθῇ οἰκείως, καὶ ἀντιστρέφει, οἷον τὸ πτερὸν πτερωτοῦ

eng

is made accurate, the connexion will be reciprocal, for we can speak of a wing, having reference necessarily to a winged

grc

πτερὸν καὶ τὸ πτερωτὸν πτερῷ πτερωτόν. —ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ ὀνο

eng

creature, and of a winged creature as being such because of its wings. Occasionally, perhaps, it is

grc

ματοποιεῖν ἴσως ἀναγκαῖον, ἐὰν μὴ κείμενον ᾖ ὄνομα πρὸς ὃ

eng

necessary to coin words, if no word exists by which a correlation can

grc

οἰκείως ἂν ἀποδοθείη· οἷον τὸ πηδάλιον πλοίου ἐὰν ἀπο

eng

adequately be explained. If we define a rudder as necessarily having reference

grc

δοθῇ, οὐκ οἰκεία ἡ ἀπόδοσις, —οὐ γὰρ ᾗ πλοῖον

eng

to a boat, our definition will not be appropriate, for the rudder does not

grc

ταύτῃ αὐτοῦ τὸ πηδάλιον λέγεται· ἔστι γὰρ πλοῖα ὧν οὐκ

eng

have this reference to a boat qua boat, as there are boats which have

grc

ἔστι πηδάλια·— διὸ οὐκ ἀντιστρέφει· τὸ γὰρ πλοῖον οὐ λέγε

eng

no rudders. Thus we cannot use the terms reciprocally, for the word 'boat' cannot be said to

grc

ται πηδαλίου πλοῖον. ἀλλ’ ἴσως οἰκειοτέρα ἂν ἡ ἀπόδοσις

eng

find its explanation in the word 'rudder'. As there is no existing word, our

grc

εἴη, εἰ οὕτω πως ἀποδοθείη τὸ πηδάλιον πηδαλιωτοῦ πηδά

eng

definition would perhaps be more accurate if we coined some word

grc

λιον ἢ ὁπωσοῦν ἄλλως, —ὄνομα γὰρ οὐ κεῖται·— καὶ ἀντι

eng

like 'ruddered' as the correlative of 'rudder'. If we express

grc

στρέφει γε, ἐὰν οἰκείως ἀποδοθῇ· τὸ γὰρ πηδαλιωτὸν

eng

ourselves thus accurately, at any rate the terms are reciprocally connected, for the 'ruddered' thing is 'ruddered'

grc

πηδαλίῳ πηδαλιωτόν. ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων,

eng

in virtue of its rudder. So it is in all other cases. A head

grc

οἷον ἡ κεφαλὴ οἰκειοτέρως ἂν ἀποδοθείη κεφαλωτοῦ ἢ ζῴου

eng

will be more accurately defined as the correlative of that which is 'headed', than as that

grc

ἀποδιδομένη· οὐ γὰρ ᾗ ζῷον κεφαλὴν ἔχει· πολλὰ γὰρ

eng

of an animal, for the animal does not have a head qua animal, since many

grc

τῶν ζῴων κεφαλὴν οὐκ ἔχει. οὕτω δὲ ῥᾷστα ἂν ἴσως τις

eng

animals have no head. Thus we may perhaps most easily comprehend

grc

λαμβάνοι οἷς μὴ κεῖται ὀνόματα, εἰ ἀπὸ τῶν πρώτων καὶ

eng

that to which a thing is related, when a name does not exist, if, from that

grc

τοῖς πρὸς αὐτὰ ἀντιστρέφουσι τιθείη τὰ ὀνόματα, ὥσπερ

eng

which has a name, we derive a new name, and apply it to that with

grc

ἐπὶ τῶν προειρημένων ἀπὸ τοῦ πτεροῦ τὸ πτερωτὸν καὶ ἀπὸ

eng

which the first is reciprocally connected, as in the aforesaid instances, when we derived the

grc

τοῦ πηδαλίου τὸ πηδαλιωτόν. πάντα οὖν τὰ πρός τι, ἐάν

eng

word 'winged' from 'wing' and from 'rudder'. All relatives, then, if

grc

περ οἰκείως ἀποδιδῶται, πρὸς ἀντιστρέφοντα λέγεται· ἐπεί,

eng

properly defined, have a correlative. I add

grc

ἐάν γε πρὸς τὸ τυχὸν ἀποδιδῶται καὶ μὴ πρὸς αὐτὸ ὃ

eng

this condition because, if that to which they are related is stated as haphazard and not accurately,

grc

λέγεται, οὐκ ἀντιστρέφει. —λέγω δὲ ὅτι οὐδὲ τῶν ὁμολο

eng

the two are not found to be interdependent. Let me state what I mean more clearly.

grc

γουμένως πρὸς ἀντιστρέφοντα λεγομένων καὶ ὀνομάτων αὐτοῖς

eng

Even in the case of acknowledged correlatives, and where names exist for each, there will

grc

κειμένων οὐδὲν ἀντιστρέφει, ἐὰν πρός τι τῶν συμβεβηκότων

eng

be no interdependence if one of the two is denoted, not by that name which expresses

grc

ἀποδιδῶται καὶ μὴ πρὸς αὐτὸ ὃ λέγεται· οἷον ὁ δοῦλος

eng

the correlative notion, but by one of irrelevant significance. The term 'slave,' if

grc

ἐὰν μὴ δεσπότου ἀποδοθῇ ἀλλ’ ἀνθρώπου ἢ δίποδος ἢ

eng

defined as related, not to a master, but to a man,

grc

ὁτουοῦν τῶν τοιούτων, οὐκ ἀντιστρέφει· οὐ γὰρ οἰκεία

eng

or a biped, or anything of that sort, is not reciprocally connected with that in relation to which

grc

ἡ ἀπόδοσις. —ἔτι ἐὰν μὲν οἰκείως ἀποδεδομένον ᾖ πρὸς

eng

it is defined, for the statement is not exact. Further, if one thing is said to be correlative with another, and

grc

ὃ λέγεται, πάντων περιαιρουμένων τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα συμ

eng

the terminology used is correct, then, though all irrelevant attributes should be removed, and

grc

βεβηκότα ἐστίν, καταλειπομένου δὲ τούτου μόνου πρὸς ὃ

eng

only that one attribute left in virtue of which it was correctly stated to be

grc

ἀπεδόθη οἰκείως, ἀεὶ πρὸς αὐτὸ ῥηθήσεται· οἷον εἰ ὁ

eng

correlative with that other, the stated correlation will still exist. If the

grc

δοῦλος πρὸς δεσπότην λέγεται, περιαιρουμένων ἁπάντων

eng

correlative of 'the slave' is said to be 'the master', then, though

grc

ὅσα συμβεβηκότα ἐστὶ τῷ δεσπότῃ, οἷον τὸ δίποδι

eng

all irrelevant attributes of the said 'master', such as 'biped', 'receptive

grc

εἶναι, τὸ ἐπιστήμης δεκτικῷ, τὸ ἀνθρώπῳ, καταλειπο

eng

of knowledge', 'human', should be removed, and the attribute 'master' alone

grc

μένου δὲ μόνου τοῦ δεσπότην εἶναι, ἀεὶ ὁ δοῦλος

eng

left, the stated correlation existing between him and the slave will

grc

πρὸς αὐτὸ ῥηθήσεται· ὁ γὰρ δοῦλος δεσπότου δοῦλος λέ

eng

remain the same, for it is of a master that a slave is said to be

grc

γεται. ἐὰν δέ γε μὴ οἰκείως ἀποδοθῇ πρὸς ὅ ποτε λέγε

eng

the slave. On the other hand, if, of two correlatives, one is not correctly termed, then,

grc

ται, περιαιρουμένων μὲν τῶν ἄλλων καταλειπομένου δὲ

eng

when all other attributes are removed and that alone is left in virtue of which it

grc

μόνου τοῦ πρὸς ὃ ἀπεδόθη, οὐ ῥηθήσεται πρὸς αὐτό· ἀπο

eng

was stated to be correlative, the stated correlation will be found to have disappeared. For

grc

δεδόσθω γὰρ ὁ δοῦλος ἀνθρώπου καὶ τὸ πτερὸν ὄρνιθος,

eng

suppose the correlative of 'the slave' should be said to be 'the man', or the correlative

grc

καὶ περιῃρήσθω τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τὸ δεσπότῃ αὐτῷ εἶναι· οὐ

eng

of 'the wing' 'the bird'; if the attribute 'master' be withdrawn from' the man', the

grc

γὰρ ἔτι ὁ δοῦλος πρὸς ἄνθρωπον ῥηθήσεται, —μὴ γὰρ ὄντος

eng

correlation between 'the man' and 'the slave' will cease to exist, for if the man is not a

grc

δεσπότου οὐδὲ δοῦλός ἐστιν·— ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τοῦ ὄρνιθος περι

eng

master, the slave is not a slave. Similarly, if the attribute 'winged' be

grc

ῃρήσθω τὸ πτερωτῷ εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι ἔσται τὸ πτερὸν τῶν

eng

withdrawn from 'the bird', 'the wing' will no longer be

grc

πρός τι· μὴ γὰρ ὄντος πτερωτοῦ οὐδὲ πτερὸν ἔσται τινός.—

eng

relative; for if the so-called correlative is not winged, it follows that 'the wing' has no correlative.

grc

ὥστε δεῖ μὲν ἀποδιδόναι πρὸς ὅ ποτε οἰκείως λέγεται· κἂν

eng

Thus it is essential that the correlated terms should be exactly designated; if

grc

μὲν ὄνομα ᾖ κείμενον ῥᾳδία ἡ ἀπόδοσις γίγνεται, μὴ ὄν

eng

there is a name existing, the statement will be easy; if not, it

grc

τος δὲ ἀναγκαῖον ἴσως ὀνοματοποιεῖν. οὕτω δὲ ἀποδιδο

eng

is doubtless our duty to construct names. When the terminology

grc

μένων φανερὸν ὅτι πάντα τὰ πρός τι πρὸς ἀντιστρέφοντα

eng

is thus correct, it is evident that all correlatives are

grc

ῥηθήσεται.

eng

interdependent.

grc

Δοκεῖ δὲ τὰ πρός τι ἅμα τῇ φύσει εἶναι. καὶ ἐπὶ μὲν

eng

Correlatives are thought to come into existence simultaneously. This is for the most part

grc

τῶν πλείστων ἀληθές ἐστιν· ἅμα γὰρ διπλάσιόν τέ ἐστι

eng

true, as in the case of the double and the half. The existence of the half necessitates the existence of that

grc

καὶ ἥμισυ, καὶ ἡμίσεος ὄντος διπλάσιόν ἐστιν, καὶ δού

eng

of which it is a half. Similarly the existence of a master necessitates the existence of a slave, and

grc

λου ὄντος δεσπότης ἐστίν· ὁμοίως δὲ τούτοις καὶ τὰ

eng

that of a slave implies that of a master; these are merely instances of a general

grc

ἄλλα. καὶ συναναιρεῖ δὲ ταῦτα ἄλληλα· μὴ γὰρ ὄντος

eng

rule. Moreover, they cancel one another; for if there

grc

διπλασίου οὐκ ἔστιν ἥμισυ, καὶ ἡμίσεος μὴ ὄντος οὐκ

eng

is no double it follows that there is no

grc

ἔστι διπλάσιον· ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα

eng

half, and vice versa; this rule also applies to all such

grc

τοιαῦτα. —οὐκ ἐπὶ πάντων δὲ τῶν πρός τι ἀληθὲς δοκεῖ

eng

correlatives. Yet it does not appear to be true in all cases that

grc

τὸ ἅμα τῇ φύσει εἶναι· τὸ γὰρ ἐπιστητὸν τῆς ἐπιστήμης

eng

correlatives come into existence simultaneously. The object of knowledge would appear to

grc

πρότερον ἂν δόξειεν εἶναι· ὡς γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ προϋπαρ

eng

exist before knowledge itself, for it is usually the case

grc

χόντων τῶν πραγμάτων τὰς ἐπιστήμας λαμβάνομεν· ἐπ’

eng

that we acquire knowledge of objects already existing; it would

grc

ὀλίγων γὰρ ἢ ἐπ’ οὐδενὸς ἴδοι τις ἂν ἅμα τῷ ἐπιστητῷ τὴν

eng

be difficult, if not impossible, to find a branch of knowledge the beginning of the existence of which was

grc

ἐπιστήμην γιγνομένην. ἔτι τὸ μὲν ἐπιστητὸν ἀναιρεθὲν συν

eng

contemporaneous with that of its object. Again, while the object of knowledge, if it ceases to

grc

αναιρεῖ τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ἡ δὲ ἐπιστήμη τὸ ἐπιστητὸν οὐ συν

eng

exist, cancels at the same time the knowledge which was its correlative, the converse of this is

grc

αναιρεῖ· ἐπιστητοῦ γὰρ μὴ ὄντος οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη, —οὐ

eng

not true. It is true that if the object of knowledge does not exist there can be no knowledge: for

grc

δενὸς γὰρ ἔτι ἔσται ἐπιστήμη,— ἐπιστήμης δὲ μὴ οὔσης οὐδὲν

eng

there will no longer be anything to know. Yet it is equally true that, if knowledge of a certain object does not

grc

κωλύει ἐπιστητὸν εἶναι· οἷον καὶ ὁ τοῦ κύκλου τετραγω

eng

exist, the object may nevertheless quite well exist. Thus, in the case of the squaring of the circle,

grc

νισμὸς εἴγε ἔστιν ἐπιστητόν, ἐπιστήμη μὲν αὐτοῦ οὐκ ἔστιν

eng

if indeed that process is an object of knowledge, though it itself exists as an object of knowledge,

grc

οὐδέπω, αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ ἐπιστητὸν ἔστιν. ἔτι ζῴου μὲν ἀναιρεθέν

eng

yet the knowledge of it has not yet come into existence. Again, if all animals ceased to

grc

τος οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη, τῶν δ’ ἐπιστητῶν πολλὰ ἐνδέχεται

eng

exist, there would be no knowledge, but there might yet be many objects of

grc

εἶναι. —ὁμοίως δὲ τούτοις καὶ τὰ ἐπὶ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἔχει·

eng

knowledge. This is likewise the case with regard to perception:

grc

τὸ γὰρ αἰσθητὸν πρότερον τῆς αἰσθήσεως δοκεῖ εἶναι· τὸ

eng

for the object of perception is, it appears, prior to the act of perception. If

grc

μὲν γὰρ αἰσθητὸν ἀναιρεθὲν συναναιρεῖ τὴν αἴσθησιν, ἡ δὲ

eng

the perceptible is annihilated, perception also will cease to exist; but the annihilation of perception

grc

αἴσθησις τὸ αἰσθητὸν οὐ συναναιρεῖ. αἱ γὰρ αἰσθήσεις περὶ

eng

does not cancel the existence of the perceptible. For perception implies a body perceived and

grc

σῶμα καὶ ἐν σώματί εἰσιν, αἰσθητοῦ δὲ ἀναιρεθέντος ἀνῄ

eng

a body in which perception takes place. Now if that which is perceptible is annihilated, it

grc

ρηται καὶ σῶμα, —τῶν γὰρ αἰσθητῶν καὶ τὸ σῶμα,— σώ

eng

follows that the body is annihilated, for the body is a perceptible thing; and

grc

ματος δὲ μὴ ὄντος ἀνῄρηται καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις, ὥστε συν

eng

if the body does not exist, it follows that perception also ceases to exist. Thus

grc

αναιρεῖ τὸ αἰσθητὸν τὴν αἴσθησιν. ἡ δέ γε αἴσθησις τὸ

eng

the annihilation of the perceptible involves that of perception. But the annihilation of perception does not involve

grc

αἰσθητὸν οὔ· ζῴου γὰρ ἀναιρεθέντος αἴσθησις μὲν ἀνῄ

eng

that of the perceptible. For if the animal is annihilated, it follows

grc

ρηται, αἰσθητὸν δὲ ἔσται, οἷον σῶμα, θερμόν, γλυκύ,

eng

that perception also is annihilated, but perceptibles such as body,

grc

πικρόν, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα πάντα ὅσα ἐστὶν αἰσθητά. ἔτι ἡ μὲν

eng

heat, sweetness, bitterness, and so on, will remain. Again, perception is

grc

αἴσθησις ἅμα τῷ αἰσθητικῷ γίγνεται, —ἅμα γὰρ ζῷόν τε

eng

generated at the same time as the perceiving subject, for it

grc

γίγνεται καὶ αἴσθησις,— τὸ δέ γε αἰσθητὸν ἔστι καὶ πρὸ

eng

comes into existence at the same time as the animal. But the perceptible

grc

τοῦ αἴσθησιν εἶναι, —πῦρ γὰρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα,

eng

surely exists before perception; for fire and water and such elements, out

grc

ἐξ ὧν καὶ τὸ ζῷον συνίσταται, ἔστι καὶ πρὸ τοῦ ζῷον ὅλως

eng

of which the animal is itself composed, exist before the animal is an

grc

εἶναι ἢ αἴσθησιν,— ὥστε πρότερον ἂν τῆς αἰσθήσεως τὸ αἰσθητὸν

eng

animal at all, and before perception. Thus it would seem that the perceptible exists

grc

εἶναι δόξειεν.

eng

before perception.

grc

Ἔχει δὲ ἀπορίαν πότερον οὐδεμία οὐσία τῶν πρός τι

eng

It may be questioned whether it is true that no substance is relative, as

grc

λέγεται, καθάπερ δοκεῖ, ἢ τοῦτο ἐνδέχεται κατά τινας

eng

seems to be the case, or whether exception is to be made in the

grc

τῶν δευτέρων οὐσιῶν. ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τῶν πρώτων οὐσιῶν ἀλη

eng

case of certain secondary substances. With regard to primary substances, it is quite true that there is

grc

θές ἐστιν· οὔτε γὰρ τὰ ὅλα οὔτε τὰ μέρη πρός τι λέγεται· ὁ

eng

no such possibility, for neither wholes nor parts of primary substances are relative.

grc

γὰρ τὶς ἄνθρωπος οὐ λέγεται τινός τις ἄνθρωπος, οὐδὲ

eng

The individual man or ox is not defined with reference

grc

ὁ τὶς βοῦς τινός τις βοῦς· ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τὰ μέρη· ἡ

eng

to something external. Similarly with the parts:

grc

γὰρ τὶς χεὶρ οὐ λέγεται τινός τις χεὶρ ἀλλὰ τινὸς χείρ,

eng

a particular hand or head is not defined as a particular hand or head

grc

καὶ ἡ τὶς κεφαλὴ οὐ λέγεται τινός τις κεφαλὴ ἀλλὰ

eng

of a particular person, but as the hand or head of a

grc

τινὸς κεφαλή. ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν δευτέρων οὐσιῶν,

eng

particular person. It is true also, for the most part at least, in

grc

ἐπί γε τῶν πλείστων· οἷον ὁ ἄνθρωπος οὐ λέγεται τινὸς ἄν

eng

the case of secondary substances; the species 'man' and the species 'ox' are not defined with reference

grc

θρωπος, οὐδὲ ὁ βοῦς τινὸς βοῦς, οὐδὲ τὸ ξύλον τινὸς ξύλον,

eng

to anything outside themselves. Wood, again, is only relative in so far as it is some one's property, not

grc

ἀλλὰ τινὸς κτῆμα λέγεται. ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν τοιούτων φα

eng

in so far as it is wood. It is plain, then, that in the

grc

νερὸν ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι τῶν πρός τι, ἐπ’ ἐνίων δὲ τῶν δευτέρων

eng

cases mentioned substance is not relative. But with regard to some secondary substances there

grc

οὐσιῶν ἔχει ἀμφισβήτησιν· οἷον ἡ κεφαλὴ τινὸς λέγεται

eng

is a difference of opinion; thus, such terms as 'head' and 'hand' are

grc

κεφαλὴ καὶ ἡ χεὶρ τινὸς λέγεται χεὶρ καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν

eng

defined with reference to that of which the things indicated are a part, and

grc

τοιούτων, ὥστε ταῦτα τῶν πρός τι δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι. —εἰ

eng

so it comes about that these appear to have a relative character. Indeed,

grc

μὲν οὖν ἱκανῶς ὁ τῶν πρός τι ὁρισμὸς ἀποδέδοται, ἢ τῶν πάνυ

eng

if our definition of that which is relative was complete, it

grc

χαλεπῶν ἢ τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἐστὶ τὸ λῦσαι ὡς οὐδεμία οὐσία

eng

is very difficult, if not impossible, to prove that no

grc

τῶν πρός τι λέγεται· εἰ δὲ μὴ ἱκανῶς, ἀλλ’ ἔστι τὰ πρός τι

eng

substance is relative. If, however, our definition was not complete, if those things only are properly called

grc

οἷς τὸ εἶναι ταὐτόν ἐστι τῷ πρός τί πως ἔχειν, ἴσως ἂν

eng

relative in the case of which relation to an external object is a necessary condition of existence, perhaps some explanation

grc

ῥηθείη τι πρὸς αὐτά. ὁ δὲ πρότερος ὁρισμὸς παρακολουθεῖ

eng

of the dilemma may be found. The former definition does indeed apply to

grc

μὲν πᾶσι τοῖς πρός τι, οὐ μὴν τοῦτό γέ ἐστι τὸ πρός τι

eng

all relatives, but the fact that a thing is explained with reference

grc

αὐτοῖς εἶναι τὸ αὐτὰ ἅπερ ἐστὶν ἑτέρων λέγεσθαι. ἐκ δὲ

eng

to something else does not make it essentially relative. From this

grc

τούτων δῆλόν ἐστιν ὅτι ἐάν τις εἰδῇ τι ὡρισμένως τῶν πρός τι,

eng

it is plain that, if a man definitely apprehends a relative thing, he will

grc

κἀκεῖνο πρὸς ὃ λέγεται ὡρισμένως εἴσεται. φανερὸν

eng

also definitely apprehend that to which it is relative. Indeed

grc

μὲν οὖν καὶ ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἐστίν· εἰ γὰρ οἶδέ τις τόδε τι ὅτι

eng

this is self-evident: for if a man knows that some particular thing

grc

τῶν πρός τί ἐστιν, ἔστι δὲ τὸ εἶναι τοῖς πρός τι ταὐτὸ τῷ

eng

is relative, assuming that we call that a relative in the case of which relation to something

grc

πρός τί πως ἔχειν, κἀκεῖνο οἶδε πρὸς ὃ τοῦτό πως ἔχει·

eng

is a necessary condition of existence, he knows that also to which it is related.

grc

εἰ γὰρ οὐκ οἶδεν ὅλως πρὸς ὃ τοῦτό πως ἔχει, οὐδ’ εἰ

eng

For if he does not know at all that to which it is related, he will not

grc

πρός τί πως ἔχει εἴσεται. καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν καθ’ ἕκαστα δὲ δῆ

eng

know whether or not it is relative. This is clear, moreover, in

grc

λον τὸ τοιοῦτον· οἷον τόδε τι εἰ οἶδεν ἀφωρισμένως ὅτι ἔστι

eng

particular instances. If a man knows definitely that such and such a thing is

grc

διπλάσιον, καὶ ὅτου διπλάσιόν ἐστιν εὐθὺς ἀφωρισμένως οἶ

eng

double', he will also forthwith know definitely that of which it is the double. For

grc

δεν, —εἰ γὰρ μηδενὸς τῶν ἀφωρισμένων οἶδεν αὐτὸ διπλά

eng

if there is nothing definite of which he knows it to be the double,

grc

σιον, οὐδ’ εἰ ἔστι διπλάσιον ὅλως οἶδεν·— ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ

eng

he does not know at all that it is double. Again, if he knows

grc

τόδε τι εἰ οἶδεν ὅτι κάλλιόν ἐστι, καὶ ὅτου κάλλιόν ἐ

eng

that a thing is more beautiful, it follows necessarily that he will forthwith definitely

grc

στιν ἀφωρισμένως ἀναγκαῖον εἰδέναι διὰ ταῦτα, (οὐκ ἀο

eng

know that also than which it is more beautiful. He will not merely know

grc

ρίστως δὲ εἴσεται ὅτι τοῦτό ἐστι χείρονος κάλλιον· ὑπόληψις

eng

indefinitely that it is more beautiful than something which is less beautiful, for this

grc

γὰρ τὸ τοιοῦτο γίγνεται, οὐκ ἐπιστήμη· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι εἴσεται

eng

would be supposition, not knowledge. For if he does not

grc

ἀκριβῶς ὅτι ἐστὶ χείρονος κάλλιον· εἰ γὰρ οὕτως ἔτυχεν,

eng

know definitely that than which it is more beautiful, he can no longer claim to know definitely that it is more beautiful

grc

οὐδέν ἐστι χεῖρον αὐτοῦ)· ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν,

eng

than something else which is less beautiful: for it might be that nothing was less beautiful. It is, therefore, evident that if a man

grc

ὃ ἂν εἰδῇ τις τῶν πρός τι ὡρισμένως, κἀκεῖνο πρὸς ὃ

eng

apprehends some relative thing definitely, he necessarily knows that also definitely

grc

λέγεται ὡρισμένως εἰδέναι. τὴν δέ γε κεφαλὴν καὶ τὴν

eng

to which it is related. Now the head, the hand, and such

grc

χεῖρα καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν τοιούτων αἵ εἰσιν οὐσίαι αὐτὸ μὲν

eng

things are substances, and it is possible to know their essential character definitely,

grc

ὅπερ ἐστὶν ὡρισμένως ἔστιν εἰδέναι, πρὸς ὃ δὲ λέγεται οὐκ

eng

but it does not necessarily follow that we should know that to which they are

grc

ἀναγκαῖον· τίνος γὰρ αὕτη ἡ κεφαλὴ ἢ τίνος ἡ χεὶρ οὐκ

eng

related. It is not possible to know forthwith whose head

grc

ἔστιν εἰδέναι ὡρισμένως· ὥστε οὐκ ἂν εἴη ταῦτα τῶν πρός τι·

eng

or hand is meant. Thus these are not relatives,

grc

εἰ δὲ μή ἐστι τῶν πρός τι, ἀληθὲς ἂν εἴη λέγειν ὅτι

eng

and, this being the case, it would be true to say that

grc

οὐδεμία οὐσία τῶν πρός τί ἐστιν. ἴσως δὲ χαλεπὸν περὶ

eng

no substance is relative in character. It is perhaps a difficult

grc

τῶν τοιούτων σφοδρῶς ἀποφαίνεσθαι μὴ πολλάκις ἐπε

eng

matter, in such cases, to make a positive statement without more

grc

σκεμμένον, τὸ μέντοι διηπορηκέναι ἐφ’ ἕκαστον αὐτῶν οὐκ

eng

exhaustive examination, but to have raised questions with regard to details is not

grc

ἄχρηστόν ἐστιν.

eng

without advantage.

grc

Ποιότητα δὲ λέγω καθ’ ἣν ποιοί τινες λέγονται· ἔστι

eng

By 'quality' I mean that in virtue of which people are said to be such and such. Quality is

grc

δὲ ἡ ποιότης τῶν πλεοναχῶς λεγομένων. ἓν μὲν οὖν

eng

a term that is used in many senses. One sort

grc

εἶδος ποιότητος ἕξις καὶ διάθεσις λεγέσθωσαν. διαφέρει δὲ

eng

of quality let us call 'habit' or 'disposition'. Habit differs from

grc

ἕξις διαθέσεως τῷ μονιμώτερον καὶ πολυχρονιώτερον εἶναι·

eng

disposition in being more lasting and more firmly established.

grc

τοιαῦται δὲ αἵ τε ἐπιστῆμαι καὶ αἱ ἀρεταί· ἥ τε γὰρ ἐπι

eng

The various kinds of knowledge and of virtue are habits, for knowledge, even

grc

στήμη δοκεῖ τῶν παραμονίμων εἶναι καὶ δυσκινήτων, ἐὰν καὶ

eng

when acquired only in a moderate degree, is, it is agreed, abiding

grc

μετρίως τις ἐπιστήμην λάβῃ, ἐάνπερ μὴ μεγάλη μετα

eng

in its character and difficult to displace, unless some great mental

grc

βολὴ γένηται ὑπὸ νόσου ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς τοιούτου· ὡσαύτως

eng

upheaval takes place, through disease or any such cause. The virtues,

grc

δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀρετή· οἷον ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη καὶ

eng

also, such as justice, self-restraint, and so on, are

grc

ἕκαστον τῶν τοιούτων οὐκ εὐκίνητον δοκεῖ εἶναι οὐδ’ εὐ

eng

not easily dislodged or dismissed, so as to give place to

grc

μετάβολον. διαθέσεις δὲ λέγονται ἅ ἐστιν εὐκίνητα καὶ ταχὺ

eng

vice. By a disposition, on the other hand, we mean a condition that

grc

μεταβάλλοντα, οἷον θερμότης καὶ κατάψυξις καὶ νόσος

eng

is easily changed and quickly gives place to its opposite. Thus, heat, cold,

grc

καὶ ὑγίεια καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα· διάκειται μὲν γάρ

eng

disease, health, and so on are dispositions. For a man is

grc

πως κατὰ ταύτας ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ταχὺ δὲ μεταβάλλει ἐκ

eng

disposed in one way or another with reference to these, but

grc

θερμοῦ ψυχρὸς γιγνόμενος καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν εἰς τὸ νο

eng

quickly changes, becoming cold instead of warm, ill instead of well.

grc

σεῖν· ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, εἰ μή τις καὶ αὐ

eng

So it is with all other dispositions also, unless through lapse

grc

τῶν τούτων τυγχάνοι διὰ χρόνου πλῆθος ἤδη πεφυσιωμένη

eng

of time a disposition has itself become inveterate and almost impossible to

grc

καὶ ἀνίατος ἢ πάνυ δυσκίνητος οὖσα, ἣν ἄν τις ἴσως ἕξιν

eng

dislodge: in which case we should perhaps go so far as to call

grc

ἤδη προσαγορεύοι. φανερὸν δὲ ὅτι ταῦτα βούλονται ἕξεις

eng

it a habit. It is evident that men incline to call those conditions habits

grc

λέγειν ἅ ἐστι πολυχρονιώτερα καὶ δυσκινητότερα· τοὺς γὰρ

eng

which are of a more or less permanent type and difficult to displace; for those

grc

τῶν ἐπιστημῶν μὴ πάνυ κατέχοντας ἀλλ’ εὐκινήτους ὄντας

eng

who are not retentive of knowledge, but volatile, are not said to have such

grc

οὔ φασιν ἕξιν ἔχειν, καίτοι διάκεινταί γέ πως κατὰ τὴν

eng

and such a 'habit' as regards knowledge, yet they are disposed, we may say,

grc

ἐπιστήμην ἢ χεῖρον ἢ βέλτιον. ὥστε διαφέρει ἕξις διαθέσεως

eng

either better or worse, towards knowledge. Thus habit differs from disposition in this,

grc

τῷ τὸ μὲν εὐκίνητον εἶναι τὸ δὲ πολυχρονιώτερόν τε καὶ

eng

that while the latter in ephemeral, the former is permanent and difficult

grc

δυσκινητότερον. —εἰσὶ δὲ αἱ μὲν ἕξεις καὶ διαθέσεις, αἱ δὲ

eng

to alter. Habits are at the same time dispositions, but

grc

διαθέσεις οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἕξεις· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἕξεις ἔχοντες

eng

dispositions are not necessarily habits. For those who have some specific habit may be said

grc

καὶ διάκεινταί πως κατὰ ταύτας, οἱ δὲ διακείμενοι οὐ

eng

also, in virtue of that habit, to be thus or thus disposed; but those who are disposed in some specific

grc

πάντως καὶ ἕξιν ἔχουσιν.

eng

way have not in all cases the corresponding habit.

grc

Ἕτερον δὲ γένος ποιότητος καθ’ ὃ πυκτικοὺς ἢ δρομι

eng

Another sort of quality is that in virtue of which, for example, we call

grc

κοὺς ἢ ὑγιεινοὺς ἢ νοσώδεις λέγομεν, καὶ ἁπλῶς ὅσα

eng

men good boxers or runners, or healthy or sickly: in fact it includes

grc

κατὰ δύναμιν φυσικὴν ἢ ἀδυναμίαν λέγεται. οὐ γὰρ τῷ

eng

all those terms which refer to inborn capacity or incapacity. Such things are

grc

διακεῖσθαί πως ἕκαστον τῶν τοιούτων λέγεται, ἀλλὰ

eng

not predicated of a person in virtue of his disposition, but in virtue of

grc

τῷ δύναμιν ἔχειν φυσικὴν τοῦ ποιῆσαί τι ῥᾳδίως

eng

his inborn capacity or incapacity to do something with ease or to avoid

grc

ἢ μηδὲν πάσχειν· οἷον πυκτικοὶ ἢ δρομικοὶ λέγονται

eng

defeat of any kind. Persons are called good boxers or good runners, not

grc

οὐ τῷ διακεῖσθαί πως ἀλλὰ τῷ δύναμιν ἔχειν φυσικὴν

eng

in virtue of such and such a disposition, but in virtue of

grc

τοῦ ποιῆσαί τι ῥᾳδίως, ὑγιεινοὶ δὲ λέγονται τῷ δύναμιν

eng

an inborn capacity to accomplish something with ease. Men are called healthy in

grc

ἔχειν φυσικὴν τοῦ μηδὲν πάσχειν ὑπὸ τῶν τυχόντων ῥᾳ

eng

virtue of the inborn capacity of easy resistance to those unhealthy influences that

grc

δίως, νοσώδεις δὲ τῷ ἀδυναμίαν ἔχειν τοῦ μηδὲν

eng

may ordinarily arise; unhealthy, in virtue of the lack of this

grc

πάσχειν. ὁμοίως δὲ τούτοις καὶ τὸ σκληρὸν καὶ τὸ μαλα

eng

capacity. Similarly with regard to softness and hardness.

grc

κὸν ἔχει· τὸ μὲν γὰρ σκληρὸν λέγεται τῷ δύναμιν ἔχειν

eng

Hardness is predicated of a thing because it has that capacity of resistance

grc

τοῦ μὴ ῥᾳδίως διαιρεῖσθαι, τὸ δὲ μαλακὸν τῷ ἀδυναμίαν

eng

which enables it to withstand disintegration; softness, again, is predicated of a thing by reason

grc

ἔχειν τοῦ αὐτοῦ τούτου.

eng

of the lack of that capacity.

grc

Τρίτον δὲ γένος ποιότητος παθητικαὶ ποιότητες καὶ

eng

A third class within this category is that of affective qualities and affections.

grc

πάθη· ἔστι δὲ τὰ τοιάδε οἷον γλυκύτης τε καὶ πικρότης καὶ

eng

Sweetness, bitterness, sourness, are examples of this sort of quality,

grc

στρυφνότης καὶ πάντα τὰ τούτοις συγγενῆ, ἔτι δὲ θερμότης

eng

together with all that is akin to these; heat, moreover, and cold,

grc

καὶ ψυχρότης καὶ λευκότης καὶ μελανία. ὅτι μὲν οὖν αὗ

eng

whiteness, and blackness are affective qualities. It is evident

grc

ται ποιότητές εἰσιν φανερόν· τὰ γὰρ δεδεγμένα ποιὰ

eng

that these are qualities, for those things that possess them are themselves said to

grc

λέγεται κατ’ αὐτάς· οἷον τὸ μέλι τῷ γλυκύτητα δεδέ

eng

be such and such by reason of their presence. Honey is called sweet because it

grc

χθαι λέγεται γλυκύ, καὶ τὸ σῶμα λευκὸν τῷ λευκότητα δε

eng

contains sweetness; the body is called white because it contains whiteness;

grc

δέχθαι· ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἔχει. παθητικαὶ

eng

and so in all other cases. The term 'affective

grc

δὲ ποιότητες λέγονται οὐ τῷ αὐτὰ τὰ δεδεγμένα τὰς ποι

eng

quality' is not used as indicating that those things which admit these qualities are

grc

ότητας πεπονθέναι τι· οὔτε γὰρ τὸ μέλι τῷ πεπονθέναι τι

eng

affected in any way. Honey is not called sweet because it is affected in

grc

λέγεται γλυκύ, οὔτε τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν· ὁμοίως

eng

a specific way, nor is this what is meant in any other instance. Similarly

grc

δὲ τούτοις καὶ ἡ θερμότης καὶ ἡ ψυχρότης παθητικαὶ

eng

heat and cold are called affective qualities, not because

grc

ποιότητες λέγονται οὐ τῷ αὐτὰ τὰ δεδεγμένα πεπον

eng

those things which admit them are affected. What

grc

θέναι τι, τῷ δὲ κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἑκάστην τῶν εἰρη

eng

is meant is that these said qualities are

grc

μένων ποιοτήτων πάθους εἶναι ποιητικὴν παθητικαὶ ποιότη

eng

capable of producing an 'affection' in the way of

grc

τες λέγονται· ἥ τε γὰρ γλυκύτης πάθος τι κατὰ τὴν γεῦσιν

eng

perception. For sweetness has the power of affecting the sense of taste;

grc

ἐμποιεῖ καὶ ἡ θερμότης κατὰ τὴν ἁφήν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ

eng

heat, that of touch; and so it is with the rest of these

grc

αἱ ἄλλαι. λευκότης δὲ καὶ μελανία καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι χροιαὶ

eng

qualities. Whiteness and blackness, however, and the other colours, are

grc

οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον τοῖς εἰρημένοις παθητικαὶ ποιότητες

eng

not said to be affective qualities in this sense, but -because

grc

λέγονται, ἀλλὰ τῷ αὐτὰς ἀπὸ πάθους γεγενῆσθαι. ὅτι μὲν

eng

they themselves are the results of an affection. It is

grc

οὖν γίγνονται διὰ πάθος πολλαὶ μεταβολαὶ χρωμάτων, δῆ

eng

plain that many changes of colour take place because of affections.

grc

λον· αἰσχυνθεὶς γάρ τις ἐρυθρὸς ἐγένετο καὶ φοβηθεὶς

eng

When a man is ashamed, he blushes; when he is afraid,

grc

ὠχρὸς καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν τοιούτων· ὥστε καὶ εἴ τις φύσει

eng

he becomes pale, and so on. So true is this, that when a man is

grc

τῶν τοιούτων τι παθῶν πέπονθεν, τὴν ὁμοίαν χροιὰν

eng

by nature liable to such affections, arising from some concomitance of elements in his constitution, it is a probable

grc

εἰκός ἐστιν ἔχειν αὐτόν· ἥτις γὰρ νῦν ἐν τῷ αἰσχυνθῆ

eng

inference that he has the corresponding complexion of skin. For the same disposition of bodily elements, which

grc

ναι διάθεσις τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἐγένετο, καὶ κατὰ φυσι

eng

in the former instance was momentarily present in the case of an access of

grc

κὴν σύστασιν ἡ αὐτὴ γένοιτ’ ἂν διάθεσις, ὥστε φύσει καὶ

eng

shame, might be a result of a man's natural temperament, so as to produce the

grc

τὴν χροιὰν ὁμοίαν γίγνεσθαι. —ὅσα μὲν οὖν τῶν τοιού

eng

corresponding colouring also as a natural characteristic. All conditions, therefore, of

grc

των συμπτωμάτων ἀπό τινων παθῶν δυσκινήτων καὶ παρα

eng

this kind, if caused by certain permanent and

grc

μονίμων τὴν ἀρχὴν εἴληφε ποιότητες λέγονται· εἴτε

eng

lasting affections, are called affective qualities. For

grc

γὰρ ἐν τῇ κατὰ φύσιν συστάσει ὠχρότης ἢ μελανία

eng

pallor and duskiness of complexion are called qualities, inasmuch as we

grc

γεγένηται, ποιότης λέγεται, —ποιοὶ γὰρ κατὰ ταύτας λε

eng

are said to be such and such in virtue of them,

grc

γόμεθα,— εἴτε διὰ νόσον μακρὰν ἢ διὰ καῦμα [τὸ αὐτὸ]

eng

not only if they originate in natural constitution, but also if they

grc

συμβέβηκεν ὠχρότης ἢ μελανία, καὶ μὴ ῥᾳδίως ἀποκαθ

eng

come about through long disease or sunburn, and are difficult to

grc

ίστανται ἢ καὶ διὰ βίου παραμένουσι, ποιότητες καὶ αὐ

eng

remove, or indeed remain throughout life. For in the same way we

grc

ταὶ λέγονται, —ὁμοίως γὰρ ποιοὶ κατὰ ταύτας λεγόμεθα.—

eng

are said to be such and such because of these.

grc

ὅσα δὲ ἀπὸ ῥᾳδίως διαλυομένων καὶ ταχὺ ἀποκαθισταμένων

eng

Those conditions, however, which arise from causes which may easily be rendered ineffective or speedily removed, are

grc

γίγνεται πάθη λέγεται· οὐ γὰρ λέγονται ποιοί τινες

eng

called, not qualities, but affections: for we are not said to be such virtue

grc

κατὰ ταῦτα· οὔτε γὰρ ὁ ἐρυθριῶν διὰ τὸ αἰσχυνθῆναι

eng

of them. The man who blushes through shame is not said to be a

grc

ἐρυθρίας λέγεται, οὔτε ὁ ὠχριῶν διὰ τὸ φοβεῖσθαι

eng

constitutional blusher, nor is the man who becomes pale through fear said to be constitutionally

grc

ὠχρίας, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον πεπονθέναι τι· ὥστε πάθη μὲν τὰ

eng

pale. He is said rather to have been affected. Thus such conditions

grc

τοιαῦτα λέγεται, ποιότητες δὲ οὔ. —ὁμοίως δὲ τούτοις

eng

are called affections, not qualities. In like manner there

grc

καὶ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν παθητικαὶ ποιότητες καὶ πάθη λέ

eng

are affective qualities and affections of the soul.

grc

γεται. ὅσα τε γὰρ ἐν τῇ γενέσει εὐθὺς ἀπό τινων πα

eng

That temper with which a man is born and which has

grc

θῶν γεγένηται ποιότητες λέγονται, οἷον ἥ τε μανικὴ

eng

its origin in certain deep-seated affections is called a quality. I mean

grc

ἔκστασις καὶ ἡ ὀργὴ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα· ποιοὶ γὰρ κατὰ ταύ

eng

such conditions as insanity, irascibility, and so on: for people are said to

grc

τας λέγονται, ὀργίλοι τε καὶ μανικοί. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὅσαι

eng

be mad or irascible in virtue of these. Similarly those abnormal psychic

grc

ἐκστάσεις μὴ φυσικαί, ἀλλ’ ἀπό τινων ἄλλων συμπτωμάτων

eng

states which are not inborn, but arise from the concomitance of

grc

γεγένηνται δυσαπάλλακτοι ἢ καὶ ὅλως ἀκίνητοι, ποιό

eng

certain other elements, and are difficult to remove, or altogether permanent,

grc

τητες καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα· ποιοὶ γὰρ κατὰ ταύτας λέγονται.

eng

are called qualities, for in virtue of them men are said to be such and such.

grc

ὅσα δὲ ἀπὸ ταχὺ καθισταμένων γίγνεται πάθη λέγεται,

eng

Those, however, which arise from causes easily rendered ineffective are called affections, not qualities.

grc

οἷον εἰ λυπούμενος ὀργιλώτερός ἐστιν· οὐ γὰρ λέγεται

eng

Suppose that a man is irritable when vexed: he is not even spoken

grc

ὀργίλος ὁ ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ πάθει ὀργιλώτερος ὤν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλ

eng

of as a bad-tempered man, when in such circumstances he loses his temper somewhat, but rather

grc

λον πεπονθέναι τι· ὥστε πάθη μὲν λέγεται τὰ τοιαῦτα,

eng

is said to be affected. Such conditions are therefore termed, not qualities,

grc

ποιότητες δὲ οὔ.

eng

but affections.

grc

Τέταρτον δὲ γένος ποιότητος σχῆμά τε καὶ ἡ περὶ

eng

The fourth sort of quality is figure and the shape

grc

ἕκαστον ὑπάρχουσα μορφή, ἔτι δὲ πρὸς τούτοις εὐθύτης

eng

that belongs to a thing; and besides this, straightness and

grc

καὶ καμπυλότης καὶ εἴ τι τούτοις ὅμοιόν ἐστιν· καθ’ ἕκα

eng

curvedness and any other qualities of this type; each of these

grc

στον γὰρ τούτων ποιόν τι λέγεται· τῷ γὰρ τρίγωνον ἢ τε

eng

defines a thing as being such and such. Because it is triangular or quadrangular

grc

τράγωνον εἶναι ποιόν τι λέγεται, καὶ τῷ εὐθὺ ἢ καμπύλον.

eng

a thing is said to have a specific character, or again because it is straight or curved;

grc

καὶ κατὰ τὴν μορφὴν δὲ ἕκαστον ποιόν τι λέγεται. τὸ δὲ

eng

in fact a thing's shape in every case gives rise to a qualification of it. Rarity

grc

μανὸν καὶ τὸ πυκνὸν καὶ τὸ τραχὺ καὶ τὸ λεῖον δόξειε

eng

and density, roughness and smoothness, seem to be terms indicating

grc

μὲν ἂν ποιὸν σημαίνειν, ἔοικε δὲ ἀλλότρια τὰ τοιαῦτα

eng

quality: yet these, it would appear, really belong to a

grc

εἶναι τῆς περὶ τὸ ποιὸν διαιρέσεως· θέσιν γάρ τινα μᾶλλον

eng

class different from that of quality. For it is rather a certain relative position of the

grc

φαίνεται τῶν μορίων ἑκάτερον δηλοῦν· πυκνὸν μὲν γὰρ τῷ

eng

parts composing the thing thus qualified which, it appears, is indicated by each of these terms. A thing is dense, owing to

grc

τὰ μόρια σύνεγγυς εἶναι ἀλλήλοις, μανὸν δὲ τῷ διεστάναι

eng

the fact that its parts are closely combined with one another; rare, because there are interstices

grc

ἀπ’ ἀλλήλων· καὶ λεῖον μὲν τῷ ἐπ’ εὐθείας πως τὰ μόρια

eng

between the parts; smooth, because its parts lie, so to speak,

grc

κεῖσθαι, τραχὺ δὲ τῷ τὸ μὲν ὑπερέχειν τὸ δὲ ἐλλείπειν. —

eng

evenly; rough, because some parts project beyond others.

grc

ἴσως μὲν οὖν καὶ ἄλλος ἄν τις φανείη τρόπος ποιότητος, ἀλλ’

eng

There may be other sorts of quality, but those that are most properly

grc

οἵ γε μάλιστα λεγόμενοι σχεδὸν τοσοῦτοί εἰσιν.

eng

so called have, we may safely say, been enumerated.

grc

Ποιότητες μὲν οὖν εἰσὶν αἱ εἰρημέναι, ποιὰ δὲ τὰ κατὰ

eng

These, then, are qualities, and the things that take their name from them as derivatives, or are

grc

ταύτας παρωνύμως λεγόμενα ἢ ὁπωσοῦν ἄλλως ἀπ’ αὐ

eng

in some other way dependent on them, are said to be qualified in some specific way.

grc

τῶν. ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν πλείστων καὶ σχεδὸν ἐπὶ πάντων παρ

eng

In most, indeed in almost all cases, the name of

grc

ωνύμως λέγεται, οἷον ἀπὸ τῆς λευκότητος ὁ λευκὸς καὶ ἀπὸ

eng

that which is qualified is derived from that of the

grc

τῆς γραμματικῆς ὁ γραμματικὸς καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς δικαιοσύνης ὁ

eng

quality. Thus the terms 'whiteness', 'grammar', 'justice', give us the adjectives

grc

δίκαιος, ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. ἐπ’ ἐνίων δὲ διὰ

eng

white', 'grammatical', 'just', and so on. There are some cases, however, in

grc

τὸ μὴ κεῖσθαι ταῖς ποιότησιν ὀνόματα οὐκ ἐνδέχεται παρ

eng

which, as the quality under consideration has no name, it is impossible that those possessed of it

grc

ωνύμως ἀπ’ αὐτῶν λέγεσθαι· οἷον ὁ δρομικὸς ἢ ὁ πυκτικὸς

eng

should have a name that is derivative. For instance, the name given to the runner

grc

ὁ κατὰ δύναμιν φυσικὴν λεγόμενος ἀπ’ οὐδεμιᾶς ποιότητος

eng

or boxer, who is so called in virtue of an inborn capacity, is not derived from

grc

παρωνύμως λέγεται· οὐ γὰρ κεῖται ὀνόματα ταῖς δυνάμεσι

eng

that of any quality; for lob those capacities have no name assigned to them. In

grc

καθ’ ἃς οὗτοι ποιοὶ λέγονται, ὥσπερ καὶ ταῖς ἐπιστήμαις καθ’

eng

this, the inborn capacity is distinct from the science, with reference to which men are called, e.g.

grc

ἃς πυκτικοὶ ἢ παλαιστρικοὶ οἱ κατὰ διάθεσιν λέγονται, —πυ

eng

boxers or wrestlers. Such a science is classed as a disposition; it has a name, and

grc

κτικὴ γὰρ ἐπιστήμη λέγεται καὶ παλαιστρική, ποιοὶ δὲ ἀπὸ

eng

is called 'boxing' or 'wrestling' as the case may be, and the name given to those

grc

τούτων παρωνύμως οἱ διακείμενοι λέγονται.— ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ

eng

disposed in this way is derived from that of the science. Sometimes, even though a

grc

ὀνόματος κειμένου οὐ λέγεται παρωνύμως τὸ κατ’ αὐτὴν

eng

name exists for the quality, that which takes its character from

grc

ποιὸν λεγόμενον, οἷον ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς ὁ σπουδαῖος· τῷ γὰρ

eng

the quality has a name that is not a derivative. For instance, the

grc

ἀρετὴν ἔχειν σπουδαῖος λέγεται, ἀλλ’ οὐ παρωνύμως ἀπὸ

eng

upright man takes his character from the possession of the quality of integrity, but the name given him is not derived

grc

τῆς ἀρετῆς· οὐκ ἐπὶ πολλῶν δὲ τὸ τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν. ποιὰ οὖν

eng

from the word 'integrity'. Yet this does not occur often. We may therefore state

grc

λέγεται τὰ παρωνύμως ἀπὸ τῶν εἰρημένων ποιοτήτων λεγόμενα

eng

that those things are said to be possessed of some specific quality which have a name derived from that of the aforesaid quality,

grc

ἢ ὁπωσοῦν ἄλλως ἀπ’ αὐτῶν.

eng

or which are in some other way dependent on it.

grc

Ὑπάρχει δὲ καὶ ἐναντιότης κατὰ τὸ ποιόν, οἷον δι

eng

One quality may be the contrary of another; thus justice is the contrary of injustice, whiteness

grc

καιοσύνη ἀδικίᾳ ἐναντίον καὶ λευκότης μελανίᾳ καὶ τἆλλα

eng

of blackness, and so on. The things, also, which are said to be such and such in virtue of

grc

ὡσαύτως, καὶ τὰ κατ’ αὐτὰς δὲ ποιὰ λεγόμενα, οἷον τὸ

eng

these qualities, may be contrary the one to the other; for that which is unjust is contrary to

grc

ἄδικον τῷ δικαίῳ καὶ τὸ λευκὸν τῷ μέλανι. οὐκ ἐπὶ πάν

eng

that which is just, that which is white to that which is black. This, however, is

grc

των δὲ τὸ τοιοῦτον· τῷ γὰρ πυῤῥῷ ἢ ὠχρῷ ἢ ταῖς τοιαύ

eng

not always the case. Red, yellow, and such colours,

grc

ταις χροιαῖς οὐδέν ἐστιν ἐναντίον ποιοῖς οὖσιν. —ἔτι ἐὰν

eng

though qualities, have no contraries. If one

grc

τῶν ἐναντίων θάτερον ᾖ ποιόν, καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν ἔσται ποιόν. τοῦ

eng

of two contraries is a quality, the other will also be a quality. This

grc

το δὲ δῆλον προχειριζομένῳ τὰς ἄλλας κατηγορίας, οἷον εἰ ἔστιν

eng

will be evident from particular instances, if we apply the names used to denote the other categories;

grc

ἡ δικαιοσύνη τῇ ἀδικίᾳ ἐναντίον, ποιὸν δὲ ἡ δικαιοσύνη,

eng

for instance, granted that justice is the contrary of injustice and justice is a quality, injustice

grc

ποιὸν ἄρα καὶ ἡ ἀδικία· οὐδεμία γὰρ τῶν ἄλλων κατηγο

eng

will also be a quality: neither quantity, nor relation, nor

grc

ριῶν ἐφαρμόζει τῇ ἀδικίᾳ, οὔτε ποσὸν οὔτε πρός τι

eng

place, nor indeed any other category but that

grc

οὔτε πού, οὐδ’ ὅλως τι τῶν τοιούτων οὐδὲν ἀλλ’ ἢ ποιόν·

eng

of quality, will be applicable properly to injustice.

grc

ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων κατὰ τὸ ποιὸν ἐναν

eng

So it is with all other contraries falling under the category of

grc

τίων.

eng

quality.

grc

Ἐπιδέχεται δὲ καὶ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον τὰ ποιά·

eng

Qualities admit of variation of degree.

grc

λευκὸν γὰρ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον ἕτερον ἑτέρου λέγεται, καὶ

eng

Whiteness is predicated of one thing in a greater or less degree than of another. This

grc

δίκαιον ἕτερον ἑτέρου μᾶλλον. καὶ αὐτὸ δὲ ἐπίδοσιν λαμβά

eng

is also the case with reference to justice. Moreover, one and the same thing may exhibit a

grc

νει, —λευκὸν γὰρ ὂν ἔτι ἐνδέχεται λευκότερον γενέσθαι·— οὐ

eng

quality in a greater degree than it did before: if a thing is white, it may become whiter. Though

grc

πάντα δέ, ἀλλὰ τὰ πλεῖστα· δικαιοσύνη γὰρ δικαιοσύνης

eng

this is generally the case, there are exceptions. For if we should say that justice admitted

grc

εἰ λέγεται μᾶλλον ἀπορήσειεν ἄν τις, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ

eng

of variation of degree, difficulties might ensue, and this is true with regard to

grc

ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων διαθέσεων. ἔνιοι γὰρ διαμφισβητοῦσι περὶ

eng

all those qualities which are dispositions. There are some, indeed, who dispute the possibility

grc

τῶν τοιούτων· δικαιοσύνην μὲν γὰρ δικαιοσύνης οὐ πάνυ

eng

of variation here. They maintain that justice and health cannot very

grc

φασὶ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον λέγεσθαι, οὐδὲ ὑγίειαν ὑγιείας,

eng

well admit of variation of degree themselves, but that people vary in

grc

ἧττον μέντοι ἔχειν ἕτερον ἑτέρου ὑγίειάν φασι, καὶ δικαιοσύ

eng

the degree in which they possess these qualities, and that this is

grc

νην ἧττον ἕτερον ἑτέρου, ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ γραμματικὴν καὶ τὰς

eng

the case with grammatical learning and all those qualities which are classed

grc

ἄλλας διαθέσεις. ἀλλ’ οὖν τά γε κατὰ ταύτας λεγόμενα ἀναμ

eng

as dispositions. However that may be, it is an incontrovertible fact that the things which in virtue of these

grc

φισβητήτως ἐπιδέχεται τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον· γραμματι

eng

qualities are said to be what they are vary in the degree in which they possess them; for one

grc

κώτερος γὰρ ἕτερος ἑτέρου λέγεται καὶ δικαιότερος καὶ

eng

man is said to be better versed in grammar, or more healthy

grc

ὑγιεινότερος, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὡσαύτως. τρίγωνον δὲ καὶ

eng

or just, than another, and so on. The qualities expressed by the

grc

τετράγωνον οὐ δοκεῖ τὸ μᾶλλον ἐπιδέχεσθαι, οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλ

eng

terms 'triangular' and 'quadrangular' do not appear to admit of variation of degree, nor indeed do any that

grc

λων σχημάτων οὐδέν· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιδεχόμενα τὸν τοῦ τρι

eng

have to do with figure. For those things to which the definition of the

grc

γώνου λόγον καὶ τὸν τοῦ κύκλου πάνθ’ ὁμοίως τρίγωνα ἢ

eng

triangle or circle is applicable are all equally triangular or circular. Those, on the other

grc

κύκλοι εἰσίν, τῶν δὲ μὴ ἐπιδεχομένων οὐδὲν ἕτερον ἑτέρου

eng

hand, to which the same definition is not applicable, cannot be said to differ from

grc

μᾶλλον ῥηθήσεται· οὐδὲν γὰρ μᾶλλον τὸ τετράγωνον τοῦ ἑτε

eng

one another in degree; the square is no more a circle

grc

ρομήκους κύκλος ἐστίν· οὐδέτερον γὰρ ἐπιδέχεται τὸν τοῦ κύκλου

eng

than the rectangle, for to neither is the definition of the circle appropriate.

grc

λόγον. ἁπλῶς δέ, ἐὰν μὴ ἐπιδέχηται ἀμφότερα τὸν τοῦ

eng

In short, if the definition of the term proposed

grc

προκειμένου λόγον, οὐ ῥηθήσεται τὸ ἕτερον τοῦ ἑτέρου μᾶλλον.

eng

is not applicable to both objects, they cannot be compared.

grc

οὐ πάντα οὖν τὰ ποιὰ ἐπιδέχεται τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον.

eng

Thus it is not all qualities which admit of variation of degree.

grc

Τῶν μὲν οὖν εἰρημένων οὐδὲν ἴδιον ποιότητος, ὅμοια δὲ

eng

Whereas none of the characteristics I have mentioned are peculiar to quality, the fact that likeness and unlikeness can

grc

καὶ ἀνόμοια κατὰ μόνας τὰς ποιότητας λέγεται· ὅμοιον

eng

be predicated with reference to quality only, gives to that category its distinctive feature. One thing

grc

γὰρ ἕτερον ἑτέρῳ οὐκ ἔστι κατ’ ἄλλο οὐδὲν ἢ καθ’ ὃ ποιόν

eng

is like another only with reference to that in virtue of which it is such and

grc

ἐστιν. ὥστε ἴδιον ἂν εἴη ποιότητος τὸ ὅμοιον ἢ ἀνόμοιον

eng

such; thus this forms the peculiar mark of

grc

λέγεσθαι κατ’ αὐτήν.

eng

quality.

grc

Οὐ δεῖ δὲ ταράττεσθαι μή τις ἡμᾶς φήσῃ ὑπὲρ ποι

eng

We must not be disturbed because it may be argued that, though

grc

ότητος τὴν πρόθεσιν ποιησαμένους πολλὰ τῶν πρός τι

eng

proposing to discuss the category of quality, we have included in it

grc

συγκαταριθμεῖσθαι· τὰς γὰρ ἕξεις καὶ τὰς διαθέσεις τῶν πρός

eng

many relative terms. We did say that habits and dispositions were

grc

τι εἶναι. σχεδὸν γὰρ ἐπὶ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων τὰ γένη

eng

relative. In practically all such cases the genus

grc

πρός τι λέγεται, τῶν δὲ καθ’ ἕκαστα οὐδέν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐπι

eng

is relative, the individual not. Thus knowledge, as

grc

στήμη, γένος οὖσα, αὐτὸ ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἑτέρου λέγεται, —τινὸς

eng

a genus, is explained by reference to something else, for we mean a

grc

γὰρ ἐπιστήμη λέγεται.— τῶν δὲ καθ’ ἕκαστα οὐδὲν αὐτὸ ὅπερ

eng

knowledge of something. But particular branches of knowledge are not thus

grc

ἐστὶν ἑτέρου λέγεται, οἷον ἡ γραμματικὴ οὐ λέγεται τινὸς

eng

explained. The knowledge of grammar is not relative to anything external, nor

grc

γραμματικὴ οὐδ’ ἡ μουσικὴ τινὸς μουσική, ἀλλ’ εἰ ἄρα

eng

is the knowledge of music, but these, if relative at all, are

grc

κατὰ τὸ γένος καὶ αὗται πρός τι λέγεται· οἷον ἡ γραμ

eng

relative only in virtue of their genera; thus grammar is

grc

ματικὴ λέγεται τινὸς ἐπιστήμη, οὐ τινὸς γραμματική,

eng

said be the knowledge of something, not the grammar of something; similarly music

grc

καὶ ἡ μουσικὴ τινὸς ἐπιστήμη, οὐ τινὸς μουσική· ὥστε

eng

is the knowledge of something, not the music of something. Thus

grc

αἱ καθ’ ἕκαστα οὐκ εἰσὶ τῶν πρός τι. λεγόμεθα δὲ ποιοὶ

eng

individual branches of knowledge are not relative. And it is because we possess these individual branches of

grc

ταῖς καθ’ ἕκαστα· ταύτας γὰρ καὶ ἔχομεν, —ἐπιστήμονες γὰρ

eng

knowledge that we are said to be such and such. It is these that we actually possess: we are

grc

λεγόμεθα τῷ ἔχειν τῶν καθ’ ἕκαστα ἐπιστημῶν τινά·— ὥστε

eng

called experts because we possess knowledge in some particular branch. Those particular

grc

αὗται ἂν καὶ ποιότητες εἴησαν αἱ καθ’ ἕκαστα, καθ’ ἅς

eng

branches, therefore, of knowledge, in virtue of which we are sometimes said

grc

ποτε καὶ ποιοὶ λεγόμεθα· αὗται δὲ οὐκ εἰσὶ τῶν πρός τι.—

eng

to be such and such, are themselves qualities, and are not relative.

grc

ἔτι εἰ τυγχάνει τὸ αὐτὸ ποιὸν καὶ πρός τι ὄν, οὐδὲν ἄτοπον

eng

Further, if anything should happen to fall within both the category of quality and that of relation,

grc

ἐν ἀμφοτέροις τοῖς γένεσιν αὐτὸ καταριθμεῖσθαι.

eng

there would be nothing extraordinary in classing it under both these heads.

grc

<. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .>

grc

Ἐπιδέχεται δὲ καὶ τὸ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν ἐναντιό

eng

Action and affection both admit of contraries and also

grc

τητα καὶ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον· τὸ γὰρ θερμαίνειν

eng

of variation of degree. Heating is the

grc

τῷ ψύχειν ἐναντίον καὶ τὸ θερμαίνεσθαι τῷ ψύχεσθαι καὶ

eng

contrary of cooling, being heated of being cooled, being glad

grc

τὸ ἥδεσθαι τῷ λυπεῖσθαι· ὥστε ἐπιδέχεται ἐναντιότητα. καὶ

eng

of being vexed. Thus they admit of contraries. They

grc

τὸ μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἧττον· θερμαίνειν γὰρ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧτ

eng

also admit of variation of degree: for it is possible to heat

grc

τον ἔστι, καὶ θερμαίνεσθαι μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον, καὶ λυπεῖσθαι

eng

in a greater or less degree; also to be heated in a greater

grc

μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον· ἐπιδέχεται οὖν τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον

eng

or less degree. Thus action and affection also admit of

grc

τὸ ποιεῖν καὶ τὸ πάσχειν.

eng

variation of degree.

grc

<. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .>

grc

Ὑπὲρ μὲν οὖν τούτων τοσαῦτα λέγεται· εἴρηται δὲ καὶ ὑπὲρ τοῦ κεῖσθαι

eng

So much, then, is stated with regard to these categories. We spoke, moreover, of the category of position when we were dealing

grc

ἐν τοῖς πρός τι, ὅτι παρωνύμως ἀπὸ τῶν θέσεων λέγεται. ὑπὲρ δὲ τῶν λοιπῶν,

eng

with that of relation, and stated that such terms derived their names from those of the corresponding attitudes. As for the rest,

grc

τοῦ τε ποτὲ καὶ τοῦ ποὺ καὶ τοῦ ἔχειν, διὰ τὸ προφανῆ εἶναι οὐδὲν ὑπὲρ

eng

time, place, state, since they are easily intelligible, I say no more about them than

grc

αὐτῶν ἄλλο λέγεται ἢ ὅσα ἐν ἀρχῇ ἐῤῥήθη, ὅτι τὸ ἔχειν μὲν σημαίνει τὸ

eng

was said at the beginning, that in the category of state are included such states

grc

ὑποδεδέσθαι, τὸ ὡπλίσθαι, τὸ δὲ ποὺ οἷον ἐν Λυκείῳ, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα δὲ ὅσα

eng

as 'shod', 'armed', in that of place 'in the Lyceum' and so on, as

grc

ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἐῤῥήθη. —ὑπὲρ μὲν οὖν τῶν προτεθέντων γενῶν ἱκανὰ τὰ εἰρη

eng

was explained before. The proposed categories have, then, been adequately dealt with.

grc

μένα· περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀντικειμένων, ποσαχῶς εἴωθε ἀντιτίθεσθαι, ῥητέον.]

eng

We must next explain the various senses in which the term 'opposite' is used.

grc

Λέγεται δὲ ἕτερον ἑτέρῳ ἀντικεῖσθαι τετραχῶς, ἢ

eng

Things are said to be opposed in four senses: (i) as correlatives

grc

ὡς τὰ πρός τι, ἢ ὡς τὰ ἐναντία, ἢ ὡς στέρησις καὶ ἕξις,

eng

to one another, (ii) as contraries to one another, (iii) as privatives to

grc

ἢ ὡς κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις. ἀντίκειται δὲ ἕκαστον τῶν

eng

positives, (iv) as affirmatives to negatives. Let me sketch my meaning in outline.

grc

τοιούτων, ὡς τύπῳ εἰπεῖν, ὡς μὲν τὰ πρός τι οἷον τὸ διπλά

eng

An instance of the use of the word 'opposite' with reference to correlatives is afforded

grc

σιον τῷ ἡμίσει, ὡς δὲ τὰ ἐναντία οἷον τὸ κακὸν τῷ ἀγαθῷ,

eng

by the expressions 'double' and 'half'; with reference to contraries by 'bad' and 'good'. Opposites

grc

ὡς δὲ κατὰ στέρησιν καὶ ἕξιν οἷον τυφλότης καὶ ὄψις,

eng

in the sense of 'privatives' and 'positives' are' blindness' and 'sight'; in the

grc

ὡς δὲ κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις οἷον κάθηται—οὐ κάθηται.

eng

sense of affirmatives and negatives, the propositions 'he sits', 'he does not sit'.

grc

Ὅσα μὲν οὖν ὡς τὰ πρός τι ἀντίκειται αὐτὰ ἅπερ ἐστὶ

eng

i) Pairs of opposites which fall under the category of relation are explained by a reference of the

grc

τῶν ἀντικειμένων λέγεται ἢ ὁπωσοῦν ἄλλως πρὸς αὐτά·

eng

one to the other, the reference being indicated by the preposition 'of' or by some other preposition.

grc

οἷον τὸ διπλάσιον τοῦ ἡμίσεος αὐτὸ ὅπερ ἐστὶ διπλάσιον

eng

Thus, double is a relative term, for that which is double is explained as the double of

grc

λέγεται· καὶ ἡ ἐπιστήμη δὲ τῷ ἐπιστητῷ ὡς τὰ πρός τι

eng

something. Knowledge, again, is the opposite of

grc

ἀντίκειται, καὶ λέγεταί γε ἡ ἐπιστήμη αὐτὸ ὅπερ ἐστὶ

eng

the thing known, in the same sense;

grc

τοῦ ἐπιστητοῦ· καὶ τὸ ἐπιστητὸν δὲ αὐτὸ ὅπερ ἐστὶ πρὸς τὸ

eng

and the thing known also is explained by

grc

ἀντικείμενον λέγεται τὴν ἐπιστήμην· τὸ γὰρ ἐπιστητὸν τινὶ

eng

its relation to its opposite, knowledge. For the thing known is explained as that

grc

λέγεται ἐπιστητὸν τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ.

eng

which is known by something, that is, by knowledge.

grc

Ὅσα οὖν ἀντίκειται ὡς τὰ πρός τι αὐτὰ ἅπερ ἐστὶ τῶν ἀντι

eng

Such things, then, as are opposite the one to the other in the sense of being correlatives

grc

κειμένων ἢ ὁπωσδήποτε πρὸς ἄλληλα λέγεται· τὰ δὲ ὡς

eng

are explained by a reference of the one to the other. (ii) Pairs

grc

τὰ ἐναντία, αὐτὰ μὲν ἅπερ ἐστὶν οὐδαμῶς πρὸς ἄλληλα λέ

eng

of opposites which are contraries are not in any way interdependent, but

grc

γεται, ἐναντία μέντοι ἀλλήλων λέγεται· οὔτε γὰρ τὸ ἀγα

eng

are contrary the one to the other. The good is not spoken

grc

θὸν τοῦ κακοῦ λέγεται ἀγαθόν, ἀλλ’ ἐναντίον, οὔτε τὸ λευκὸν

eng

of as the good of the had, but as the contrary of the bad, nor is white spoken of as the

grc

τοῦ μέλανος λευκόν, ἀλλ’ ἐναντίον. ὥστε διαφέρουσιν αὗται

eng

white of the black, but as the contrary of the black. These two types of opposition

grc

αἱ ἀντιθέσεις ἀλλήλων. —ὅσα δὲ τῶν ἐναντίων τοιαῦτά ἐστιν

eng

are therefore distinct. Those contraries which are such that the subjects in

grc

ὥστε ἐν οἷς πέφυκε γίγνεσθαι ἢ ὧν κατηγορεῖται ἀναγκαῖον

eng

which they are naturally present, or of which they are predicated, must necessarily

grc

αὐτῶν θάτερον ὑπάρχειν, τούτων οὐδέν ἐστιν ἀνὰ μέσον· [ὧν δέ

eng

contain either the one or the other of them, have no intermediate, but those

grc

γε μὴ ἀναγκαῖον θάτερον ὑπάρχειν, τούτων ἔστι τι ἀνὰ μέσον

eng

in the case of which no such necessity obtains, always have an

grc

πάντως.] οἷον νόσος καὶ ὑγίεια ἐν σώματι ζῴου πέφυκε

eng

intermediate. Thus disease and health are naturally present in the body of an

grc

γίγνεσθαι, καὶ ἀναγκαῖόν γε θάτερον ὑπάρχειν τῷ τοῦ ζῴου

eng

animal, and it is necessary that either the one or the other should be present

grc

σώματι ἢ νόσον ἢ ὑγίειαν· καὶ περιττὸν δὲ καὶ ἄρτιον ἀριθ

eng

in the body of an animal. Odd and even, again, are predicated of

grc

μοῦ κατηγορεῖται, καὶ ἀναγκαῖόν γε θάτερον τῷ ἀριθμῷ

eng

number, and it is necessary that the one or the other

grc

ὑπάρχειν ἢ περιττὸν ἢ ἄρτιον· καὶ οὐκ ἔστι γε τούτων οὐδὲν

eng

should be present in numbers. Now there is no intermediate

grc

ἀνὰ μέσον, οὔτε νόσου καὶ ὑγιείας οὔτε περιττοῦ καὶ ἀρτίου. ὧν

eng

between the terms of either of these two pairs. On

grc

δέ γε μὴ ἀναγκαῖον θάτερον ὑπάρχειν, τούτων ἔστι τι ἀνὰ

eng

the other hand, in those contraries with regard to which no such necessity obtains, we find an

grc

μέσον· οἷον μέλαν καὶ λευκὸν ἐν σώματι πέφυκε γίγνεσθαι,

eng

intermediate. Blackness and whiteness are naturally present in the body, but it is not necessary that

grc

καὶ οὐκ ἀναγκαῖόν γε θάτερον αὐτῶν ὑπάρχειν τῷ σώματι, —

eng

either the one or the other should be present in the body, inasmuch as it is not

grc

οὐ γὰρ πᾶν ἤτοι λευκὸν ἢ μέλαν ἐστίν·— καὶ φαῦλον δὲ καὶ

eng

true to say that everybody must be white or black. Badness and goodness, again, are

grc

σπουδαῖον κατηγορεῖται μὲν καὶ κατ’ ἀνθρώπου καὶ κατ’

eng

predicated of man, and of many other things, but it is not necessary

grc

ἄλλων πολλῶν, οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον δὲ θάτερον αὐτῶν ὑπάρχειν

eng

that either the one quality or the other should be present in that

grc

ἐκείνοις ὧν κατηγορεῖται· οὐ γὰρ πάντα ἤτοι φαῦλα ἢ σπου

eng

of which they are predicated: it is not true to say that everything that may be good or bad must

grc

δαῖά ἐστιν. καὶ ἔστι γέ τι τούτων ἀνὰ μέσον, οἷον τοῦ μὲν

eng

be either good or bad. These pairs of contraries have intermediates: the intermediates between white and

grc

λευκοῦ καὶ τοῦ μέλανος τὸ φαιὸν καὶ ὠχρὸν καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα

eng

black are grey, sallow, and all the other colours that come between; the

grc

χρώματα, τοῦ δὲ φαύλου καὶ τοῦ σπουδαίου τὸ οὔτε φαῦλον οὔτε

eng

intermediate between good and bad is that which is neither the one nor the

grc

σπουδαῖον. ἐπ’ ἐνίων μὲν οὖν ὀνόματα κεῖται τοῖς ἀνὰ μέσον,

eng

other. Some intermediate qualities have names, such as grey and sallow and all

grc

οἷον λευκοῦ καὶ μέλανος τὸ φαιὸν καὶ ὠχρόν· ἐπ’ ἐνίων δὲ

eng

the other colours that come between white and black; in other cases,

grc

ὀνόματι μὲν οὐκ εὔπορον τὸ ἀνὰ μέσον ἀποδοῦναι, τῇ δὲ

eng

however, it is not easy to name the intermediate, but we must define

grc

ἑκατέρου τῶν ἄκρων ἀποφάσει τὸ ἀνὰ μέσον ὁρίζεται,

eng

it as that which is not either extreme, as in the

grc

οἷον τὸ οὔτε ἀγαθὸν οὔτε κακὸν καὶ οὔτε δίκαιον οὔτε

eng

case of that which is neither good nor bad, neither just nor

grc

ἄδικον.

eng

unjust.

grc

Στέρησις δὲ καὶ ἕξις λέγεται μὲν περὶ ταὐτόν τι, οἷον

eng

iii) 'privatives' and 'Positives' have reference to the same subject. Thus, sight

grc

ἡ ὄψις καὶ ἡ τυφλότης περὶ ὀφθαλμόν· καθόλου δὲ εἰπεῖν, ἐν

eng

and blindness have reference to the eye. It is a universal rule that each

grc

ᾧ πέφυκεν ἡ ἕξις γίγνεσθαι, περὶ τοῦτο λέγεται ἑκάτερον

eng

of a pair of opposites of this type has reference to that to which the particular 'positive' is

grc

αὐτῶν. ἐστερῆσθαι δὲ τότε λέγομεν ἕκαστον τῶν τῆς ἕξεως

eng

natural. We say that that is capable of some particular faculty or possession has suffered privation when the

grc

δεκτικῶν, ὅταν ἐν ᾧ πέφυκεν ὑπάρχειν καὶ ὅτε πέφυκεν

eng

faculty or possession in question is in no way present in that in which, and at the time at

grc

ἔχειν μηδαμῶς ὑπάρχῃ· νωδόν τε γὰρ λέγομεν οὐ τὸ μὴ

eng

which, it should naturally be present. We do not call that toothless which has not teeth,

grc

ἔχον ὀδόντας, καὶ τυφλὸν οὐ τὸ μὴ ἔχον ὄψιν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὴ

eng

or that blind which has not sight, but rather that which has not teeth or sight at the

grc

ἔχον ὅτε πέφυκεν ἔχειν· τινὰ γὰρ ἐκ γενετῆς οὔτε ὄψιν

eng

time when by nature it should. For there are some creatures which from birth are

grc

οὔτε ὀδόντας ἔχει, ἀλλ’ οὐ λέγεται νωδὰ οὐδὲ τυφλά.

eng

without sight, or without teeth, but these are not called toothless or blind.

grc

τὸ δὲ ἐστερῆσθαι καὶ τὸ ἔχειν τὴν ἕξιν οὐκ ἔστι στέρησις καὶ

eng

To be without some faculty or to possess it is not the same as the corresponding 'privative' or

grc

ἕξις· ἕξις μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ἡ ὄψις, στέρησις δὲ ἡ τυφλότης,

eng

positive'. 'Sight' is a 'positive', 'blindness' a 'privative', but 'to possess sight'

grc

τὸ δὲ ἔχειν τὴν ὄψιν οὐκ ἔστιν ὄψις, οὐδὲ τὸ τυφλὸν εἶναι

eng

is not equivalent to 'sight', 'to be blind' is not equivalent to

grc

τυφλότης· στέρησις γάρ τις ἡ τυφλότης ἐστίν, τὸ δὲ τυφλὸν

eng

blindness'. Blindness is a 'privative', to be blind is to be in a

grc

εἶναι ἐστερῆσθαι, οὐ στέρησίς ἐστιν. ἔτι εἰ ἦν ἡ τυφλότης

eng

state of privation, but is not a 'privative'. Moreover, if 'blindness' were equivalent

grc

ταὐτὸν τῷ τυφλὸν εἶναι, κατηγορεῖτο ἂν ἀμφότερα κατὰ

eng

to 'being blind', both would be predicated of the same

grc

τοῦ αὐτοῦ· ἀλλὰ τυφλὸς μὲν λέγεται ὁ ἄνθρωπος, τυφλότης

eng

subject; but though a man is said to be blind, he is by

grc

δὲ ὁ ἄνθρωπος οὐδαμῶς λέγεται. ἀντικεῖσθαι δὲ καὶ ταῦτα

eng

no means said to be blindness. To be in a state of 'possession' is,

grc

δοκεῖ, τὸ ἐστερῆσθαι καὶ τὸ τὴν ἕξιν ἔχειν ὡς στέρησις καὶ

eng

it appears, the opposite of being in a state of 'privation', just as 'positives' and 'privatives' themselves are

grc

ἕξις· ὁ γὰρ τρόπος τῆς ἀντιθέσεως ὁ αὐτός· ὡς γὰρ ἡ τυ

eng

opposite. There is the same type of antithesis in both cases; for just

grc

φλότης τῇ ὄψει ἀντίκειται, οὕτω καὶ τὸ τυφλὸν εἶναι τῷ

eng

as blindness is opposed to sight, so is being blind opposed

grc

ὄψιν ἔχειν ἀντίκειται. (οὐκ ἔστι δὲ οὐδὲ τὸ ὑπὸ τὴν κατάφασιν

eng

to having sight. That which is affirmed or denied is

grc

καὶ ἀπόφασιν κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις· ἡ μὲν γὰρ κατάφασις

eng

not itself affirmation or denial. By 'affirmation' we mean

grc

λόγος ἐστὶ καταφατικὸς καὶ ἡ ἀπόφασις λόγος ἀποφατι

eng

an affirmative proposition, by 'denial' a negative. Now, those facts which

grc

κός, τῶν δὲ ὑπὸ τὴν κατάφασιν ἢ ἀπόφασιν οὐδέν ἐστι

eng

form the matter of the affirmation or denial are not propositions;

grc

λόγος. λέγεται δὲ καὶ ταῦτα ἀντικεῖσθαι ἀλλήλοις ὡς κα

eng

yet these two are said to be opposed in the same sense as the affirmation and denial, for in this case

grc

τάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις· καὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ τούτων ὁ τρόπος τῆς

eng

also the type of antithesis is the same. For as the affirmation is opposed to the denial, as in the two

grc

ἀντιθέσεως ὁ αὐτός· ὡς γάρ ποτε ἡ κατάφασις πρὸς τὴν

eng

propositions 'he sits', 'he does not sit', so also the fact which constitutes the

grc

ἀπόφασιν ἀντίκειται, οἷον τὸ κάθηται—οὐ κάθηται, οὕτω

eng

matter of the proposition in one case is opposed to that in

grc

καὶ τὸ ὑφ’ ἑκάτερον πρᾶγμα ἀντίκειται, τὸ καθῆσθαι—μὴ

eng

the other, his sitting, that is to say, to his not

grc

καθῆσθαι.) —ὅτι δὲ ἡ στέρησις καὶ ἡ ἕξις οὐκ ἀντίκειται ὡς

eng

sitting. It is evident that 'positives' and 'privatives' are not opposed each to each in

grc

τὰ πρός τι, φανερόν· οὐ γὰρ λέγεται αὐτὸ ὅπερ ἐστὶ τοῦ ἀντι

eng

the same sense as relatives. The one is not explained by reference to the

grc

κειμένου· ἡ γὰρ ὄψις οὐκ ἔστι τυφλότητος ὄψις, οὐδ’ ἄλλως

eng

other; sight is not sight of blindness, nor is any other preposition

grc

οὐδαμῶς πρὸς αὐτὸ λέγεται· ὡσαύτως δὲ οὐδὲ ἡ τυφλότης

eng

used to indicate the relation. Similarly blindness is not

grc

λέγοιτ’ ἂν τυφλότης ὄψεως, ἀλλὰ στέρησις μὲν ὄψεως ἡ

eng

said to be blindness of sight,

grc

τυφλότης λέγεται, τυφλότης δὲ ὄψεως οὐ λέγεται. ἔτι τὰ

eng

but rather, privation of sight. Relatives, moreover,

grc

πρός τι πάντα πρὸς ἀντιστρέφοντα λέγεται, ὥστε καὶ ἡ τυ

eng

reciprocate; if blindness, therefore, were a relative, there would be a

grc

φλότης εἴπερ ἦν τῶν πρός τι, ἀντέστρεφεν ἂν κἀκεῖνο πρὸς

eng

reciprocity of relation between it and that with which it was

grc

ὃ λέγεται· ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἀντιστρέφει· οὐ γὰρ λέγεται ἡ ὄψις

eng

correlative. But this is not the case. Sight is not called the

grc

τυφλότητος ὄψις.

eng

sight of blindness.

grc

Ὅτι δὲ οὐδ’ ὡς τὰ ἐναντία ἀντίκειται τὰ κατὰ στέρη

eng

That those terms which fall under the heads of 'positives' and 'privatives' are not opposed each

grc

σιν λεγόμενα καὶ ἕξιν ἐκ τῶνδε δῆλον. τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἐναν

eng

to each as contraries, either, is plain from the following facts: Of a pair of

grc

τίων, ὧν μηδέν ἐστιν ἀνὰ μέσον, ἀναγκαῖον, ἐν οἷς πέφυκε

eng

contraries such that they have no intermediate, one or the other must needs be present

grc

γίγνεσθαι ἢ ὧν κατηγορεῖται, θάτερον αὐτῶν ὑπάρχειν ἀεί·

eng

in the subject in which they naturally subsist, or of which they are predicated;

grc

τούτων γὰρ οὐδὲν ἦν ἀνὰ μέσον, ὧν θάτερον ἀναγκαῖον ἦν τῷ

eng

for it is those, as we proved,' in the case of which this necessity

grc

δεκτικῷ ὑπάρχειν, οἷον ἐπὶ νόσου καὶ ὑγιείας καὶ περιττοῦ

eng

obtains, that have no intermediate. Moreover, we cited health and disease, odd and even,

grc

καὶ ἀρτίου· ὧν δὲ ἔστι τι ἀνὰ μέσον, οὐδέποτε ἀνάγκη παντὶ

eng

as instances. But those contraries which have an intermediate are not subject to

grc

ὑπάρχειν θάτερον· οὔτε γὰρ λευκὸν ἢ μέλαν ἀνάγκη πᾶν

eng

any such necessity. It is not necessary that every substance, receptive of such

grc

εἶναι τὸ δεκτικόν, οὔτε θερμὸν ἢ ψυχρόν, —τούτων γὰρ

eng

qualities, should be either black or white, cold or hot, for something intermediate between these

grc

ἀνὰ μέσον τι οὐδὲν κωλύει ὑπάρχειν·— ἔτι δὲ καὶ τού

eng

contraries may very well be present in the subject. We proved, moreover, that those

grc

των ἦν τι ἀνὰ μέσον ὧν μὴ ἀναγκαῖον ἦν θάτερον ὑπάρχειν

eng

contraries have an intermediate in the case of which the said necessity does not obtain. Yet when

grc

τῷ δεκτικῷ, εἰ μὴ οἷς φύσει τὸ ἓν ὑπάρχει, οἷον τῷ

eng

one of the two contraries is a constitutive property of the subject, as it is a

grc

πυρὶ τὸ θερμῷ εἶναι καὶ τῇ χιόνι τὸ λευκῇ· —ἐπὶ δὲ

eng

constitutive property of fire to be hot, of snow to be white, it is

grc

τούτων ἀφωρισμένως ἀναγκαῖον θάτερον ὑπάρχειν, καὶ οὐχ

eng

necessary determinately that one of the two contraries, not one or the other, should be present

grc

ὁπότερον ἔτυχεν· οὐ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται τὸ πῦρ ψυχρὸν εἶναι

eng

in the subject; for fire cannot be cold, or

grc

οὐδὲ τὴν χιόνα μέλαιναν·— ὥστε παντὶ μὲν οὐκ ἀνάγκη

eng

snow black. Thus, it is not the case here that one of the

grc

τῷ δεκτικῷ θάτερον αὐτῶν ὑπάρχειν, ἀλλὰ μόνον οἷς φύ

eng

two must needs be present in every subject receptive of these qualities, but only in that subject of which the one

grc

σει τὸ ἓν ὑπάρχει, καὶ τούτοις ἀφωρισμένως τὸ ἓν καὶ οὐχ

eng

forms a constitutive property. Moreover, in such cases it is one member of the pair determinately, and not either the one or

grc

ὁπότερον ἔτυχεν. ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς στερήσεως καὶ τῆς ἕξεως οὐδέ

eng

the other, which must be present. In the case of 'positives' and 'privatives', on the other hand,

grc

τερον τῶν εἰρημένων ἀληθές· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀεὶ τῷ δεκτικῷ ἀναγ

eng

neither of the aforesaid statements holds good. For it is not necessary that a subject receptive

grc

καῖον θάτερον αὐτῶν ὑπάρχειν, —τὸ γὰρ μήπω πεφυκὸς

eng

of the qualities should always have either the one or the other; that which has not yet

grc

ὄψιν ἔχειν οὔτε τυφλὸν οὔτε ὄψιν ἔχειν λέγεται, ὥστε οὐκ ἂν

eng

advanced to the state when sight is natural is not said either to be blind or to see. Thus 'positives'

grc

εἴη ταῦτα τῶν τοιούτων ἐναντίων ὧν οὐδέν ἐστιν ἀνὰ μέσον·—

eng

and 'privatives' do not belong to that class of contraries which consists of those which have no intermediate.

grc

ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ ὧν τι ἔστιν ἀνὰ μέσον· ἀναγκαῖον γάρ ποτε παντὶ

eng

On the other hand, they do not belong either to that class which consists of contraries which have an intermediate. For under certain conditions it is necessary that either the

grc

τῷ δεκτικῷ θάτερον αὐτῶν ὑπάρχειν· ὅταν γὰρ ἤδη πε

eng

one or the other should form part of the constitution of every appropriate subject. For when a thing has reached

grc

φυκὸς ᾖ ἔχειν ὄψιν, τότε ἢ τυφλὸν ἢ ἔχον ὄψιν ῥηθήσεται,

eng

the stage when it is by nature capable of sight, it will be said either to see or to be blind,

grc

καὶ τούτων οὐκ ἀφωρισμένως θάτερον, ἀλλ’ ὁπότερον ἔτυχεν,

eng

and that in an indeterminate sense, signifying that the capacity may be either present or absent; for it is not necessary either

grc

οὐ γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον ἢ τυφλὸν ἢ ὄψιν ἔχον εἶναι, ἀλλ’ ὁπό

eng

that it should see or that it should be blind, but that it should be either in the one state

grc

τερον ἔτυχεν·— ἐπὶ δέ γε τῶν ἐναντίων, ὧν ἔστιν ἀνὰ μέσον τι,

eng

or in the other. Yet in the case of those contraries which have an intermediate we found that it was never necessary

grc

οὐδέποτε ἀναγκαῖον ἦν παντὶ θάτερον ὑπάρχειν, ἀλλὰ τισίν,

eng

that either the one or the other should be present in every appropriate subject, but only that in certain subjects one of

grc

καὶ τούτοις ἀφωρισμένως τὸ ἕν. ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι κατ’ οὐδέτερον

eng

the pair should be present, and that in a determinate sense. It is, therefore, plain that 'positives' and

grc

τῶν τρόπων ὡς τὰ ἐναντία ἀντίκειται τὰ κατὰ στέρησιν καὶ

eng

privatives' are not opposed each to each in either of the senses in which

grc

ἕξιν ἀντικείμενα. —ἔτι ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ἐναντίων ὑπάρχοντος τοῦ

eng

contraries are opposed. Again, in the case of contraries, it is possible that there should

grc

δεκτικοῦ δυνατὸν εἰς ἄλληλα μεταβολὴν γενέσθαι, εἰ μή

eng

be changes from either into the other, while the subject retains its identity, unless indeed one

grc

τινι φύσει τὸ ἓν ὑπάρχει, οἷον τῷ πυρὶ τὸ θερμῷ εἶναι· καὶ γὰρ

eng

of the contraries is a constitutive property of that subject, as heat is of fire. For it

grc

τὸ ὑγιαῖνον δυνατὸν νοσῆσαι καὶ τὸ λευκὸν μέλαν γενέσθαι

eng

is possible that that that which is healthy should become diseased, that

grc

καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν θερμόν, καὶ ἐκ σπουδαίου γε φαῦλον καὶ ἐκ

eng

which is white, black, that which is cold, hot, that which is good,

grc

φαύλου σπουδαῖον δυνατὸν γενέσθαι· —ὁ γὰρ φαῦλος εἰς βελ

eng

bad, that which is bad, good. The bad man, if he

grc

τίους διατριβὰς ἀγόμενος καὶ λόγους κἂν μικρόν γέ τι ἐπι

eng

is being brought into a better way of life and thought, may

grc

δοίη εἰς τὸ βελτίω εἶναι· ἐὰν δὲ ἅπαξ κἂν μικρὰν ἐπίδοσιν

eng

make some advance, however slight, and if he should once improve, even ever

grc

λάβῃ, φανερὸν ὅτι ἢ τελείως ἂν μεταβάλοι ἢ πάνυ πολλὴν ἂν

eng

so little, it is plain that he might change completely, or at any rate make

grc

ἐπίδοσιν λάβοι· ἀεὶ γὰρ εὐκινητότερος πρὸς ἀρετὴν γίγνεται,

eng

very great progress; for a man becomes more and more easily moved to virtue, however small the

grc

κἂν ἡντινοῦν ἐπίδοσιν εἰληφὼς ἐξ ἀρχῆς ᾖ, ὥστε καὶ πλείω

eng

improvement was at first. It is, therefore, natural to suppose that he will make yet greater progress

grc

εἰκὸς ἐπίδοσιν λαμβάνειν· καὶ τοῦτο ἀεὶ γιγνόμενον τε

eng

than he has made in the past; and as this process goes on, it will

grc

λείως εἰς τὴν ἐναντίαν ἕξιν ἀποκαθίστησιν, ἐάνπερ μὴ χρόνῳ

eng

change him completely and establish him in the contrary state, provided he is not hindered by lack

grc

ἐξείργηται·— ἐπὶ δέ γε τῆς στερήσεως καὶ τῆς ἕξεως ἀδύνα

eng

of time. In the case of 'positives' and 'privatives', however, change

grc

τον εἰς ἄλληλα μεταβολὴν γενέσθαι· ἀπὸ μὲν γὰρ τῆς ἕξεως

eng

in both directions is impossible. There may be a

grc

ἐπὶ τὴν στέρησιν γίγνεται μεταβολή, ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς στε

eng

change from possession to privation, but not from

grc

ρήσεως ἐπὶ τὴν ἕξιν ἀδύνατον· οὔτε γὰρ τυφλὸς γενόμενός

eng

privation to possession. The man who has become blind does not regain

grc

τις πάλιν ἔβλεψεν, οὔτε φαλακρὸς ὢν κομήτης ἐγένετο, οὔτε

eng

his sight; the man who has become bald does not regain his hair; the man who has lost his teeth

grc

νωδὸς ὢν ὀδόντας ἔφυσεν.

eng

does not grow his grow a new set.

grc

Ὅσα δὲ ὡς κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις ἀντίκειται, φανε

eng

iv) Statements opposed as affirmation and negation belong

grc

ρὸν ὅτι κατ’ οὐδένα τῶν εἰρημένων τρόπων ἀντίκειται·

eng

manifestly to a class which is distinct,

grc

ἐπὶ μόνων γὰρ τούτων ἀναγκαῖον ἀεὶ τὸ μὲν ἀληθὲς τὸ δὲ

eng

for in this case, and in this case only, it is necessary for the one opposite to be

grc

ψεῦδος αὐτῶν εἶναι. οὔτε γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐναντίων ἀναγκαῖον

eng

true and the other false. Neither in the case of contraries, nor in the

grc

ἀεὶ θάτερον μὲν ἀληθὲς εἶναι θάτερον δὲ ψεῦδος, οὔτε ἐπὶ τῶν

eng

case of correlatives, nor in the case of 'positives' and 'privatives', is it necessary

grc

πρός τι, οὔτε ἐπὶ τῆς ἕξεως καὶ στερήσεως· οἷον ὑγίεια

eng

for one to be true and the other false. Health and

grc

καὶ νόσος ἐναντία, καὶ οὐδέτερόν γε οὔτε ἀληθὲς οὔτε ψεῦδός

eng

disease are contraries: neither of them is true or false.

grc

ἐστιν· ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τὸ διπλάσιον καὶ τὸ ἥμισυ ὡς τὰ πρός τι

eng

Double' and 'half' are opposed to each other

grc

ἀντίκειται, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτῶν οὐδέτερον οὔτε ἀληθὲς οὔτε ψεῦ

eng

as correlatives: neither of them is true or false.

grc

δος· οὐδέ γε τὰ κατὰ στέρησιν καὶ ἕξιν, οἷον ἡ ὄψις καὶ ἡ

eng

The case is the same, of course, with regard to 'positives' and 'privatives' such as 'sight'

grc

τυφλότης· ὅλως δὲ τῶν κατὰ μηδεμίαν συμπλοκὴν λεγομένων

eng

and 'blindness'. In short, where there is no sort of combination of

grc

οὐδὲν οὔτε ἀληθὲς οὔτε ψεῦδός ἐστιν· πάντα δὲ τὰ εἰρη

eng

words, truth and falsity have no place, and all the opposites we

grc

μένα ἄνευ συμπλοκῆς λέγεται. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ μάλιστα δό

eng

have mentioned so far consist of simple words. At the same time, when the

grc

ξειεν ἂν τὸ τοιοῦτο συμβαίνειν ἐπὶ τῶν κατὰ συμπλοκὴν ἐναν

eng

words which enter into opposed statements are contraries, these, more than any other set of opposites,

grc

τίων λεγομένων, —τὸ γὰρ ὑγιαίνειν Σωκράτη τῷ νοσεῖν Σω

eng

would seem to claim this characteristic. 'Socrates is ill' is the contrary of 'Socrates is

grc

κράτη ἐναντίον ἐστίν,— ἀλλ’ οὐδ’ ἐπὶ τούτων ἀναγκαῖον ἀεὶ

eng

well', but not even of such composite expressions is it true to say that one

grc

θάτερον μὲν ἀληθὲς θάτερον δὲ ψεῦδος εἶναι· ὄντος μὲν γὰρ

eng

of the pair must always be true and the other false. For if Socrates exists,

grc

Σωκράτους ἔσται τὸ μὲν ἀληθὲς τὸ δὲ ψεῦδος, μὴ ὄντος δὲ

eng

one will be true and the other false, but if he does not exist, both

grc

ἀμφότερα ψευδῆ· οὔτε γὰρ τὸ νοσεῖν Σωκράτη οὔτε τὸ

eng

will be false; for neither 'Socrates is ill' nor 'Socrates is

grc

ὑγιαίνειν ἀληθὲς αὐτοῦ μὴ ὄντος ὅλως τοῦ Σωκράτους.

eng

well' is true, if Socrates does not exist at all.

grc

ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς στερήσεως καὶ τῆς ἕξεως μὴ ὄντος γε ὅλως

eng

In the case of 'positives' and 'privatives', if the subject does not exist at all, neither proposition is true, but

grc

οὐδέτερον ἀληθές, ὄντος δὲ οὐκ ἀεὶ θάτερον ἀληθές·

eng

even if the subject exists, it is not always the fact that one is true and the other false.

grc

τὸ γὰρ ὄψιν ἔχειν Σωκράτη τῷ τυφλὸν εἶναι Σωκράτη ἀντί

eng

For 'Socrates has sight' is the opposite of 'Socrates is blind' in

grc

κειται ὡς στέρησις καὶ ἕξις, καὶ ὄντος γε οὐκ ἀναγ

eng

the sense of the word 'opposite' which applies to possession and privation.

grc

καῖον θάτερον ἀληθὲς εἶναι ἢ ψεῦδος, —ὅτε γὰρ μήπω

eng

Now if Socrates exists, it is not necessary that one should

grc

πέφυκεν ἔχειν, ἀμφότερα ψευδῆ,— μὴ ὄντος δὲ ὅλως τοῦ

eng

be true and the other false, for when he is not yet

grc

Σωκράτους καὶ οὕτω ψευδῆ ἀμφότερα, καὶ τὸ ὄψιν αὐτὸν

eng

able to acquire the power of vision, both are false, as also

grc

ἔχειν καὶ τὸ τυφλὸν εἶναι. ἐπὶ δέ γε τῆς καταφάσεως

eng

if Socrates is altogether non-existent. But in the case of

grc

καὶ τῆς ἀποφάσεως ἀεί, ἐάν τε ᾖ ἐάν τε μὴ ᾖ, τὸ μὲν ἕτε

eng

affirmation and negation, whether the subject exists or not, one is

grc

ρον ἔσται ψεῦδος τὸ δὲ ἕτερον ἀληθές· τὸ γὰρ νοσεῖν Σωκρά

eng

always false and the other true. For manifestly, if Socrates

grc

τη καὶ τὸ μὴ νοσεῖν Σωκράτη, ὄντος τε αὐτοῦ φανερὸν ὅτι

eng

exists, one of the two propositions 'Socrates is ill', 'Socrates

grc

τὸ ἕτερον αὐτῶν ἀληθὲς ἢ ψεῦδος, καὶ μὴ ὄντος ὁμοίως·

eng

is not ill', is true, and the other false.

grc

τὸ μὲν γὰρ νοσεῖν μὴ ὄντος ψεῦδος, τὸ δὲ μὴ νοσεῖν ἀλη

eng

This is likewise the case if he does not exist; for if he does not exist, to say that he is ill is false, to say that he is not ill

grc

θές· ὥστε ἐπὶ μόνων τούτων ἴδιον ἂν εἴη τὸ ἀεὶ θάτερον αὐ

eng

is true. Thus it is in the case of those opposites only, which are opposite in the sense in which the term

grc

τῶν ἀληθὲς ἢ ψεῦδος εἶναι, ὅσα ὡς κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφα

eng

is used with reference to affirmation and negation, that the rule holds good, that one of the pair must be

grc

σις ἀντίκειται.

eng

true and the other false.

grc

Ἐναντίον δέ ἐστιν ἀγαθῷ μὲν ἐξ ἀνάγκης κακόν, —τοῦτο δὲ

eng

That the contrary of a good is an evil is

grc

δῆλον τῇ καθ’ ἕκαστον ἐπαγωγῇ, οἷον ὑγιείᾳ νόσος καὶ δικαιοσύνῃ

eng

shown by induction: the contrary of health is disease, of courage,

grc

ἀδικία καὶ ἀνδρείᾳ δειλία, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων,— κακῷ

eng

cowardice, and so on. But the contrary of an evil

grc

δὲ ὁτὲ μὲν ἀγαθὸν ἐναντίον ἐστίν, ὁτὲ δὲ κακόν· τῇ γὰρ ἐνδείᾳ

eng

is sometimes a good, sometimes an evil. For defect, which is an

grc

κακῷ ὄντι ἡ ὑπερβολὴ ἐναντίον κακὸν ὄν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ

eng

evil, has excess for its contrary, this also being an evil, and the mean, which is a

grc

μεσότης ἐναντία ἑκατέρῳ οὖσα ἀγαθόν. ἐπ’ ὀλίγων δ’ ἂν

eng

good, is equally the contrary of the one and of the other. It is only in a

grc

τὸ τοιοῦτον ἴδοι τις, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν πλείστων ἀεὶ τῷ κακῷ τὸ

eng

few cases, however, that we see instances of this: in most, the contrary of

grc

ἀγαθὸν ἐναντίον ἐστίν. —ἔτι τῶν ἐναντίων οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον, ἐὰν

eng

an evil is a good. In the case of contraries, it is not always necessary that

grc

θάτερον ᾖ, καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν εἶναι· ὑγιαινόντων γὰρ ἁπάντων ὑγίεια

eng

if one exists the other should also exist: for if all become healthy there will be

grc

μὲν ἔσται, νόσος δὲ οὔ· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ λευκῶν ὄντων ἁπάν

eng

health and no disease, and again, if everything turns white,

grc

των λευκότης μὲν ἔσται, μελανία δὲ οὔ. ἔτι εἰ τὸ Σωκράτη

eng

there will be white, but no black. Again, since the fact that

grc

ὑγιαίνειν τῷ Σωκράτη νοσεῖν ἐναντίον ἐστίν, μὴ ἐνδέχεται

eng

Socrates is ill is the contrary of the fact that Socrates is well, and two

grc

δὲ ἅμα ἀμφότερα τῷ αὐτῷ ὑπάρχειν, οὐκ ἂν ἐνδέχοιτο τοῦ

eng

contrary conditions cannot both obtain in one and the same individual at the same time,

grc

ἑτέρου τῶν ἐναντίων ὄντος καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν εἶναι· ὄντος γὰρ τοῦ

eng

both these contraries could not exist at once: for if that Socrates was well was

grc

Σωκράτη ὑγιαίνειν οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ νοσεῖν Σωκράτη.

eng

a fact, then that Socrates was ill could not possibly be one.

grc

Δῆλον δὲ ὅτι καὶ περὶ ταὐτὸν ἢ εἴδει ἢ γένει πέφυκε

eng

It is plain that contrary attributes must needs be present in subjects which belong to

grc

γίγνεσθαι τὰ ἐναντία· νόσος μὲν γὰρ καὶ ὑγίεια ἐν σώματι ζῴου,

eng

the same species or genus. Disease and health require as their subject the body of an animal;

grc

λευκότης δὲ καὶ μελανία ἁπλῶς ἐν σώματι, δικαιοσύνη δὲ καὶ

eng

white and black require a body, without further qualification; justice and injustice require as their subject

grc

ἀδικία ἐν ψυχῇ. ἀνάγκη δὲ πάντα τὰ ἐναντία ἢ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει

eng

the human soul. Moreover, it is necessary that pairs of contraries should in all cases either

grc

εἶναι ἢ ἐν τοῖς ἐναντίοις γένεσιν, ἢ αὐτὰ γένη εἶναι· λευκὸν

eng

belong to the same genus or belong to contrary genera or be themselves genera. White

grc

μὲν γὰρ καὶ μέλαν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει, —χρῶμα γὰρ αὐτῶν

eng

and black belong to the same genus, colour;

grc

τὸ γένος,— δικαιοσύνη δὲ καὶ ἀδικία ἐν τοῖς ἐναντίοις

eng

justice and injustice, to contrary genera, virtue and vice;

grc

γένεσιν, —τοῦ μὲν γὰρ ἀρετή, τοῦ δὲ κακία τὸ γένος,— ἀγα

eng

while good and evil do not belong to

grc

θὸν δὲ καὶ κακὸν οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν γένει, ἀλλ’ αὐτὰ τυγχάνει γένη

eng

genera, but are themselves actual genera, with terms under

grc

τινῶν ὄντα.

eng

them.

grc

Πρότερον ἕτερον ἑτέρου λέγεται τετραχῶς· πρῶτον μὲν

eng

There are four senses in which one thing can be said to be 'prior' to another. Primarily and most

grc

καὶ κυριώτατα κατὰ χρόνον, καθ’ ὃ πρεσβύτερον ἕτε

eng

properly the term has reference to time: in this sense the word

grc

ρον ἑτέρου καὶ παλαιότερον λέγεται, —τῷ γὰρ τὸν χρόνον πλείω

eng

is used to indicate that one thing is older or more ancient than another, for the

grc

εἶναι καὶ πρεσβύτερον καὶ παλαιότερον λέγεται·— δεύτερον

eng

expressions 'older' and 'more ancient' imply greater length of time. Secondly, one

grc

δὲ τὸ μὴ ἀντιστρέφον κατὰ τὴν τοῦ εἶναι ἀκολούθησιν, οἷον

eng

thing is said to be 'prior' to another when the sequence of their

grc

τὸ ἓν τῶν δύο πρότερον· δυεῖν μὲν γὰρ ὄντων ἀκολουθεῖ

eng

being cannot be reversed. In this sense 'one' is 'prior' to 'two'. For

grc

εὐθὺς τὸ ἓν εἶναι, ἑνὸς δὲ ὄντος οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον δύο εἶναι,

eng

if 'two' exists, it follows directly that 'one' must exist, but if 'one' exists, it does

grc

ὥστε οὐκ ἀντιστρέφει ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑνὸς ἡ ἀκολούθησις τοῦ εἶναι τὸ

eng

not follow necessarily that 'two' exists: thus the sequence subsisting cannot be reversed. It is agreed, then,

grc

λοιπόν, πρότερον δὲ δοκεῖ τὸ τοιοῦτον εἶναι ἀφ’ οὗ μὴ ἀντι

eng

that when the sequence of two things cannot be reversed, then that one on which the

grc

στρέφει ἡ τοῦ εἶναι ἀκολούθησις. τρίτον δὲ κατά τινα τάξιν

eng

other depends is called 'prior' to that other. In the third place, the term 'prior' is

grc

πρότερον λέγεται, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν καὶ τῶν λό

eng

used with reference to any order, as in the case of science and of oratory.

grc

γων· ἔν τε γὰρ ταῖς ἀποδεικτικαῖς ἐπιστήμαις ὑπάρχει τὸ πρότε

eng

For in sciences which use demonstration there is that which is prior

grc

ρον καὶ τὸ ὕστερον τῇ τάξει, —τὰ γὰρ στοιχεῖα πρότερα τῶν

eng

and that which is posterior in order; in geometry, the elements are

grc

διαγραμμάτων τῇ τάξει, καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς γραμματικῆς τὰ στοιχεῖα

eng

prior to the propositions; in reading and writing, the letters of the

grc

πρότερα τῶν συλλαβῶν,— ἐπί τε τῶν λόγων ὁμοίως, —τὸ γὰρ

eng

alphabet are prior to the syllables. Similarly, in the case of speeches,

grc

προοίμιον τῆς διηγήσεως πρότερον τῇ τάξει ἐστίν. — ἔτι

eng

the exordium is prior in order to the narrative. Besides these

grc

παρὰ τὰ εἰρημένα τὸ βέλτιον καὶ τὸ τιμιώτερον πρότερον

eng

senses of the word, there is a fourth. That which is better and more honourable is

grc

εἶναι τῇ φύσει δοκεῖ· εἰώθασι δὲ καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ τοὺς

eng

said to have a natural priority. In common parlance men speak of

grc

ἐντιμοτέρους καὶ μᾶλλον ἀγαπωμένους ὑπ’ αὐτῶν προ

eng

those whom they honour and love as 'coming

grc

τέρους φάσκειν εἶναι· ἔστι μὲν δὴ σχεδὸν ἀλλοτριώτατος

eng

first' with them. This sense of the word is perhaps

grc

τῶν τρόπων οὗτος.

eng

the most far-fetched.

grc

Οἱ μὲν οὖν λεγόμενοι τοῦ προτέρου τρόποι τοσοῦτοί

eng

Such, then, are the different senses in which the term 'prior' is used.

grc

εἰσιν. δόξειε δ’ ἂν καὶ παρὰ τοὺς εἰρημένους ἕτερος

eng

Yet it would seem that besides those mentioned there

grc

εἶναι προτέρου τρόπος· τῶν γὰρ ἀντιστρεφόντων κατὰ τὴν τοῦ

eng

is yet another. For in those things, the being of each of which implies

grc

εἶναι ἀκολούθησιν τὸ αἴτιον ὁπωσοῦν θατέρῳ τοῦ εἶναι πρότε

eng

that of the other, that which is in any way the cause may reasonably be said

grc

ρον εἰκότως φύσει λέγοιτ’ ἄν. ὅτι δ’ ἔστι τινὰ τοιαῦτα,

eng

to be by nature 'prior' to the effect. It is plain that there are instances of

grc

δῆλον· τὸ γὰρ εἶναι ἄνθρωπον ἀντιστρέφει κατὰ τὴν τοῦ εἶ

eng

this. The fact of the being of a man carries with it the truth

grc

ναι ἀκολούθησιν πρὸς τὸν ἀληθῆ περὶ αὐτοῦ λόγον· εἰ γὰρ

eng

of the proposition that he is, and the implication is reciprocal: for if

grc

ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος, ἀληθὴς ὁ λόγος ᾧ λέγομεν ὅτι ἔστιν ἄν

eng

a man is, the proposition wherein we allege that he is true,

grc

θρωπος· καὶ ἀντιστρέφει γε, —εἰ γὰρ ἀληθὴς ὁ λόγος ᾧ λέ

eng

and conversely, if the proposition wherein we allege that

grc

γομεν ὅτι ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος, ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος·— ἔστι δὲ ὁ μὲν ἀλη

eng

he is true, then he is. The true proposition, however, is

grc

θὴς λόγος οὐδαμῶς αἴτιος τοῦ εἶναι τὸ πρᾶγμα, τὸ μέντοι

eng

in no way the cause of the being of the man, but the fact of the man's

grc

πρᾶγμα φαίνεταί πως αἴτιον τοῦ εἶναι ἀληθῆ τὸν λόγον·

eng

being does seem somehow to be the cause of the truth of the proposition,

grc

τῷ γὰρ εἶναι τὸ πρᾶγμα ἢ μὴ ἀληθὴς ὁ λόγος ἢ ψευ

eng

for the truth or falsity of the proposition depends on the fact of the man's being

grc

δὴς λέγεται. ὥστε κατὰ πέντε τρόπους πρότερον ἕτερον ἑτέρου

eng

or not being. Thus the word 'prior' may be used in five

grc

λέγοιτ’ ἄν.

eng

senses.

grc

Ἅμα δὲ λέγεται ἁπλῶς μὲν καὶ κυριώτατα ὧν ἡ γέ

eng

The term 'simultaneous' is primarily and most appropriately applied to those things the genesis of the one of

grc

νεσις ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χρόνῳ· οὐδέτερον γὰρ πρότερον οὐδὲ

eng

which is simultaneous with that of the other; for in such cases neither is prior or posterior

grc

ὕστερόν ἐστιν· ἅμα δὲ κατὰ τὸν χρόνον ταῦτα λέγεται.

eng

to the other. Such things are said to be simultaneous in point of time.

grc

φύσει δὲ ἅμα ὅσα ἀντιστρέφει μὲν κατὰ τὴν τοῦ εἶναι

eng

Those things, again, are 'simultaneous' in point of nature, the being of

grc

ἀκολούθησιν, μηδαμῶς δὲ αἴτιον θάτερον θατέρῳ τοῦ εἶναί

eng

each of which involves that of the other, while at the same

grc

ἐστιν, οἷον ἐπὶ τοῦ διπλασίου καὶ τοῦ ἡμίσεος· ἀντιστρέφει μὲν

eng

time neither is the cause of the other's being. This is the case with regard

grc

γὰρ ταῦτα, —διπλασίου γὰρ ὄντος ἐστὶν ἥμισυ, καὶ ἡμίσεος

eng

to the double and the half, for these are reciprocally dependent, since, if there is a double, there is also a half,

grc

ὄντος διπλάσιόν ἐστιν,— οὐδέτερον δὲ οὐδετέρῳ αἴτιον τοῦ

eng

and if there is a half, there is also a double, while at the same time neither is the cause of the

grc

εἶναί ἐστιν. καὶ τὰ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ γένους ἀντιδιῃρημένα ἀλλή

eng

being of the other. Again, those species which are distinguished one from another and opposed one to another within the

grc

λοις ἅμα τῇ φύσει λέγεται. ἀντιδιῃρῆσθαι δὲ λέγεται

eng

same genus are said to be 'simultaneous' in nature. I mean those species which are distinguished each

grc

ἀλλήλοις τὰ κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν διαίρεσιν, οἷον τὸ πτηνὸν τῷ

eng

from each by one and the same method of division. Thus the 'winged' species is simultaneous with the

grc

πεζῷ καὶ τῷ ἐνύδρῳ· ταῦτα γὰρ ἀλλήλοις ἀντιδιῄρηται ἐκ

eng

terrestrial' and the 'water' species. These are distinguished within the same genus, and are

grc

τοῦ αὐτοῦ γένους ὄντα· τὸ γὰρ ζῷον διαιρεῖται εἰς ταῦτα, εἴς

eng

opposed each to each, for the genus 'animal' has the 'winged', the 'terrestrial',

grc

τε τὸ πτηνὸν καὶ τὸ πεζὸν καὶ τὸ ἔνυδρον, καὶ οὐδέν γε

eng

and the 'water' species, and no one of these is prior or

grc

τούτων πρότερον ἢ ὕστερόν ἐστιν, ἀλλ’ ἅμα τῇ φύσει τὰ

eng

posterior to another; on the contrary, all such things appear to be

grc

τοιαῦτα δοκεῖ εἶναι· (διαιρεθείη δ’ ἂν καὶ ἕκαστον τού

eng

simultaneous' in nature. Each of these also, the terrestrial, the

grc

των εἰς εἴδη πάλιν, οἷον τὸ πεζὸν καὶ τὸ πτηνὸν καὶ τὸ

eng

winged, and the water species, can be divided again into

grc

ἔνυδρον.) ἔσται οὖν κἀκεῖνα ἅμα τῇ φύσει, ὅσα ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ

eng

subspecies. Those species, then, also will be 'simultaneous' point of nature, which, belonging to the same genus, are

grc

γένους κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν διαίρεσίν ἐστιν· τὰ δὲ γένη τῶν εἰ

eng

distinguished each from each by one and the same method of differentiation. But genera are prior

grc

δῶν ἀεὶ πρότερα· οὐ γὰρ ἀντιστρέφει κατὰ τὴν τοῦ εἶναι

eng

to species, for the sequence of their being cannot be

grc

ἀκολούθησιν· οἷον ἐνύδρου μὲν ὄντος ἔστι ζῷον, ζῴου δὲ ὄντος

eng

reversed. If there is the species 'water-animal', there will be the genus 'animal', but granted the being of the genus 'animal', it

grc

οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἔνυδρον εἶναι. —ἅμα οὖν τῇ φύσει λέγεται ὅσα

eng

does not follow necessarily that there will be the species 'water-animal'. Those things, therefore, are said to be 'simultaneous' in

grc

ἀντιστρέφει μὲν κατὰ τὴν τοῦ εἶναι ἀκολούθησιν, μηδαμῶς δὲ

eng

nature, the being of each of which involves that of the other, while at the same time

grc

αἴτιον τὸ ἕτερον τῷ ἑτέρῳ τοῦ εἶναί ἐστιν, καὶ τὰ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ

eng

neither is in any way the cause of the other's being; those species, also, which are distinguished each

grc

γένους ἀντιδιῃρημένα ἀλλήλοις· ἁπλῶς δὲ ἅμα, ὧν ἡ γένεσις ἐν

eng

from each and opposed within the same genus. Those things, moreover, are 'simultaneous' in the unqualified sense of the word which come

grc

τῷ αὐτῷ χρόνῳ.

eng

into being at the same time.

grc

Κινήσεως δέ ἐστιν εἴδη ἕξ· γένεσις, φθορά, αὔξησις,

eng

There are six sorts of movement: generation, destruction, increase, diminution,

grc

μείωσις, ἀλλοίωσις, κατὰ τόπον μεταβολή. αἱ μὲν οὖν ἄλλαι

eng

alteration, and change of place. It is evident in all but

grc

κινήσεις φανερὸν ὅτι ἕτεραι ἀλλήλων εἰσίν· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἡ

eng

one case that all these sorts of movement are distinct each from each. Generation is distinct

grc

γένεσις φθορὰ οὐδέ γε ἡ αὔξησις μείωσις οὐδὲ ἡ κατὰ τόπον

eng

from destruction, increase and change of place from

grc

μεταβολή†, ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι· ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ἀλλοιώσεως ἔχει

eng

diminution, and so on. But in the case of alteration

grc

τινὰ ἀπορίαν, μήποτε ἀναγκαῖον ᾖ τὸ ἀλλοιούμενον κατά τινα τῶν

eng

it may be argued that the process necessarily implies one or other of the

grc

λοιπῶν κινήσεων ἀλλοιοῦσθαι. τοῦτο δὲ οὐκ ἀληθές ἐστιν· σχεδὸν

eng

other five sorts of motion. This is not true, for we

grc

γὰρ κατὰ πάντα τὰ πάθη ἢ τὰ πλεῖστα ἀλλοιοῦσθαι συμβέβη

eng

may say that all affections, or nearly all, produce in us an

grc

κεν ἡμῖν οὐδεμιᾶς τῶν ἄλλων κινήσεων κοινωνοῦσιν· οὔτε

eng

alteration which is distinct from all other sorts of motion, for

grc

γὰρ αὔξεσθαι ἀναγκαῖον τὸ κατὰ πάθος κινούμενον οὔτε

eng

that which is affected need not suffer either increase or

grc

μειοῦσθαι, ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ὥσθ’ ἑτέρα ἂν

eng

diminution or any of the other sorts of motion. Thus alteration

grc

εἴη παρὰ τὰς ἄλλας κινήσεις ἡ ἀλλοίωσις· εἰ γὰρ ἦν ἡ

eng

is a distinct sort of motion; for, if it were

grc

αὐτή, ἔδει τὸ ἀλλοιούμενον εὐθὺς καὶ αὔξεσθαι ἢ μειοῦσθαι

eng

not, the thing altered would not only be altered, but would forthwith necessarily suffer increase or diminution or

grc

ἤ τινα τῶν ἄλλων ἀκολουθεῖν κινήσεων· ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἀνάγκη.

eng

some one of the other sorts of motion in addition; which as a matter of fact is not the case.

grc

ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τὸ αὐξόμενον ἤ τινα ἄλλην κίνησιν κι

eng

Similarly that which was undergoing the process of increase or was subject to some other sort of motion would, if alteration were not a

grc

νούμενον ἀλλοιοῦσθαι· ἀλλ’ ἔστι τινὰ αὐξανόμενα ἃ οὐκ

eng

distinct form of motion, necessarily be subject to alteration also. But there are some things which undergo increase but yet

grc

ἀλλοιοῦται· οἷον τὸ τετράγωνον γνώμονος περιτεθέντος ηὔ

eng

not alteration. The square, for instance, if a gnomon is applied

grc

ξηται μέν, ἀλλοιότερον δὲ οὐδὲν γεγένηται· ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ

eng

to it, undergoes increase but not alteration, and so it is

grc

ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων. ὥσθ’ ἕτεραι ἂν εἴησαν αἱ κι

eng

with all other figures of this sort. Alteration and increase, therefore, are

grc

νήσεις ἀλλήλων.

eng

distinct.

grc

Ἔστι δὲ ἁπλῶς μὲν κίνησις ἠρεμίᾳ ἐναντίον· ταῖς δὲ

eng

Speaking generally, rest is the contrary of motion. But the different

grc

καθ’ ἕκαστα, γενέσει μὲν φθορά, αὐξήσει δὲ μείωσις·

eng

forms of motion have their own contraries in other forms; thus destruction is the contrary of generation, diminution of increase,

grc

τῇ δὲ κατὰ τόπον μεταβολῇ ἡ κατὰ τόπον ἠρεμία μά

eng

rest in a place, of change of place. As for this last,

grc

λιστα ἔοικεν ἀντικεῖσθαι, καὶ εἰ ἄρα ἡ εἰς τὸν ἐναντίον

eng

change in the reverse direction would seem to be most truly its contrary;

grc

τόπον μεταβολή, οἷον τῇ κάτωθεν ἡ ἄνω, τῇ ἄνωθεν ἡ

eng

thus motion upwards is the contrary of motion downwards and vice versa.

grc

κάτω. τῇ δὲ λοιπῇ τῶν ἀποδοθεισῶν κινήσεων οὐ ῥᾴδιον

eng

In the case of that sort of motion which yet

grc

ἀποδοῦναι τί ποτέ ἐστιν ἐναντίον, ἔοικε δὲ οὐδὲν εἶναι αὐτῇ

eng

remains, of those that have been enumerated, it is not easy to state

grc

ἐναντίον, εἰ μή τις καὶ ἐπὶ ταύτης τὴν κατὰ τὸ ποιὸν ἠρε

eng

what is its contrary. It appears to have no contrary, unless one should

grc

μίαν ἀντιθείη <ἢ> τὴ<ν> εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον τοῦ ποιοῦ μεταβολή<ν>,

eng

define the contrary here also either as 'rest in its quality' or as

grc

καθάπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς κατὰ τόπον μεταβολῆς τὴν κατὰ

eng

change in the direction of the contrary quality', just as we

grc

τόπον ἠρεμίαν ἢ τὴν εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον τόπον μεταβολήν, —ἔστι

eng

defined the contrary of change of place either as rest in a place

grc

γὰρ ἡ ἀλλοίωσις μεταβολὴ κατὰ τὸ ποιόν·— ὥστε ἀντίκει

eng

or as change in the reverse direction. For a thing is

grc

ται τῇ <κατὰ τὸ ποιὸν κινήσει ἡ> κατὰ τὸ ποιὸν ἠρεμία

eng

altered when change of quality takes place; therefore either rest in its quality or change in the

grc

<ἢ> ἡ εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον τοῦ ποιοῦ μεταβολή, οἷον τὸ λευκὸν γί

eng

direction of the contrary may be called the contrary of this qualitative form of motion. In this way

grc

γνεσθαι τῷ μέλαν γίγνεσθαι· ἀλλοιοῦται γὰρ εἰς τὰ ἐναντία

eng

becoming white is the contrary of becoming black; there is alteration in the contrary direction, since

grc

τοῦ ποιοῦ μεταβολῆς γιγνομένης.

eng

a change of a qualitative nature takes place.

grc

Τὸ ἔχειν κατὰ πλείονας τρόπους λέγεται· ἢ γὰρ

eng

The term 'to have' is used in various senses. In the

grc

ὡς ἕξιν καὶ διάθεσιν ἢ ἄλλην τινὰ ποιότητα, —λε

eng

first place it is used with reference to habit or disposition or any other quality, for

grc

γόμεθα γὰρ ἐπιστήμην ἔχειν καὶ ἀρετήν·— ἢ ὡς ποσόν,

eng

we are said to 'have' a piece of knowledge or a virtue. Then, again, it has

grc

οἷον ὃ τυγχάνει τις ἔχων μέγεθος, —λέγεται γὰρ τρίπη

eng

reference to quantity, as, for instance, in the case of a man's height; for he is said to

grc

χυ μέγεθος ἔχειν ἢ τετράπηχυ·— ἢ ὡς τὰ περὶ τὸ σῶμα,

eng

have' a height of three or four cubits. It is used, moreover, with regard to apparel, a man

grc

οἷον ἱμάτιον ἢ χιτῶνα· ἢ ὡς ἐν μορίῳ, οἷον ἐν χειρὶ δα

eng

being said to 'have' a coat or tunic; or in respect of something which we have on a part of ourselves, as a

grc

κτύλιον· ἢ ὡς μέρος, οἷον χεῖρα ἢ πόδα· ἢ ὡς ἐν ἀγγείῳ,

eng

ring on the hand: or in respect of something which is a part of us, as hand or foot. The term refers also

grc

οἷον ὁ μέδιμνος τοὺς πυροὺς ἢ τὸ κεράμιον τὸν οἶνον, —οἶνον

eng

to content, as in the case of a vessel and wheat, or of a jar

grc

γὰρ ἔχειν τὸ κεράμιον λέγεται, καὶ ὁ μέδιμνος πυρούς·

eng

and wine; a jar is said to 'have' wine, and a corn-measure wheat.

grc

ταῦτ’ οὖν ἔχειν λέγεται ὡς ἐν ἀγγείῳ·— ἢ ὡς κτῆμα·

eng

The expression in such cases has reference to content. Or it refers to that which has been acquired;

grc

ἔχειν γὰρ οἰκίαν καὶ ἀγρὸν λεγόμεθα. λεγόμεθα δὲ καὶ

eng

we are said to 'have' a house or a field. A man is also said

grc

γυναῖκα ἔχειν καὶ ἡ γυνὴ ἄνδρα· ἔοικε δὲ ἀλλοτριώτατος ὁ νῦν

eng

to 'have' a wife, and a wife a husband, and this appears to be the most

grc

ῥηθεὶς τρόπος τοῦ ἔχειν εἶναι· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο τῷ ἔχειν γυ

eng

remote meaning of the term, for by the use of it we mean

grc

ναῖκα σημαίνομεν ἢ ὅτι συνοικεῖ. ἴσως δ’ ἂν καὶ ἄλλοι τινὲς

eng

simply that the husband lives with the wife. Other senses of the word

grc

φανείησαν τοῦ ἔχειν τρόποι, οἱ δὲ εἰωθότες λέγεσθαι σχεδὸν

eng

might perhaps be found, but the most ordinary ones have

grc

ἅπαντες κατηρίθμηνται.

eng

all been enumerated.

Alignment of Aristotle's Categories

Aristotle, Categories