Alignment of Aristotle's Categories

grc

Ὁμώνυμα λέγεται ὧν ὄνομα μόνον κοινόν, ὁ δὲ κατὰ τοὔνομα λόγος τῆς οὐσίας ἕτερος, οἷον ζῷον ὅ τε ἄνθρωπος καὶ τὸ γεγραμμένον·

eng

Things are said to be named 'equivocally' when, though they have a common name, the definition corresponding with the name differs for each. Thus, a real man and a figure in a picture can both lay claim to the name 'animal';

grc

τούτων γὰρ ὄνομα μόνον κοινόν, ὁ δὲ κατὰ τοὔνομα λόγος τῆς οὐσίας ἕτερος·

eng

yet these are equivocally so named, for, though they have a common name, the definition corresponding with the name differs for each.

grc

ἐὰν γὰρ ἀποδιδῷ τις τί ἐστιν αὐτῶν ἑκατέρῳ τὸ ζῴῳ εἶναι, ἴδιον ἑκατέρου λόγον ἀποδώσει.

eng

For should any one define in what sense each is an animal, his definition in the one case will be appropriate to that case only.

grc

συνώνυμα δὲ λέγεται ὧν τό τε ὄνομα κοινὸν καὶ ὁ κατὰ τοὔνομα λόγος τῆς οὐσίας ὁ αὐτός, οἷον ζῷον ὅ τε ἄνθρωπος καὶ ὁ βοῦς·

eng

On the other hand, things are said to be named 'univocally' which have both the name and the definition answering to the name in common. A man and an ox are both 'animal',

grc

τούτων γὰρ ἑκάτερον κοινῷ ὀνόματι προσαγορεύεται ζῷον, καὶ ὁ λόγος δὲ τῆς οὐσίας ὁ αὐτός·

eng

and these are univocally so named, inasmuch as not only the name, but also the definition, is the same in both cases:

grc

ἐὰν γὰρ ἀποδιδῷ τις τὸν ἑκατέρου λόγον τί ἐστιν αὐτῶν ἑκατέρῳ τὸ ζῴῳ εἶναι, τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον ἀποδώσει.

eng

for if a man should state in what sense each is an animal, the statement in the one case would be identical with that in the other.

grc

παρώνυμα δὲ λέγεται ὅσα ἀπό τινος διαφέροντα τῇ πτώσει τὴν κατὰ τοὔνομα προσηγορίαν ἔχει, οἷον ἀπὸ τῆς γραμματικῆς ὁ γραμματικὸς καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἀνδρείας ὁ ἀνδρεῖος.

eng

Things are said to be named 'derivatively', which derive their name from some other name, but differ from it in termination. Thus the grammarian derives his name from the word 'grammar', and the courageous man from the word 'courage'.

grc

Τῶν λεγομένων τὰ μὲν κατὰ συμπλοκὴν λέγεται, τὰ δὲ ἄνευ συμπλοκῆς.

eng

Forms of speech are either simple or composite.

grc

τὰ μὲν οὖν κατὰ συμπλοκήν, οἷον ἄνθρωπος τρέχει, ἄνθρωπος νικᾷ·

eng

Examples of the latter are such expressions as 'the man runs', 'the man wins';

grc

τὰ δὲ ἄνευ συμπλοκῆς, οἷον ἄνθρωπος, βοῦς, τρέχει, νικᾷ.

eng

of the former 'man', 'ox', 'runs', 'wins'.

grc

Τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν καθ’ ὑποκειμένου τινὸς λέγεται, ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ δὲ οὐδενί ἐστιν, οἷον ἄνθρωπος καθ’ ὑποκειμένου μὲν λέγεται τοῦ τινὸς ἀνθρώπου, ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ δὲ οὐδενί ἐστιν·

eng

Of things themselves some are predicable of a subject, and are never present in a subject. Thus 'man' is predicable of the individual man, and is never present in a subject.

grc

τὰ δὲ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ μέν ἐστι, καθ’ ὑποκειμένου δὲ οὐδενὸς λέγεται, —ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ δὲ λέγω ὃ ἔν τινι μὴ ὡς μέρος ὑπάρχον ἀδύνατον χωρὶς εἶναι τοῦ ἐν ᾧ ἐστίν,— οἷον ἡ τὶς γραμματικὴ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ μέν ἐστι τῇ ψυχῇ, καθ’ ὑποκειμένου δὲ οὐδενὸς λέγεται, καὶ τὸ τὶ λευκὸν ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ μέν ἐστι τῷ σώματι, —ἅπαν γὰρ χρῶμα ἐν σώματι,— καθ’ ὑποκειμένου δὲ οὐδενὸς λέγεται·

eng

By being 'present in a subject' I do not mean present as parts are present in a whole, but being incapable of existence apart from the said subject. Some things, again, are present in a subject, but are never predicable of a subject. For instance, a certain point of grammatical knowledge is present in the mind, but is not predicable of any subject; or again, a certain whiteness may be present in the body (for colour requires a material basis), yet it is never predicable of anything.

grc

τὰ δὲ καθ’ ὑποκειμένου τε λέγεται καὶ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἐστίν, οἷον ἡ ἐπιστήμη ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ μέν ἐστι τῇ ψυχῇ, καθ’ ὑποκειμένου δὲ λέγεται τῆς γραμματικῆς·

eng

Other things, again, are both predicable of a subject and present in a subject. Thus while knowledge is present in the human mind, it is predicable of grammar.

grc

τὰ δὲ οὔτε ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἐστὶν οὔτε καθ’ ὑποκειμένου λέγεται, οἷον ὁ τὶς ἄνθρωπος ἢ ὁ τὶς ἵππος, —οὐδὲν γὰρ τῶν τοιούτων οὔτε ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἐστὶν οὔτε καθ’ ὑποκειμένου λέγεται·‍

eng

There is, lastly, a class of things which are neither present in a subject nor predicable of a subject, such as the individual man or the individual horse.

grc

ἁπλῶς δὲ τὰ ἄτομα καὶ ἓν ἀριθμῷ κατ’ οὐδενὸς ὑποκειμένου λέγεται, ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ δὲ ἔνια οὐδὲν κωλύει εἶναι·

eng

But, to speak more generally, that which is individual and has the character of a unit is never predicable of a subject. Yet in some cases there is nothing to prevent such being present in a subject.

grc

ἡ γὰρ τὶς γραμματικὴ τῶν ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἐστίν.

eng

Thus a certain point of grammatical knowledge is present in a subject.

grc

Ὅταν ἕτερον καθ’ ἑτέρου κατηγορῆται ὡς καθ’ ὑποκειμένου, ὅσα κατὰ τοῦ κατηγορουμένου λέγεται, πάντα καὶ κατὰ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου ῥηθήσεται·

eng

When one thing is predicated of another, all that which is predicable of the predicate will be predicable also of the subject.

grc

οἷον ἄνθρωπος κατὰ τοῦ τινὸς ἀνθρώπου κατηγορεῖται, τὸ δὲ ζῷον κατὰ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου·

eng

Thus, 'man' is predicated of the individual man; but 'animal' is predicated of 'man';

grc

οὐκοῦν καὶ κατὰ τοῦ τινὸς ἀνθρώπου τὸ ζῷον κατηγορηθήσεται·

eng

it will, therefore, be predicable of the individual man also:

grc

ὁ γὰρ τὶς ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἄνθρωπός ἐστι καὶ ζῷον.

eng

for the individual man is both 'man' and 'animal'.

grc

τῶν ἑτερογενῶν καὶ μὴ ὑπ’ ἄλληλα τεταγμένων ἕτεραι τῷ εἴδει καὶ αἱ διαφοραί, οἷον ζῴου καὶ ἐπιστήμης·

eng

If genera are different and co-ordinate, their differentiae are themselves different in kind. Take as an instance the genus 'animal' and the genus 'knowledge'.

grc

ζῴου μὲν γὰρ διαφοραὶ τό τε πεζὸν καὶ τὸ πτηνὸν καὶ τὸ ἔνυδρον καὶ τὸ δίπουν, ἐπιστήμης δὲ οὐδεμία τούτων·

eng

With feet', 'two-footed', 'winged', 'aquatic', are differentiae of 'animal'; the species of knowledge are not distinguished by the same differentiae.

grc

οὐ γὰρ διαφέρει ἐπιστήμη ἐπιστήμης τῷ δίπους εἶναι.

eng

One species of knowledge does not differ from another in being 'two-footed'.

grc

τῶν δέ γε ὑπ’ ἄλληλα γενῶν οὐδὲν κωλύει τὰς αὐτὰς διαφορὰς εἶναι·

eng

But where one genus is subordinate to another, there is nothing to prevent their having the same differentiae:

grc

τὰ γὰρ ἐπάνω τῶν ὑπ’ αὐτὰ γενῶν κατηγορεῖται, ὥστε ὅσαι τοῦ κατηγορουμένου διαφοραί εἰσι τοσαῦται καὶ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου ἔσονται.

eng

for the greater class is predicated of the lesser, so that all the differentiae of the predicate will be differentiae also of the subject.

grc

Τῶν κατὰ μηδεμίαν συμπλοκὴν λεγομένων ἕκαστον ἤτοι οὐσίαν σημαίνει ἢ ποσὸν ἢ ποιὸν ἢ πρός τι ἢ ποὺ ἢ ποτὲ ἢ κεῖσθαι ἢ ἔχειν ἢ ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν.

eng

Expressions which are in no way composite signify substance, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, state, action, or affection.

grc

ἔστι δὲ οὐσία μὲν ὡς τύπῳ εἰπεῖν οἷον ἄνθρωπος, ἵππος·

eng

To sketch my meaning roughly, examples of substance are 'man' or 'the horse',

grc

ποσὸν δὲ οἷον δίπηχυ, τρίπηχυ·

eng

of quantity, such terms as 'two cubits long' or 'three cubits long',

grc

ποιὸν δὲ οἷον λευκόν, γραμματικόν·

eng

of quality, such attributes as 'white', 'grammatical'.

grc

πρός τι δὲ οἷον διπλάσιον, ἥμισυ, μεῖζον·

eng

Double', 'half', 'greater', fall under the category of relation;

grc

ποὺ δὲ οἷον ἐν Λυκείῳ, ἐν ἀγορᾷ·

eng

in a the market place', 'in the Lyceum', under that of place;

grc

ποτὲ δὲ οἷον χθές, πέρυσιν·

eng

yesterday', 'last year', under that of time.

grc

κεῖσθαι δὲ οἷον ἀνάκειται, κάθηται·

eng

Lying', 'sitting', are terms indicating position,

grc

ἔχειν δὲ οἷον ὑποδέδεται, ὥπλισται·

eng

shod', 'armed', state;

grc

ποιεῖν δὲ οἷον τέμνειν, καίειν·

eng

to lance', 'to cauterize', action;

grc

πάσχειν δὲ οἷον τέμνεσθαι, καίεσθαι.

eng

to be lanced', 'to be cauterized', affection.

grc

ἕκαστον δὲ τῶν εἰρημένων αὐτὸ μὲν καθ’ αὑτὸ ἐν οὐδεμιᾷ καταφάσει λέγεται, τῇ δὲ πρὸς ἄλληλα τούτων συμπλοκῇ κατάφασις γίγνεται·

eng

No one of these terms, in and by itself, involves an affirmation; it is by the combination of such terms that positive or negative statements arise.

grc

ἅπασα γὰρ δοκεῖ κατάφασις ἤτοι ἀληθὴς ἢ ψευδὴς εἶναι, τῶν δὲ κατὰ μηδεμίαν συμπλοκὴν λεγομένων οὐδὲν οὔτε ἀληθὲς οὔτε ψεῦδός ἐστιν, οἷον ἄνθρωπος, λευκόν, τρέχει, νικᾷ.

eng

For every assertion must, as is admitted, be either true or false, whereas expressions which are not in any way composite such as 'man', 'white', 'runs', 'wins', cannot be either true or false.

grc

Οὐσία δέ ἐστιν ἡ κυριώτατά τε καὶ πρώτως καὶ μάλιστα λεγομένη, ἣ μήτε καθ’ ὑποκειμένου τινὸς λέγεται μήτε ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ τινί ἐστιν, οἷον ὁ τὶς ἄνθρωπος ἢ ὁ τὶς ἵππος.

eng

Substance, in the truest and primary and most definite sense of the word, is that which is neither predicable of a subject nor present in a subject; for instance, the individual man or horse.

grc

δεύτεραι δὲ οὐσίαι λέγονται, ἐν οἷς εἴδεσιν αἱ πρώτως οὐσίαι λεγόμεναι ὑπάρχουσιν, ταῦτά τε καὶ τὰ τῶν εἰδῶν τούτων γένη·

eng

But in a secondary sense those things are called substances within which, as species, the primary substances are included; also those which, as genera, include the species.

grc

οἷον ὁ τὶς ἄνθρωπος ἐν εἴδει μὲν ὑπάρχει τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, γένος δὲ τοῦ εἴδους ἐστὶ τὸ ζῷον·

eng

For instance, the individual man is included in the species 'man', and the genus to which the species belongs is 'animal';

grc

δεύτεραι οὖν αὗται λέγονται οὐσίαι, οἷον ὅ τε ἄνθρωπος καὶ τὸ ζῷον.

eng

these, therefore-that is to say, the species 'man' and the genus 'animal,-are termed secondary substances.

grc

φανερὸν δὲ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ὅτι τῶν καθ’ ὑποκειμένου λεγομένων ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τοὔνομα καὶ τὸν λόγον κατηγορεῖσθαι τοῦ ὑποκειμένου·

eng

It is plain from what has been said that both the name and the definition of the predicate must be predicable of the subject.

grc

οἷον ἄνθρωπος καθ’ ὑποκειμένου λέγεται τοῦ τινὸς ἀνθρώπου, καὶ κατηγορεῖταί γε τοὔνομα, —τὸν γὰρ ἄνθρωπον κατὰ τοῦ τινὸς ἀνθρώπου κατηγορήσεις·‍

eng

For instance, 'man' is predicted of the individual man. Now in this case the name of the species man' is applied to the individual, for we use the term 'man' in describing the individual;

grc

καὶ ὁ λόγος δὲ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου κατὰ τοῦ τινὸς ἀνθρώπου κατηγορηθήσεται, —ὁ γὰρ τὶς ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν·‍

eng

and the definition of 'man' will also be predicated of the individual man, for the individual man is both man and animal.

grc

ὥστε καὶ τοὔνομα καὶ ὁ λόγος κατὰ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου κατηγορηθήσεται.

eng

Thus, both the name and the definition of the species are predicable of the individual.

grc

τῶν δ’ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ὄντων ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν πλείστων οὔτε τοὔνομα οὔτε ὁ λόγος κατηγορεῖται τοῦ ὑποκειμένου·

eng

With regard, on the other hand, to those things which are present in a subject, it is generally the case that neither their name nor their definition is predicable of that in which they are present.

grc

ἐπ’ ἐνίων δὲ τοὔνομα μὲν οὐδὲν κωλύει κατηγορεῖσθαι τοῦ ὑποκειμένου, τὸν δὲ λόγον ἀδύνατον·

eng

Though, however, the definition is never predicable, there is nothing in certain cases to prevent the name being used.

grc

οἷον τὸ λευκὸν ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ὂν τῷ σώματι κατηγορεῖται τοῦ ὑποκειμένου, —λευκὸν γὰρ σῶμα λέγεται,— ὁ δὲ λόγος τοῦ λευκοῦ οὐδέποτε κατὰ τοῦ σώματος κατηγορηθήσεται.

eng

For instance, 'white' being present in a body is predicated of that in which it is present, for a body is called white: the definition, however, of the colour white' is never predicable of the body.

grc

τὰ δ’ ἄλλα πάντα ἤτοι καθ’ ὑποκειμένων λέγεται τῶν πρώτων οὐσιῶν ἢ ἐν ὑποκειμέναις αὐταῖς ἐστίν.

eng

Everything except primary substances is either predicable of a primary substance or present in a primary substance.

grc

τοῦτο δὲ φανερὸν ἐκ τῶν καθ’ ἕκαστα προχειριζομένων·

eng

This becomes evident by reference to particular instances which occur.

grc

οἷον τὸ ζῷον κατὰ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου κατηγορεῖται, οὐκοῦν καὶ κατὰ τοῦ τινὸς ἀνθρώπου, —εἰ γὰρ κατὰ μηδενὸς τῶν τινῶν ἀνθρώπων, οὐδὲ κατὰ ἀνθρώπου ὅλως·‍

eng

Animal' is predicated of the species 'man', therefore of the individual man, for if there were no individual man of whom it could be predicated, it could not be predicated of the species 'man' at all.

grc

πάλιν τὸ χρῶμα ἐν σώματι, οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐν τινὶ σώματι·

eng

Again, colour is present in body, therefore in individual bodies,

grc

εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἐν τινὶ τῶν καθ’ ἕκαστα, οὐδὲ ἐν σώματι ὅλως·

eng

for if there were no individual body in which it was present, it could not be present in body at all.

grc

ὥστε τὰ ἄλλα πάντα ἤτοι καθ’ ὑποκειμένων τῶν πρώτων οὐσιῶν λέγεται ἢ ἐν ὑποκειμέναις αὐταῖς ἐστίν.

eng

Thus everything except primary substances is either predicated of primary substances, or is present in them,

grc

μὴ οὐσῶν οὖν τῶν πρώτων οὐσιῶν ἀδύνατον τῶν ἄλλων τι εἶναι·

eng

and if these last did not exist, it would be impossible for anything else to exist.

grc

πάντα γὰρ τὰ ἄλλα ἤτοι καθ’ ὑποκειμένων τούτων λέγεται ἢ ἐν ὑποκειμέναις αὐταῖς ἐστίν·

grc

ὥστε μὴ οὐσῶν τῶν πρώτων οὐσιῶν ἀδύνατον τῶν ἄλλων τι εἶναι.

grc

Τῶν δὲ δευτέρων οὐσιῶν μᾶλλον οὐσία τὸ εἶδος τοῦ γένους·

eng

Of secondary substances, the species is more truly substance than the genus,

grc

ἔγγιον γὰρ τῆς πρώτης οὐσίας ἐστίν.

eng

being more nearly related to primary substance.

grc

ἐὰν γὰρ ἀποδιδῷ τις τὴν πρώτην οὐσίαν τί ἐστι, γνωριμώτερον καὶ οἰκειότερον ἀποδώσει τὸ εἶδος ἀποδιδοὺς ἢ τὸ γένος·

eng

For if any one should render an account of what a primary substance is, he would render a more instructive account, and one more proper to the subject, by stating the species than by stating the genus.

grc

οἷον τὸν τινὰ ἄνθρωπον γνωριμώτερον ἂν ἀποδοίη ἄνθρωπον ἀποδιδοὺς ἢ ζῷον, —τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἴδιον μᾶλλον τοῦ τινὸς ἀνθρώπου, τὸ δὲ κοινότερον,— καὶ τὸ τὶ δένδρον ἀποδιδοὺς γνωριμώτερον ἀποδώσει δένδρον ἀποδιδοὺς ἢ φυτόν.

eng

Thus, he would give a more instructive account of an individual man by stating that he was man than by stating that he was animal, for the former description is peculiar to the individual in a greater degree, while the latter is too general. Again, the man who gives an account of the nature of an individual tree will give a more instructive account by mentioning the species 'tree' than by mentioning the genus 'plant'.

grc

ἔτι αἱ πρῶται οὐσίαι διὰ τὸ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν ὑποκεῖσθαι καὶ πάντα τὰ ἄλλα κατὰ τούτων κατηγορεῖσθαι ἢ ἐν ταύταις εἶναι διὰ τοῦτο μάλιστα οὐσίαι λέγονται·

eng

Moreover, primary substances are most properly called substances in virtue of the fact that they are the entities which underlie everything else, and that everything else is either predicated of them or present in them.

grc

ὡς δέ γε αἱ πρῶται οὐσίαι πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα ἔχουσιν, οὕτω καὶ τὸ εἶδος πρὸς τὸ γένος ἔχει·

eng

Now the same relation which subsists between primary substance and everything else subsists also between the species and the genus:

grc

ὑπόκειται γὰρ τὸ εἶδος τῷ γένει·

eng

for the species is to the genus as subject is to predicate,

grc

τὰ μὲν γὰρ γένη κατὰ τῶν εἰδῶν κατηγορεῖται, τὰ δὲ εἴδη κατὰ τῶν γενῶν οὐκ ἀντιστρέφει·‍

eng

since the genus is predicated of the species, whereas the species cannot be predicated of the genus.

grc

ὥστε καὶ ἐκ τούτων τὸ εἶδος τοῦ γένους μᾶλλον οὐσία.

eng

Thus we have a second ground for asserting that the species is more truly substance than the genus.

grc

αὐτῶν δὲ τῶν εἰδῶν ὅσα μή ἐστι γένη, οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἕτερον ἑτέρου οὐσία ἐστίν·

eng

Of species themselves, except in the case of such as are genera, no one is more truly substance than another.

grc

οὐδὲν γὰρ οἰκειότερον ἀποδώσει κατὰ τοῦ τινὸς ἀνθρώπου τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἀποδιδοὺς ἢ κατὰ τοῦ τινὸς ἵππου τὸν ἵππον.

eng

We should not give a more appropriate account of the individual man by stating the species to which he belonged, than we should of an individual horse by adopting the same method of definition.

grc

ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τῶν πρώτων οὐσιῶν οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἕτερον ἑτέρου οὐσία ἐστίν·

eng

In the same way, of primary substances, no one is more truly substance than another;

grc

οὐδὲν γὰρ μᾶλλον ὁ τὶς ἄνθρωπος οὐσία ἢ ὁ τὶς βοῦς.

eng

an individual man is not more truly substance than an individual ox.

grc

Εἰκότως δὲ μετὰ τὰς πρώτας οὐσίας μόνα τῶν ἄλλων τὰ εἴδη καὶ τὰ γένη δεύτεραι οὐσίαι λέγονται·

eng

It is, then, with good reason that of all that remains, when we exclude primary substances, we concede to species and genera alone the name 'secondary substance',

grc

μόνα γὰρ δηλοῖ τὴν πρώτην οὐσίαν τῶν κατηγορουμένων·

eng

for these alone of all the predicates convey a knowledge of primary substance.

grc

τὸν γὰρ τινὰ ἄνθρωπον ἐὰν ἀποδιδῷ τις τί ἐστιν, τὸ μὲν εἶδος ἢ τὸ γένος ἀποδιδοὺς οἰκείως ἀποδώσει, —καὶ γνωριμώτερον ποιήσει ἄνθρωπον ἢ ζῷον ἀποδιδούς·‍

eng

For it is by stating the species or the genus that we appropriately define any individual man; and we shall make our definition more exact by stating the former than by stating the latter.

grc

τῶν δ’ ἄλλων ὅ τι ἂν ἀποδιδῷ τις, ἀλλοτρίως ἔσται ἀποδεδωκώς, οἷον λευκὸν ἢ τρέχει ἢ ὁτιοῦν τῶν τοιούτων ἀποδιδούς·

eng

All other things that we state, such as that he is white, that he runs, and so on, are irrelevant to the definition.

grc

ὥστε εἰκότως ταῦτα μόνα τῶν ἄλλων οὐσίαι λέγονται.

eng

Thus it is just that these alone, apart from primary substances, should be called substances.

grc

ἔτι αἱ πρῶται οὐσίαι διὰ τὸ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν ὑποκεῖσθαι κυριώτατα οὐσίαι λέγονται·

eng

Further, primary substances are most properly so called, because they underlie and are the subjects of everything else.

grc

ὡς δέ γε αἱ πρῶται οὐσίαι πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα πάντα ἔχουσιν, οὕτω τὰ εἴδη καὶ τὰ γένη τῶν πρώτων οὐσιῶν πρὸς τὰ λοιπὰ πάντα ἔχει·

eng

Now the same relation that subsists between primary substance and everything else subsists also between the species and the genus to which the primary substance belongs, on the one hand, and every attribute which is not included within these, on the other.

grc

κατὰ τούτων γὰρ πάντα τὰ λοιπὰ κατηγορεῖται·

eng

For these are the subjects of all such.

grc

τὸν γὰρ τινὰ ἄνθρωπον ἐρεῖς γραμματικόν, οὐκοῦν καὶ ἄνθρωπον καὶ ζῷον γραμματικὸν ἐρεῖς·

eng

If we call an individual man 'skilled in grammar', the predicate is applicable also to the species and to the genus to which he belongs.

grc

ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων.

eng

This law holds good in all cases.

grc

Κοινὸν δὲ κατὰ πάσης οὐσίας τὸ μὴ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ εἶναι.

eng

It is a common characteristic of all substance that it is never present in a subject.

grc

ἡ μὲν γὰρ πρώτη οὐσία οὔτε καθ’ ὑποκειμένου λέγεται οὔτε ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἐστίν.

eng

For primary substance is neither present in a subject nor predicated of a subject;

grc

τῶν δὲ δευτέρων οὐσιῶν φανερὸν μὲν καὶ οὕτως ὅτι οὐκ εἰσὶν ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ·

eng

while, with regard to secondary substances, it is clear from the following arguments (apart from others) that they are not present in a subject.

grc

ὁ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος καθ’ ὑποκειμένου μὲν τοῦ τινὸς ἀνθρώπου λέγεται, ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν, —οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ τινὶ ἀνθρώπῳ ὁ ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν·‍

eng

For 'man' is predicated of the individual man, but is not present in any subject: for manhood is not present in the individual man.

grc

ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τὸ ζῷον καθ’ ὑποκειμένου μὲν λέγεται τοῦ τινὸς ἀνθρώπου, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ τὸ ζῷον ἐν τῷ τινὶ ἀνθρώπῳ.

eng

In the same way, 'animal' is also predicated of the individual man, but is not present in him.

grc

ἔτι δὲ τῶν ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ὄντων τὸ μὲν ὄνομα οὐδὲν κωλύει κατηγορεῖσθαί ποτε τοῦ ὑποκειμένου, τὸν δὲ λόγον ἀδύνατον·

eng

Again, when a thing is present in a subject, though the name may quite well be applied to that in which it is present, the definition cannot be applied.

grc

τῶν δὲ δευτέρων οὐσιῶν κατηγορεῖται καὶ ὁ λόγος κατὰ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου καὶ τοὔνομα, —τὸν γὰρ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου λόγον κατὰ τοῦ τινὸς ἀνθρώπου κατηγορήσεις καὶ τὸν τοῦ ζῴου.‍

eng

Yet of secondary substances, not only the name, but also the definition, applies to the subject: we should use both the definition of the species and that of the genus with reference to the individual man.

grc

ὥστε οὐκ ἂν εἴη οὐσία τῶν ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ.

eng

Thus substance cannot be present in a subject.

grc

οὐκ ἴδιον δὲ οὐσίας τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ διαφορὰ τῶν μὴ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἐστίν·

eng

Yet this is not peculiar to substance, for it is also the case that differentiae cannot be present in subjects.

grc

τὸ γὰρ πεζὸν καὶ τὸ δίπουν καθ’ ὑποκειμένου μὲν λέγεται τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν, —οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐστὶ τὸ δίπουν οὐδὲ τὸ πεζόν.‍

eng

The characteristics 'terrestrial' and 'two-footed' are predicated of the species 'man', but not present in it. For they are not in man.

grc

καὶ ὁ λόγος δὲ κατηγορεῖται ὁ τῆς διαφορᾶς καθ’ οὗ ἂν λέγηται ἡ διαφορά·

eng

Moreover, the definition of the differentia may be predicated of that of which the differentia itself is predicated.

grc

οἷον εἰ τὸ πεζὸν κατὰ ἀνθρώπου λέγεται, καὶ ὁ λόγος τοῦ πεζοῦ κατηγορηθήσεται τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, —πεζὸν γάρ ἐστιν ὁ ἄνθρωπος.

eng

For instance, if the characteristic 'terrestrial' is predicated of the species 'man', the definition also of that characteristic may be used to form the predicate of the species 'man': for 'man' is terrestrial.

grc

μὴ ταραττέτω δὲ ἡμᾶς τὰ μέρη τῶν οὐσιῶν ὡς ἐν ὑποκειμένοις ὄντα τοῖς ὅλοις, μή ποτε ἀναγκασθῶμεν οὐκ οὐσίας αὐτὰ φάσκειν εἶναι·

eng

The fact that the parts of substances appear to be present in the whole, as in a subject, should not make us apprehensive lest we should have to admit that such parts are not substances:

grc

οὐ γὰρ οὕτω τὰ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἐλέγετο τὰ ὡς μέρη ὑπάρχοντα ἔν τινι.

eng

for in explaining the phrase 'being present in a subject', we stated' that we meant 'otherwise than as parts in a whole'.

grc

Ὑπάρχει δὲ ταῖς οὐσίαις καὶ ταῖς διαφοραῖς τὸ πάντα συνωνύμως ἀπ’ αὐτῶν λέγεσθαι·

eng

It is the mark of substances and of differentiae that, in all propositions of which they form the predicate, they are predicated univocally.

grc

πᾶσαι γὰρ αἱ ἀπὸ τούτων κατηγορίαι ἤτοι κατὰ τῶν ἀτόμων κατηγοροῦνται ἢ κατὰ τῶν εἰδῶν.

eng

For all such propositions have for their subject either the individual or the species.

grc

ἀπὸ μὲν γὰρ τῆς πρώτης οὐσίας οὐδεμία ἐστὶ κατηγορία, —κατ’ οὐδενὸς γὰρ ὑποκειμένου λέγεται·‍

eng

It is true that, inasmuch as primary substance is not predicable of anything, it can never form the predicate of any proposition.

grc

τῶν δὲ δευτέρων οὐσιῶν τὸ μὲν εἶδος κατὰ τοῦ ἀτόμου κατηγορεῖται, τὸ δὲ γένος καὶ κατὰ τοῦ εἴδους καὶ κατὰ τοῦ ἀτόμου·

eng

But of secondary substances, the species is predicated of the individual, the genus both of the species and of the individual.

grc

ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ αἱ διαφοραὶ καὶ κατὰ τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ κατὰ τῶν ἀτόμων κατηγοροῦνται.

eng

Similarly the differentiae are predicated of the species and of the individuals.

grc

καὶ τὸν λόγον δὲ ἐπιδέχονται αἱ πρῶται οὐσίαι τὸν τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ τὸν τῶν γενῶν, καὶ τὸ εἶδος δὲ τὸν τοῦ γένους.

eng

Moreover, the definition of the species and that of the genus are applicable to the primary substance, and that of the genus to the species.

grc

ὅσα γὰρ κατὰ τοῦ κατηγορουμένου λέγεται, καὶ κατὰ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου ῥηθήσεται·‍

eng

For all that is predicated of the predicate will be predicated also of the subject.

grc

ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τὸν τῶν διαφορῶν λόγον ἐπιδέχεται τά τε εἴδη καὶ τὰ ἄτομα·

eng

Similarly, the definition of the differentiae will be applicable to the species and to the individuals.

grc

συνώνυμα δέ γε ἦν ὧν καὶ τοὔνομα κοινὸν καὶ ὁ λόγος ὁ αὐτός.

eng

But it was stated above that the word 'univocal' was applied to those things which had both name and definition in common.

grc

ὥστε πάντα τὰ ἀπὸ τῶν οὐσιῶν καὶ τῶν διαφορῶν συνωνύμως λέγεται.

eng

It is, therefore, established that in every proposition, of which either substance or a differentia forms the predicate, these are predicated univocally.

grc

Πᾶσα δὲ οὐσία δοκεῖ τόδε τι σημαίνειν.

eng

All substance appears to signify that which is individual.

grc

ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν πρώτων οὐσιῶν ἀναμφισβήτητον καὶ ἀληθές ἐστιν ὅτι τόδε τι σημαίνει·

eng

In the case of primary substance this is indisputably true,

grc

ἄτομον γὰρ καὶ ἓν ἀριθμῷ τὸ δηλούμενόν ἐστιν.

eng

for the thing is a unit.

grc

ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν δευτέρων οὐσιῶν φαίνεται μὲν ὁμοίως τῷ σχήματι τῆς προσηγορίας τόδε τι σημαίνειν, ὅταν εἴπῃ ἄνθρωπον ἢ ζῷον·

eng

In the case of secondary substances, when we speak, for instance, of 'man' or 'animal', our form of speech gives the impression that we are here also indicating that which is individual,

grc

οὐ μὴν ἀληθές γε, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ποιόν τι σημαίνει, —οὐ γὰρ ἕν ἐστι τὸ ὑποκείμενον ὥσπερ ἡ πρώτη οὐσία, ἀλλὰ κατὰ πολλῶν ὁ ἄνθρωπος λέγεται καὶ τὸ ζῷον·‍

eng

but the impression is not strictly true; for a secondary substance is not an individual, but a class with a certain qualification; for it is not one and single as a primary substance is; the words 'man', 'animal', are predicable of more than one subject.

grc

οὐχ ἁπλῶς δὲ ποιόν τι σημαίνει, ὥσπερ τὸ λευκόν·

eng

Yet species and genus do not merely indicate quality, like the term 'white';

grc

οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο σημαίνει τὸ λευκὸν ἀλλ’ ἢ ποιόν, τὸ δὲ εἶδος καὶ τὸ γένος περὶ οὐσίαν τὸ ποιὸν ἀφορίζει, —ποιὰν γάρ τινα οὐσίαν σημαίνει.‍

eng

white' indicates quality and nothing further, but species and genus determine the quality with reference to a substance: they signify substance qualitatively differentiated.

grc

ἐπὶ πλεῖον δὲ τῷ γένει ἢ τῷ εἴδει τὸν ἀφορισμὸν ποιεῖται·

eng

The determinate qualification covers a larger field in the case of the genus that in that of the species:

grc

ὁ γὰρ ζῷον εἰπὼν ἐπὶ πλεῖον περιλαμβάνει ἢ ὁ τὸν ἄνθρωπον.

eng

he who uses the word 'animal' is herein using a word of wider extension than he who uses the word 'man'.

grc

Ὑπάρχει δὲ ταῖς οὐσίαις καὶ τὸ μηδὲν αὐταῖς ἐναντίον εἶναι.

eng

Another mark of substance is that it has no contrary.

grc

τῇ γὰρ πρώτῃ οὐσίᾳ τί ἂν εἴη ἐναντίον;

eng

What could be the contrary of any primary substance, such as the individual man or animal?

grc

οἷον τῷ τινὶ ἀνθρώπῳ οὐδέν ἐστιν ἐναντίον, οὐδέ γε τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἢ τῷ ζῴῳ οὐδέν ἐστιν ἐναντίον.

eng

It has none. Nor can the species or the genus have a contrary.

grc

οὐκ ἴδιον δὲ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπ’ ἄλλων πολλῶν οἷον ἐπὶ τοῦ ποσοῦ·

eng

Yet this characteristic is not peculiar to substance, but is true of many other things, such as quantity.

grc

τῷ γὰρ διπήχει οὐδέν ἐστιν ἐναντίον, οὐδὲ τοῖς δέκα, οὐδὲ τῶν τοιούτων οὐδενί, εἰ μή τις τὸ πολὺ τῷ ὀλίγῳ φαίη ἐναντίον εἶναι ἢ τὸ μέγα τῷ μικρῷ·

eng

There is nothing that forms the contrary of 'two cubits long' or of 'three cubits long', or of 'ten', or of any such term. A man may contend that 'much' is the contrary of 'little', or 'great' of 'small',

grc

τῶν δὲ ἀφωρισμένων ποσῶν οὐδὲν οὐδενὶ ἐναντίον ἐστίν.

eng

but of definite quantitative terms no contrary exists.

grc

Δοκεῖ δὲ ἡ οὐσία οὐκ ἐπιδέχεσθαι τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον·

eng

Substance, again, does not appear to admit of variation of degree.

grc

λέγω δὲ οὐχ ὅτι οὐσία οὐσίας οὐκ ἔστι μᾶλλον οὐσία, —τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ εἴρηται ὅτι ἔστιν,— ἀλλ’ ὅτι ἑκάστη οὐσία τοῦθ’ ὅπερ ἐστὶν οὐ λέγεται μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον·

eng

I do not mean by this that one substance cannot be more or less truly substance than another, for it has already been stated' that this is the case; but that no single substance admits of varying degrees within itself.

grc

οἷον εἰ ἔστιν αὕτη ἡ οὐσία ἄνθρωπος, οὐκ ἔσται μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον ἄνθρωπος, οὔτε αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ οὔτε ἕτερος ἑτέρου.

eng

For instance, one particular substance, 'man', cannot be more or less man either than himself at some other time or than some other man.

grc

οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἕτερος ἑτέρου μᾶλλον ἄνθρωπος, ὥσπερ τὸ λευκόν ἐστιν ἕτερον ἑτέρου μᾶλλον λευκόν, καὶ καλὸν ἕτερον ἑτέρου μᾶλλον·

eng

One man cannot be more man than another, as that which is white may be more or less white than some other white object, or as that which is beautiful may be more or less beautiful than some other beautiful object.

grc

καὶ αὐτὸ δὲ αὑτοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον λέγεται, οἷον τὸ σῶμα λευκὸν ὂν μᾶλλον λευκὸν λέγεται νῦν ἢ πρότερον, καὶ θερμὸν ὂν μᾶλλον θερμὸν καὶ ἧττον λέγεται·

eng

The same quality, moreover, is said to subsist in a thing in varying degrees at different times. A body, being white, is said to be whiter at one time than it was before, or, being warm, is said to be warmer or less warm than at some other time.

grc

ἡ δέ γε οὐσία οὐδὲν λέγεται, —οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος μᾶλλον νῦν ἄνθρωπος ἢ πρότερον λέγεται, οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδέν, ὅσα ἐστὶν οὐσία·‍

eng

But substance is not said to be more or less that which it is: a man is not more truly a man at one time than he was before, nor is anything, if it is substance, more or less what it is.

grc

ὥστε οὐκ ἂν ἐπιδέχοιτο ἡ οὐσία τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον.

eng

Substance, then, does not admit of variation of degree.

grc

Μάλιστα δὲ ἴδιον τῆς οὐσίας δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ ταὐτὸν καὶ ἓν ἀριθμῷ ὂν τῶν ἐναντίων εἶναι δεκτικόν·

eng

The most distinctive mark of substance appears to be that, while remaining numerically one and the same, it is capable of admitting contrary qualities.

grc

οἷον ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων οὐδενὸς ἂν ἔχοι τις προενεγκεῖν [ὅσα μή ἐστιν οὐσία], ὃ ἓν ἀριθμῷ ὂν τῶν ἐναντίων δεκτικόν ἐστιν·

eng

From among things other than substance, we should find ourselves unable to bring forward any which possessed this mark.

grc

οἷον τὸ χρῶμα, ὅ ἐστιν ἓν καὶ ταὐτὸν ἀριθμῷ, οὐκ ἔσται λευκὸν καὶ μέλαν, οὐδὲ ἡ αὐτὴ πρᾶξις καὶ μία τῷ ἀριθμῷ οὐκ ἔσται φαύλη καὶ σπουδαία, ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ὅσα μή ἐστιν οὐσία.

eng

Thus, one and the same colour cannot be white and black. Nor can the same one action be good and bad: this law holds good with everything that is not substance.

grc

ἡ δέ γε οὐσία ἓν καὶ ταὐτὸν ἀριθμῷ ὂν δεκτικὸν τῶν ἐναντίων ἐστίν·

eng

But one and the selfsame substance, while retaining its identity, is yet capable of admitting contrary qualities.

grc

οἷον ὁ τὶς ἄνθρωπος, εἷς καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς ὤν, ὁτὲ μὲν λευκὸς ὁτὲ δὲ μέλας γίγνεται, καὶ θερμὸς καὶ ψυχρός, καὶ φαῦλος καὶ σπουδαῖος.

eng

The same individual person is at one time white, at another black, at one time warm, at another cold, at one time good, at another bad.

grc

ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδενὸς φαίνεται τὸ τοιοῦτον, εἰ μή τις ἐνίσταιτο τὸν λόγον καὶ τὴν δόξαν φάσκων τῶν τοιούτων εἶναι·

eng

This capacity is found nowhere else, though it might be maintained that a statement or opinion was an exception to the rule.

grc

ὁ γὰρ αὐτὸς λόγος ἀληθής τε καὶ ψευδὴς εἶναι δοκεῖ, οἷον εἰ ἀληθὴς εἴη ὁ λόγος τὸ καθῆσθαί τινα, ἀναστάντος αὐτοῦ ὁ αὐτὸς οὗτος ψευδὴς ἔσται·

eng

The same statement, it is agreed, can be both true and false. For if the statement 'he is sitting' is true, yet, when the person in question has risen, the same statement will be false.

grc

ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς δόξης·

eng

The same applies to opinions.

grc

εἰ γάρ τις ἀληθῶς δοξάζοι τὸ καθῆσθαί τινα, ἀναστάντος αὐτοῦ ψευδῶς δοξάσει τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχων περὶ αὐτοῦ δόξαν.

eng

For if any one thinks truly that a person is sitting, yet, when that person has risen, this same opinion, if still held, will be false.

grc

εἰ δέ τις καὶ τοῦτο παραδέχοιτο, ἀλλὰ τῷ γε τρόπῳ διαφέρει·

eng

Yet although this exception may be allowed, there is, nevertheless, a difference in the manner in which the thing takes place.

grc

τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν οὐσιῶν αὐτὰ μεταβάλλοντα δεκτικὰ τῶν ἐναντίων ἐστίν, — ψυχρὸν γὰρ ἐκ θερμοῦ γενόμενον μετέβαλεν (ἠλλοίωται γάρ), καὶ μέλαν ἐκ λευκοῦ καὶ σπουδαῖον ἐκ φαύλου, ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον αὐτὸ μεταβολὴν δεχόμενον τῶν ἐναντίων δεκτικόν ἐστιν·‍

eng

It is by themselves changing that substances admit contrary qualities. It is thus that that which was hot becomes cold, for it has entered into a different state. Similarly that which was white becomes black, and that which was bad good, by a process of change; and in the same way in all other cases it is by changing that substances are capable of admitting contrary qualities.

grc

ὁ δὲ λόγος καὶ ἡ δόξα αὐτὰ μὲν ἀκίνητα πάντῃ πάντως διαμένει, τοῦ δὲ πράγματος κινουμένου τὸ ἐναντίον περὶ αὐτὰ γίγνεται·

eng

But statements and opinions themselves remain unaltered in all respects: it is by the alteration in the facts of the case that the contrary quality comes to be theirs.

grc

ὁ μὲν γὰρ λόγος διαμένει ὁ αὐτὸς τὸ καθῆσθαί τινα, τοῦ δὲ πράγματος κινηθέντος ὁτὲ μὲν ἀληθὴς ὁτὲ δὲ ψευδὴς γίγνεται·

eng

The statement 'he is sitting' remains unaltered, but it is at one time true, at another false, according to circumstances.

grc

ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς δόξης.

eng

What has been said of statements applies also to opinions.

grc

ὥστε τῷ τρόπῳ γε ἴδιον ἂν εἴη τῆς οὐσίας τὸ κατὰ τὴν αὑτῆς μεταβολὴν δεκτικὴν τῶν ἐναντίων εἶναι, —εἰ δή τις καὶ ταῦτα παραδέχοιτο, τὴν δόξαν καὶ τὸν λόγον δεκτικὰ τῶν ἐναντίων εἶναι.

eng

Thus, in respect of the manner in which the thing takes place, it is the peculiar mark of substance that it should be capable of admitting contrary qualities; for it is by itself changing that it does so. If, then, a man should make this exception and contend that statements and opinions are capable of admitting contrary qualities,

grc

οὐκ ἔστι δὲ ἀληθὲς τοῦτο·

eng

his contention is unsound.

grc

ὁ γὰρ λόγος καὶ ἡ δόξα οὐ τῷ αὐτὰ δέχεσθαί τι τῶν ἐναντίων εἶναι δεκτικὰ λέγεται, ἀλλὰ τῷ περὶ ἕτερόν τι τὸ πάθος γεγενῆσθαι·

eng

For statements and opinions are said to have this capacity, not because they themselves undergo modification, but because this modification occurs in the case of something else.

grc

τῷ γὰρ τὸ πρᾶγμα εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι, τούτῳ καὶ ὁ λόγος ἀληθὴς ἢ ψευδὴς εἶναι λέγεται, οὐ τῷ αὐτὸν δεκτικὸν εἶναι τῶν ἐναντίων·

eng

The truth or falsity of a statement depends on facts, and not on any power on the part of the statement itself of admitting contrary qualities.

grc

ἁπλῶς γὰρ οὐδὲν ὑπ’ οὐδενὸς οὔτε ὁ λόγος κινεῖται οὔτε ἡ δόξα, ὥστε οὐκ ἂν εἴη δεκτικὰ τῶν ἐναντίων μηδενὸς ἐν αὐτοῖς γιγνομένου·‍

eng

In short, there is nothing which can alter the nature of statements and opinions. As, then, no change takes place in themselves, these cannot be said to be capable of admitting contrary qualities.

grc

ἡ δέ γε οὐσία τῷ αὐτὴν τὰ ἐναντία δέχεσθαι, τούτῳ δεκτικὴ τῶν ἐναντίων λέγεται·

eng

But it is by reason of the modification which takes place within the substance itself that a substance is said to be capable of admitting contrary qualities;

grc

νόσον γὰρ καὶ ὑγίειαν δέχεται, καὶ λευκότητα καὶ μελανίαν, καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν τοιούτων αὐτὴ δεχομένη τῶν ἐναντίων εἶναι δεκτικὴ λέγεται.

eng

for a substance admits within itself either disease or health, whiteness or blackness. It is in this sense that it is said to be capable of admitting contrary qualities.

grc

ὥστε ἴδιον ἂν οὐσίας εἴη τὸ ταὐτὸν καὶ ἓν ἀριθμῷ ὂν δεκτικὸν εἶναι τῶν ἐναντίων.

eng

To sum up, it is a distinctive mark of substance, that, while remaining numerically one and the same, it is capable of admitting contrary qualities, the modification taking place through a change in the substance itself.

grc

περὶ μὲν οὖν οὐσίας τοσαῦτα εἰρήσθω.

eng

Let these remarks suffice on the subject of substance.

grc

Τοῦ δὲ ποσοῦ τὸ μέν ἐστι διωρισμένον, τὸ δὲ συνεχές·

eng

Quantity is either discrete or continuous.

grc

καὶ τὸ μὲν ἐκ θέσιν ἐχόντων πρὸς ἄλληλα τῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς μορίων συνέστηκε, τὸ δὲ οὐκ ἐξ ἐχόντων θέσιν.

eng

Moreover, some quantities are such that each part of the whole has a relative position to the other parts: others have within them no such relation of part to part.

grc

ἔστι δὲ διωρισμένον μὲν οἷον ἀριθμὸς καὶ λόγος, συνεχὲς δὲ γραμμή, ἐπιφάνεια, σῶμα, ἔτι δὲ παρὰ ταῦτα χρόνος καὶ τόπος.

eng

Instances of discrete quantities are number and speech; of continuous, lines, surfaces, solids, and, besides these, time and place.

grc

τῶν μὲν γὰρ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ μορίων οὐδείς ἐστι κοινὸς ὅρος, πρὸς ὃν συνάπτει τὰ μόρια αὐτοῦ·

eng

In the case of the parts of a number, there is no common boundary at which they join.

grc

οἷον τὰ πέντε εἰ ἔστι τῶν δέκα μόριον, πρὸς οὐδένα κοινὸν ὅρον συνάπτει τὰ πέντε καὶ τὰ πέντε, ἀλλὰ διώρισται·

eng

For example: two fives make ten, but the two fives have no common boundary, but are separate;

grc

καὶ τὰ τρία γε καὶ τὰ ἑπτὰ πρὸς οὐδένα κοινὸν ὅρον συνάπτει·

eng

the parts three and seven also do not join at any boundary.

grc

οὐδ’ ὅλως ἂν ἔχοις ἐπ’ ἀριθμοῦ λαβεῖν κοινὸν ὅρον τῶν μορίων, ἀλλ’ ἀεὶ διώρισται·

eng

Nor, to generalize, would it ever be possible in the case of number that there should be a common boundary among the parts; they are always separate.

grc

ὥστε ὁ μὲν ἀριθμὸς τῶν διωρισμένων ἐστίν.

eng

Number, therefore, is a discrete quantity.

grc

ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ὁ λόγος τῶν διωρισμένων ἐστίν·

eng

The same is true of speech.

grc

ὅτι μὲν γὰρ ποσόν ἐστιν ὁ λόγος φανερόν·

eng

That speech is a quantity is evident:

grc

καταμετρεῖται γὰρ συλλαβῇ μακρᾷ καὶ βραχείᾳ·

eng

for it is measured in long and short syllables.

grc

λέγω δὲ αὐτὸν τὸν μετὰ φωνῆς λόγον γιγνόμενον)·

eng

I mean here that speech which is vocal.

grc

πρὸς οὐδένα γὰρ κοινὸν ὅρον αὐτοῦ τὰ μόρια συνάπτει·

eng

Moreover, it is a discrete quantity for its parts have no common boundary.

grc

οὐ γὰρ ἔστι κοινὸς ὅρος πρὸς ὃν αἱ συλλαβαὶ συνάπτουσιν, ἀλλ’ ἑκάστη διώρισται αὐτὴ καθ’ αὑτήν.

eng

There is no common boundary at which the syllables join, but each is separate and distinct from the rest.

grc

ἡ δὲ γραμμὴ συνεχές ἐστιν·

eng

A line, on the other hand, is a continuous quantity,

grc

ἔστι γὰρ λαβεῖν κοινὸν ὅρον πρὸς ὃν τὰ μόρια αὐτῆς συνάπτει, στιγμήν·

eng

for it is possible to find a common boundary at which its parts join.

grc

καὶ τῆς ἐπιφανείας γραμμήν, —τὰ γὰρ τοῦ ἐπιπέδου μόρια πρός τινα κοινὸν ὅρον συνάπτει.‍

eng

In the case of the line, this common boundary is the point; in the case of the plane, it is the line: for the parts of the plane have also a common boundary.

grc

ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ σώματος ἔχοις ἂν λαβεῖν κοινὸν ὅρον, γραμμὴν ἢ ἐπιφάνειαν, πρὸς ἣν τὰ τοῦ σώματος μόρια συνάπτει.

eng

Similarly you can find a common boundary in the case of the parts of a solid, namely either a line or a plane.

grc

ἔστι δὲ καὶ ὁ χρόνος καὶ ὁ τόπος τῶν τοιούτων·

eng

Space and time also belong to this class of quantities.

grc

ὁ γὰρ νῦν χρόνος συνάπτει πρός τε τὸν παρεληλυθότα καὶ τὸν μέλλοντα.

eng

Time, past, present, and future, forms a continuous whole.

grc

πάλιν ὁ τόπος τῶν συνεχῶν ἐστιν·

eng

Space, likewise, is a continuous quantity;

grc

τόπον γάρ τινα τὰ τοῦ σώματος μόρια κατέχει, ἃ πρός τινα κοινὸν ὅρον συνάπτει·

eng

for the parts of a solid occupy a certain space, and these have a common boundary;

grc

οὐκοῦν καὶ τὰ τοῦ τόπου μόρια, ἃ κατέχει ἕκαστον τῶν τοῦ σώματος μορίων, πρὸς τὸν αὐτὸν ὅρον συνάπτει πρὸς ὃν καὶ τὰ τοῦ σώματος μόρια·

eng

it follows that the parts of space also, which are occupied by the parts of the solid, have the same common boundary as the parts of the solid.

grc

ὥστε συνεχὲς ἂν εἴη καὶ ὁ τόπος·

eng

Thus, not only time, but space also, is a continuous quantity,

grc

πρὸς γὰρ ἕνα κοινὸν ὅρον αὐτοῦ τὰ μόρια συνάπτει.

eng

for its parts have a common boundary.

grc

Ἔτι τὰ μὲν ἐκ θέσιν ἐχόντων πρὸς ἄλληλα τῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς μορίων συνέστηκεν, τὰ δὲ οὐκ ἐξ ἐχόντων θέσιν·

eng

Quantities consist either of parts which bear a relative position each to each, or of parts which do not.

grc

οἷον τὰ μὲν τῆς γραμμῆς μόρια θέσιν ἔχει πρὸς ἄλληλα, — ἕκαστον γὰρ αὐτῶν κεῖταί που, καὶ ἔχοις ἂν διαλαβεῖν καὶ ἀποδοῦναι οὗ ἕκαστον κεῖται ἐν τῷ ἐπιπέδῳ καὶ πρὸς ποῖον μόριον τῶν λοιπῶν συνάπτει·‍

eng

The parts of a line bear a relative position to each other, for each lies somewhere, and it would be possible to distinguish each, and to state the position of each on the plane and to explain to what sort of part among the rest each was contiguous.

grc

ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τὰ τοῦ ἐπιπέδου μόρια θέσιν ἔχει τινά, —ὁμοίως γὰρ ἂν ἀποδοθείη ἕκαστον οὗ κεῖται, καὶ ποῖα συνάπτει πρὸς ἄλληλα.‍

eng

Similarly the parts of a plane have position, for it could similarly be stated what was the position of each and what sort of parts were contiguous.

grc

καὶ τὰ τοῦ στερεοῦ δὲ ὡσαύτως καὶ τὰ τοῦ τόπου.

eng

The same is true with regard to the solid and to space.

grc

ἐπὶ δέ γε τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ οὐκ ἂν ἔχοι τις ἐπιβλέψαι ὡς τὰ μόρια θέσιν τινὰ ἔχει πρὸς ἄλληλα ἢ κεῖταί που, ἢ ποῖά γε πρὸς ἄλληλα συνάπτει τῶν μορίων·

eng

But it would be impossible to show that the parts of a number had a relative position each to each, or a particular position, or to state what parts were contiguous.

grc

οὐδὲ τὰ τοῦ χρόνου·

eng

Nor could this be done in the case of time,

grc

ὑπομένει γὰρ οὐδὲν τῶν τοῦ χρόνου μορίων, ὃ δὲ μή ἐστιν ὑπομένον, πῶς ἂν τοῦτο θέσιν τινὰ ἔχοι;

eng

for none of the parts of time has an abiding existence, and that which does not abide can hardly have position.

grc

ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τάξιν τινὰ εἴποις ἂν ἔχειν τῷ τὸ μὲν πρότερον εἶναι τοῦ χρόνου τὸ δ’ ὕστερον.

eng

It would be better to say that such parts had a relative order, in virtue of one being prior to another.

grc

καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ δὲ ὡσαύτως, τῷ πρότερον ἀριθμεῖσθαι τὸ ἓν τῶν δύο καὶ τὰ δύο τῶν τριῶν·

eng

Similarly with number: in counting, 'one' is prior to 'two', and 'two' to 'three',

grc

καὶ οὕτω τάξιν ἄν τινα ἔχοι, θέσιν δὲ οὐ πάνυ λάβοις ἄν.

eng

and thus the parts of number may be said to possess a relative order, though it would be impossible to discover any distinct position for each.

grc

καὶ ὁ λόγος δὲ ὡσαύτως·

eng

This holds good also in the case of speech.

grc

οὐδὲν γὰρ ὑπομένει τῶν μορίων αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ’ εἴρηταί τε καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἔτι τοῦτο λαβεῖν, ὥστε οὐκ ἂν εἴη θέσις τῶν μορίων αὐτοῦ, εἴγε μηδὲν ὑπομένει.

eng

None of its parts has an abiding existence: when once a syllable is pronounced, it is not possible to retain it, so that, naturally, as the parts do not abide, they cannot have position.

grc

τὰ μὲν οὖν ἐκ θέσιν ἐχόντων τῶν μορίων συνέστηκε, τὰ δὲ οὐκ ἐξ ἐχόντων θέσιν.

eng

Thus, some quantities consist of parts which have position, and some of those which have not.

grc

Κυρίως δὲ ποσὰ ταῦτα μόνα λέγεται τὰ εἰρημένα, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα πάντα κατὰ συμβεβηκός·

eng

Strictly speaking, only the things which I have mentioned belong to the category of quantity: everything else that is called quantitative is a quantity in a secondary sense.

grc

εἰς ταῦτα γὰρ βλέποντες καὶ τἆλλα ποσὰ λέγομεν, οἷον πολὺ τὸ λευκὸν λέγεται τῷ τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν πολλὴν εἶναι, καὶ ἡ πρᾶξις μακρὰ τῷ γε τὸν χρόνον πολὺν εἶναι, καὶ ἡ κίνησις πολλή·

eng

It is because we have in mind some one of these quantities, properly so called, that we apply quantitative terms to other things. We speak of what is white as large, because the surface over which the white extends is large; we speak of an action or a process as lengthy, because the time covered is long;

grc

οὐ γὰρ καθ’ αὑτὸ ἕκαστον τούτων ποσὸν λέγεται·

eng

these things cannot in their own right claim the quantitative epithet.

grc

οἷον ἐὰν ἀποδιδῷ τις πόση τις ἡ πρᾶξίς ἐστι, τῷ χρόνῳ ὁριεῖ ἐνιαυσίαν ἢ οὕτω πως ἀποδιδούς, καὶ τὸ λευκὸν ποσόν τι ἀποδιδοὺς τῇ ἐπιφανείᾳ ὁριεῖ, —ὅση γὰρ ἂν ἡ ἐπιφάνεια ᾖ, τοσοῦτον καὶ τὸ λευκὸν φήσει εἶναι·‍

eng

For instance, should any one explain how long an action was, his statement would be made in terms of the time taken, to the effect that it lasted a year, or something of that sort. In the same way, he would explain the size of a white object in terms of surface, for he would state the area which it covered.

grc

ὥστε μόνα κυρίως καὶ καθ’ αὑτὰ ποσὰ λέγεται τὰ εἰρημένα, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων οὐδὲν αὐτὸ καθ’ αὑτό, ἀλλ’ εἰ ἄρα κατὰ συμβεβηκός.

eng

Thus the things already mentioned, and these alone, are in their intrinsic nature quantities; nothing else can claim the name in its own right, but, if at all, only in a secondary sense.

grc

Ἔτι τῷ ποσῷ οὐδέν ἐστιν ἐναντίον, (ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἀφωρισμένων φανερὸν ὅτι οὐδέν ἐστιν ἐναντίον, οἷον τῷ διπήχει ἢ τριπήχει ἢ τῇ ἐπιφανείᾳ ἢ τῶν τοιούτων τινί, —οὐδὲν γάρ ἐστιν ἐναντίον), εἰ μὴ τὸ πολὺ τῷ ὀλίγῳ φαίη τις εἶναι ἐναντίον ἢ τὸ μέγα τῷ μικρῷ.

eng

Quantities have no contraries. In the case of definite quantities this is obvious; thus, there is nothing that is the contrary of 'two cubits long' or of 'three cubits long', or of a surface, or of any such quantities. A man might, indeed, argue that 'much' was the contrary of 'little', and 'great' of 'small'.

grc

τούτων δὲ οὐδέν ἐστι ποσὸν ἀλλὰ τῶν πρός τι·

eng

But these are not quantitative, but relative;

grc

οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐτὸ καθ’ αὑτὸ μέγα λέγεται ἢ μικρόν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἕτερον ἀναφέρεται, οἷον ὄρος μὲν μικρὸν λέγεται, κέγχρος δὲ μεγάλη τῷ τὴν μὲν τῶν ὁμογενῶν μεῖζον εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ἔλαττον τῶν ὁμογενῶν·

eng

things are not great or small absolutely, they are so called rather as the result of an act of comparison. For instance, a mountain is called small, a grain large, in virtue of the fact that the latter is greater than others of its kind, the former less.

grc

οὐκοῦν πρὸς ἕτερον ἡ ἀναφορά, ἐπεὶ εἴγε καθ’ αὑτὸ μικρὸν ἢ μέγα ἐλέγετο, οὐκ ἄν ποτε τὸ μὲν ὄρος μικρὸν ἐλέγετο, ἡ δὲ κέγχρος μεγάλη.

eng

Thus there is a reference here to an external standard, for if the terms 'great' and 'small' were used absolutely, a mountain would never be called small or a grain large.

grc

πάλιν ἐν μὲν τῇ κώμῃ πολλούς φαμεν ἀνθρώπους εἶναι, ἐν Ἀθήναις δὲ ὀλίγους πολλαπλασίους αὐτῶν ὄντας, καὶ ἐν μὲν τῇ οἰκίᾳ πολλούς, ἐν δὲ τῷ θεάτρῳ ὀλίγους πολλῷ πλείους ὄντας.‍

eng

Again, we say that there are many people in a village, and few in Athens, although those in the city are many times as numerous as those in the village: or we say that a house has many in it, and a theatre few, though those in the theatre far outnumber those in the house.

grc

ἔτι τὸ μὲν δίπηχυ καὶ τρίπηχυ καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν τοιούτων ποσὸν σημαίνει, τὸ δὲ μέγα ἢ μικρὸν οὐ σημαίνει ποσὸν ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον πρός τι·

eng

The terms 'two cubits long, "three cubits long,' and so on indicate quantity, the terms 'great' and 'small' indicate relation,

grc

πρὸς γὰρ ἕτερον θεωρεῖται τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ μικρόν·

eng

for they have reference to an external standard.

grc

ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι ταῦτα τῶν πρός τί ἐστιν.‍

eng

It is, therefore, plain that these are to be classed as relative.

grc

ἔτι ἐάν τε τιθῇ τις αὐτὰ ποσὰ εἶναι ἐάν τε μὴ τιθῇ, οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτοῖς ἐναντίον οὐδέν·

eng

Again, whether we define them as quantitative or not, they have no contraries:

grc

ὃ γὰρ μὴ ἔστιν αὐτὸ καθ’ αὑτὸ λαβεῖν ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἕτερον ἀναφέροντα, πῶς ἂν εἴη τούτῳ τι ἐναντίον;

eng

for how can there be a contrary of an attribute which is not to be apprehended in or by itself, but only by reference to something external?

grc

ἔτι εἰ ἔσται τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ μικρὸν ἐναντία, συμβήσεται τὸ αὐτὸ ἅμα τὰ ἐναντία ἐπιδέχεσθαι καὶ αὐτὰ αὑτοῖς εἶναι ἐναντία.

eng

Again, if 'great' and 'small' are contraries, it will come about that the same subject can admit contrary qualities at one and the same time, and that things will themselves be contrary to themselves.

grc

συμβαίνει γὰρ ἅμα τὸ αὐτὸ μέγα τε καὶ μικρὸν εἶναι, —ἔστι γὰρ πρὸς μὲν τοῦτο μικρόν, πρὸς ἕτερον δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο μέγα·‍

eng

For it happens at times that the same thing is both small and great. For the same thing may be small in comparison with one thing, and great in comparison with another,

grc

ὥστε τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ μέγα καὶ μικρὸν κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον εἶναι συμβαίνει, ὥστε ἅμα τὰ ἐναντία ἐπιδέχεσθαι·

eng

so that the same thing comes to be both small and great at one and the same time,

grc

ἀλλ’ οὐδὲν δοκεῖ ἅμα τὰ ἐναντία ἐπιδέχεσθαι·

eng

and is of such a nature as to admit contrary qualities at one and the same moment.

grc

οἷον ἐπὶ τῆς οὐσίας, δεκτικὴ μὲν τῶν ἐναντίων δοκεῖ εἶναι, ἀλλ’ οὔτι γε ἅμα νοσεῖ καὶ ὑγιαίνει, οὐδὲ λευκὸν καὶ μέλαν ἐστὶν ἅμα, οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδὲν ἅμα τὰ ἐναντία ἐπιδέχεται.

eng

Yet it was agreed, when substance was being discussed, that nothing admits contrary qualities at one and the same moment. For though substance is capable of admitting contrary qualities, yet no one is at the same time both sick and healthy, nothing is at the same time both white and black. Nor is there anything which is qualified in contrary ways at one and the same time.

grc

καὶ αὐτὰ δ’ αὑτοῖς συμβαίνει ἐναντία εἶναι·

eng

Moreover, if these were contraries, they would themselves be contrary to themselves.

grc

εἰ γάρ ἐστι τὸ μέγα τῷ μικρῷ ἐναντίον, τὸ δ’ αὐτό ἐστιν ἅμα μέγα καὶ μικρόν, αὐτὸ αὑτῷ ἂν εἴη ἐναντίον·

eng

For if 'great' is the contrary of 'small', and the same thing is both great and small at the same time, then 'small' or 'great' is the contrary of itself.

grc

ἀλλὰ τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἐστὶν αὐτὸ αὑτῷ εἶναι ἐναντίον.

eng

But this is impossible.

grc

οὐκ ἔστιν ἄρα τὸ μέγα τῷ μικρῷ ἐναντίον, οὐδὲ τὸ πολὺ τῷ ὀλίγῳ, ὥστε κἂν μὴ τῶν πρός τι ταῦτά τις ἐρεῖ ἀλλὰ τοῦ ποσοῦ, οὐδὲν ἐναντίον ἕξει.

eng

The term 'great', therefore, is not the contrary of the term 'small', nor 'much' of 'little'. And even though a man should call these terms not relative but quantitative, they would not have contraries.

grc

μάλιστα δὲ ἡ ἐναντιότης τοῦ ποσοῦ περὶ τὸν τόπον δοκεῖ ὑπάρχειν·

eng

It is in the case of space that quantity most plausibly appears to admit of a contrary.

grc

τὸ γὰρ ἄνω τῷ κάτω ἐναντίον τιθέασι, τὴν πρὸς τὸ μέσον χώραν κάτω λέγοντες, διὰ τὸ πλείστην τῷ μέσῳ διάστασιν πρὸς τὰ πέρατα τοῦ κόσμου εἶναι.

eng

For men define the term 'above' as the contrary of 'below', when it is the region at the centre they mean by 'below'; and this is so, because nothing is farther from the extremities of the universe than the region at the centre.

grc

ἐοίκασι δὲ καὶ τὸν τῶν ἄλλων ἐναντίων ὁρισμὸν ἀπὸ τούτων ἐπιφέρειν·

eng

Indeed, it seems that in defining contraries of every kind men have recourse to a spatial metaphor,

grc

τὰ γὰρ πλεῖστον ἀλλήλων διεστηκότα τῶν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει ἐναντία ὁρίζονται.

eng

for they say that those things are contraries which, within the same class, are separated by the greatest possible distance.

grc

Οὐ δοκεῖ δὲ τὸ ποσὸν ἐπιδέχεσθαι τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον, οἷον τὸ δίπηχυ, —οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἕτερον ἑτέρου μᾶλλον δίπηχυ·‍

eng

Quantity does not, it appears, admit of variation of degree. One thing cannot be two cubits long in a greater degree than another.

grc

οὐδ’ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ, οἷον τὰ τρία τῶν πέντε οὐδὲν μᾶλλον [πέντε ἢ] τρία λέγεται, οὐδὲ τὰ τρία τῶν τριῶν·

eng

Similarly with regard to number: what is 'three' is not more truly three than what is 'five' is five; nor is one set of three more truly three than another set.

grc

οὐδέ γε ὁ χρόνος ἕτερος ἑτέρου μᾶλλον χρόνος λέγεται·

eng

Again, one period of time is not said to be more truly time than another.

grc

οὐδ’ ἐπὶ τῶν εἰρημένων ὅλως οὐδενὸς τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον λέγεται·

eng

Nor is there any other kind of quantity, of all that have been mentioned, with regard to which variation of degree can be predicated.

grc

ὥστε τὸ ποσὸν οὐκ ἐπιδέχεται τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον.

eng

The category of quantity, therefore, does not admit of variation of degree.

grc

Ἴδιον δὲ μάλιστα τοῦ ποσοῦ τὸ ἴσον τε καὶ ἄνισον λέγεσθαι.

eng

The most distinctive mark of quantity is that equality and inequality are predicated of it.

grc

ἕκαστον γὰρ τῶν εἰρημένων ποσῶν καὶ ἴσον καὶ ἄνισον λέγεται, οἷον σῶμα καὶ ἴσον καὶ ἄνισον λέγεται, καὶ ἀριθμὸς καὶ ἴσος καὶ ἄνισος λέγεται, καὶ χρόνος καὶ ἴσος καὶ ἄνισος·

eng

Each of the aforesaid quantities is said to be equal or unequal. For instance, one solid is said to be equal or unequal to another; number, too, and time can have these terms applied to them,

grc

ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ῥηθέντων ἕκαστον ἴσον τε καὶ ἄνισον λέγεται.

eng

indeed can all those kinds of quantity that have been mentioned.

grc

τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν ὅσα μή ἐστι ποσόν, οὐ πάνυ ἂν δόξαι ἴσον τε καὶ ἄνισον λέγεσθαι, οἷον ἡ διάθεσις ἴση τε καὶ ἄνισος οὐ πάνυ λέγεται ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ὁμοία, καὶ τὸ λευκὸν ἴσον τε καὶ ἄνισον οὐ πάνυ, ἀλλ’ ὅμοιον.

eng

That which is not a quantity can by no means, it would seem, be termed equal or unequal to anything else. One particular disposition or one particular quality, such as whiteness, is by no means compared with another in terms of equality and inequality but rather in terms of similarity.

grc

ὥστε τοῦ ποσοῦ μάλιστα ἂν εἴη ἴδιον τὸ ἴσον τε καὶ ἄνισον λέγεσθαι.

eng

Thus it is the distinctive mark of quantity that it can be called equal and unequal.

grc

Πρός τι δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγεται, ὅσα αὐτὰ ἅπερ ἐστὶν ἑτέρων εἶναι λέγεται ἢ ὁπωσοῦν ἄλλως πρὸς ἕτερον·

eng

Those things are called relative, which, being either said to be of something else or related to something else, are explained by reference to that other thing.

grc

οἷον τὸ μεῖζον τοῦθ’ ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἑτέρου λέγεται, —τινὸς γὰρ μεῖζον λέγεται,— καὶ τὸ διπλάσιον ἑτέρου λέγεται τοῦθ’ ὅπερ ἐστίν, —τινὸς γὰρ διπλάσιον λέγεται·‍

eng

For instance, the word 'superior' is explained by reference to something else, for it is superiority over something else that is meant. Similarly, the expression 'double' has this external reference, for it is the double of something else that is meant.

grc

ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα.

eng

So it is with everything else of this kind.

grc

ἔστι δὲ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν πρός τι οἷον ἕξις, διάθεσις, αἴσθησις, ἐπιστήμη, θέσις·

eng

There are, moreover, other relatives, e.g. habit, disposition, perception, knowledge, and attitude.

grc

πάντα γὰρ τὰ εἰρημένα τοῦθ’ ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἑτέρων λέγεται καὶ οὐκ ἄλλο τι·

eng

The significance of all these is explained by a reference to something else and in no other way.

grc

ἡ γὰρ ἕξις τινὸς ἕξις λέγεται καὶ ἡ ἐπιστήμη τινὸς ἐπιστήμη καὶ ἡ θέσις τινὸς θέσις, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα δὲ ὡσαύτως.

eng

Thus, a habit is a habit of something, knowledge is knowledge of something, attitude is the attitude of something. So it is with all other relatives that have been mentioned.

grc

πρός τι οὖν ἐστὶν ὅσα αὐτὰ ἅπερ ἐστὶν ἑτέρων λέγεται, ἢ ὁπωσοῦν ἄλλως πρὸς ἕτερον·

eng

Those terms, then, are called relative, the nature of which is explained by reference to something else, the preposition 'of' or some other preposition being used to indicate the relation.

grc

οἷον ὄρος μέγα λέγεται πρὸς ἕτερον, —πρός τι γὰρ μέγα λέγεται τὸ ὄρος,— καὶ τὸ ὅμοιον τινὶ ὅμοιον λέγεται, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὡσαύτως πρός τι λέγεται.

eng

Thus, one mountain is called great in comparison with son with another; for the mountain claims this attribute by comparison with something. Again, that which is called similar must be similar to something else, and all other such attributes have this external reference.

grc

ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀνάκλισις καὶ ἡ στάσις καὶ ἡ καθέδρα θέσεις τινές, ἡ δὲ θέσις τῶν πρός τι·

eng

It is to be noted that lying and standing and sitting are particular attitudes, but attitude is itself a relative term.

grc

τὸ δὲ ἀνακε<κλ>ίσθαι ἢ ἑστάναι ἢ καθῆσθαι αὐτὰ μὲν οὐκ εἰσὶ θέσεις, παρωνύμως δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν εἰρημένων θέσεων λέγεται.

eng

To lie, to stand, to be seated, are not themselves attitudes, but take their name from the aforesaid attitudes.

grc

Ὑπάρχει δὲ καὶ ἐναντιότης ἐν τοῖς πρός τι, οἷον ἀρετὴ κακίᾳ ἐναντίον, ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν πρός τι ὄν, καὶ ἐπιστήμη ἀγνοίᾳ.

eng

It is possible for relatives to have contraries. Thus virtue has a contrary, vice, these both being relatives; knowledge, too, has a contrary, ignorance.

grc

οὐ πᾶσι δὲ τοῖς πρός τι ὑπάρχει ἐναντίον·

eng

But this is not the mark of all relatives;

grc

τῷ γὰρ διπλασίῳ οὐδέν ἐστιν ἐναντίον οὐδὲ τῷ τριπλασίῳ οὐδὲ τῶν τοιούτων οὐδενί.

eng

double' and 'triple' have no contrary, nor indeed has any such term.

grc

δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον ἐπιδέχεσθαι τὰ πρός τι·

eng

It also appears that relatives can admit of variation of degree.

grc

ὅμοιον γὰρ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον λέγεται, καὶ ἄνισον μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον λέγεται, ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν πρός τι ὄν·

eng

For 'like' and 'unlike', 'equal' and 'unequal', have the modifications 'more' and 'less' applied to them, and each of these is relative in character:

grc

τό τε γὰρ ὅμοιον τινὶ ὅμοιον λέγεται καὶ τὸ ἄνισον τινὶ ἄνισον.

eng

for the terms 'like' and 'unequal' bear a reference to something external.

grc

οὐ πάντα δὲ ἐπιδέχεται τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον·

eng

Yet, again, it is not every relative term that admits of variation of degree.

grc

τὸ γὰρ διπλάσιον οὐ λέγεται μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον διπλάσιον οὐδὲ τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν.

eng

No term such as 'double' admits of this modification.

grc

Πάντα δὲ τὰ πρός τι πρὸς ἀντιστρέφοντα λέγεται, οἷον ὁ δοῦλος δεσπότου λέγεται δοῦλος καὶ ὁ δεσπότης δούλου δεσπότης λέγεται, καὶ τὸ διπλάσιον ἡμίσεος διπλάσιον καὶ τὸ ἥμισυ διπλασίου ἥμισυ, καὶ τὸ μεῖζον ἐλάττονος μεῖζον καὶ τὸ ἔλαττον μείζονος ἔλαττον·

eng

All relatives have correlatives: by the term 'slave' we mean the slave of a master, by the term 'master', the master of a slave; by 'double', the double of its hall; by 'half', the half of its double; by 'greater', greater than that which is less; by 'less,' less than that which is greater.

grc

ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων·

eng

So it is with every other relative term;

grc

πλὴν τῇ πτώσει ἐνίοτε διοίσει κατὰ τὴν λέξιν, οἷον ἡ ἐπιστήμη ἐπιστητοῦ λέγεται ἐπιστήμη καὶ τὸ ἐπιστητὸν ἐπιστήμῃ ἐπιστητόν, καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις αἰσθητοῦ αἴσθησις καὶ τὸ αἰσθητὸν αἰσθήσει αἰσθητόν.

eng

but the case we use to express the correlation differs in some instances. Thus, by knowledge we mean knowledge the knowable; by the knowable, that which is to be apprehended by knowledge; by perception, perception of the perceptible; by the perceptible, that which is apprehended by perception.

grc

οὐ μὴν ἀλλ’ ἐνίοτε οὐ δόξει ἀντιστρέφειν, ἐὰν μὴ οἰκείως πρὸς ὃ λέγεται ἀποδοθῇ ἀλλὰ διαμάρτῃ ὁ ἀποδιδούς·

eng

Sometimes, however, reciprocity of correlation does not appear to exist. This comes about when a blunder is made, and that to which the relative is related is not accurately stated.

grc

οἷον τὸ πτερὸν ἐὰν ἀποδοθῇ ὄρνιθος, οὐκ ἀντιστρέφει ὄρνις πτεροῦ·

eng

If a man states that a wing is necessarily relative to a bird, the connexion between these two will not be reciprocal,

grc

οὐ γὰρ οἰκείως τὸ πρῶτον ἀποδέδοται πτερὸν ὄρνιθος,

eng

for it will not be possible to say that a bird is a bird by reason of its wings.

grc

οὐ γὰρ ᾗ ὄρνις, ταύτῃ τὸ πτερὸν αὐτῆς λέγεται, ἀλλ’ ᾗ πτερωτόν ἐστιν·

eng

The reason is that the original statement was inaccurate, for the wing is not said to be relative to the bird qua bird,

but qua winged creature.

grc

πολλῶν γὰρ καὶ ἄλλων πτερά ἐστιν ἃ οὐκ εἰσὶν ὄρνιθες·‍

eng

since many creatures besides birds have wings,

grc

ὥστε ἐὰν ἀποδοθῇ οἰκείως, καὶ ἀντιστρέφει, οἷον τὸ πτερὸν πτερωτοῦ πτερὸν καὶ τὸ πτερωτὸν πτερῷ πτερωτόν.

eng

If, then, the statement is made accurate, the connexion will be reciprocal, for we can speak of a wing, having reference necessarily to a winged creature, and of a winged creature as being such because of its wings.

grc

ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ ὀνοματοποιεῖν ἴσως ἀναγκαῖον, ἐὰν μὴ κείμενον ᾖ ὄνομα πρὸς ὃ οἰκείως ἂν ἀποδοθείη·

eng

Occasionally, perhaps, it is necessary to coin words, if no word exists by which a correlation can adequately be explained.

grc

οἷον τὸ πηδάλιον πλοίου ἐὰν ἀποδοθῇ, οὐκ οἰκεία ἡ ἀπόδοσις, —οὐ γὰρ ᾗ πλοῖον ταύτῃ αὐτοῦ τὸ πηδάλιον λέγεται·

eng

If we define a rudder as necessarily having reference to a boat, our definition will not be appropriate, for the rudder does not have this reference to a boat qua boat,

grc

ἔστι γὰρ πλοῖα ὧν οὐκ ἔστι πηδάλια·‍

eng

as there are boats which have no rudders.

grc

διὸ οὐκ ἀντιστρέφει·

eng

Thus we cannot use the terms reciprocally,

grc

τὸ γὰρ πλοῖον οὐ λέγεται πηδαλίου πλοῖον.

eng

for the word 'boat' cannot be said to find its explanation in the word 'rudder'.

grc

ἀλλ’ ἴσως οἰκειοτέρα ἂν ἡ ἀπόδοσις εἴη, εἰ οὕτω πως ἀποδοθείη τὸ πηδάλιον πηδαλιωτοῦ πηδάλιον ἢ ὁπωσοῦν ἄλλως, —ὄνομα γὰρ οὐ κεῖται·‍

eng

As there is no existing word, our definition would perhaps be more accurate if we coined some word like 'ruddered' as the correlative of 'rudder'.

grc

καὶ ἀντιστρέφει γε, ἐὰν οἰκείως ἀποδοθῇ·

eng

If we express ourselves thus accurately, at any rate the terms are reciprocally connected,

grc

τὸ γὰρ πηδαλιωτὸν πηδαλίῳ πηδαλιωτόν.

eng

for the 'ruddered' thing is 'ruddered' in virtue of its rudder.

grc

ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, οἷον ἡ κεφαλὴ οἰκειοτέρως ἂν ἀποδοθείη κεφαλωτοῦ ἢ ζῴου ἀποδιδομένη·

eng

So it is in all other cases. A head will be more accurately defined as the correlative of that which is 'headed', than as that of an animal,

grc

οὐ γὰρ ᾗ ζῷον κεφαλὴν ἔχει·

eng

for the animal does not have a head qua animal,

grc

πολλὰ γὰρ τῶν ζῴων κεφαλὴν οὐκ ἔχει.

eng

since many animals have no head.

grc

οὕτω δὲ ῥᾷστα ἂν ἴσως τις λαμβάνοι οἷς μὴ κεῖται ὀνόματα, εἰ ἀπὸ τῶν πρώτων καὶ τοῖς πρὸς αὐτὰ ἀντιστρέφουσι τιθείη τὰ ὀνόματα, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν προειρημένων ἀπὸ τοῦ πτεροῦ τὸ πτερωτὸν καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ πηδαλίου τὸ πηδαλιωτόν.

eng

Thus we may perhaps most easily comprehend that to which a thing is related, when a name does not exist, if, from that which has a name, we derive a new name, and apply it to that with which the first is reciprocally connected, as in the aforesaid instances, when we derived the word 'winged' from 'wing' and from 'rudder'.

grc

πάντα οὖν τὰ πρός τι, ἐάνπερ οἰκείως ἀποδιδῶται, πρὸς ἀντιστρέφοντα λέγεται·

eng

All relatives, then, if properly defined, have a correlative.

grc

ἐπεί, ἐάν γε πρὸς τὸ τυχὸν ἀποδιδῶται καὶ μὴ πρὸς αὐτὸ ὃ λέγεται, οὐκ ἀντιστρέφει.

eng

I add this condition because, if that to which they are related is stated as haphazard and not accurately, the two are not found to be interdependent.

grc

λέγω δὲ ὅτι οὐδὲ τῶν ὁμολογουμένως πρὸς ἀντιστρέφοντα λεγομένων καὶ ὀνομάτων αὐτοῖς κειμένων οὐδὲν ἀντιστρέφει, ἐὰν πρός τι τῶν συμβεβηκότων ἀποδιδῶται καὶ μὴ πρὸς αὐτὸ ὃ λέγεται·

eng

Let me state what I mean more clearly. Even in the case of acknowledged correlatives, and where names exist for each, there will be no interdependence if one of the two is denoted, not by that name which expresses the correlative notion, but by one of irrelevant significance.

grc

οἷον ὁ δοῦλος ἐὰν μὴ δεσπότου ἀποδοθῇ ἀλλ’ ἀνθρώπου ἢ δίποδος ἢ ὁτουοῦν τῶν τοιούτων, οὐκ ἀντιστρέφει·

eng

The term 'slave,' if defined as related, not to a master, but to a man, or a biped, or anything of that sort,

grc

οὐ γὰρ οἰκεία ἡ ἀπόδοσις.

eng

is not reciprocally connected with that in relation to which it is defined, for the statement is not exact.

grc

ἔτι ἐὰν μὲν οἰκείως ἀποδεδομένον ᾖ πρὸς ὃ λέγεται, πάντων περιαιρουμένων τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα συμβεβηκότα ἐστίν, καταλειπομένου δὲ τούτου μόνου πρὸς ὃ ἀπεδόθη οἰκείως, ἀεὶ πρὸς αὐτὸ ῥηθήσεται·

eng

Further, if one thing is said to be correlative with another, and the terminology used is correct, then, though all irrelevant attributes should be removed, and only that one attribute left in virtue of which it was correctly stated to be correlative with that other, the stated correlation will still exist.

grc

οἷον εἰ ὁ δοῦλος πρὸς δεσπότην λέγεται, περιαιρουμένων ἁπάντων ὅσα συμβεβηκότα ἐστὶ τῷ δεσπότῃ, οἷον τὸ δίποδι εἶναι, τὸ ἐπιστήμης δεκτικῷ, τὸ ἀνθρώπῳ, καταλειπομένου δὲ μόνου τοῦ δεσπότην εἶναι, ἀεὶ ὁ δοῦλος πρὸς αὐτὸ ῥηθήσεται·

eng

If the correlative of 'the slave' is said to be 'the master', then, though all irrelevant attributes of the said 'master', such as 'biped', 'receptive of knowledge', 'human', should be removed, and the attribute 'master' alone left, the stated correlation existing between him and the slave will remain the same,

grc

ὁ γὰρ δοῦλος δεσπότου δοῦλος λέγεται.

eng

for it is of a master that a slave is said to be the slave.

grc

ἐὰν δέ γε μὴ οἰκείως ἀποδοθῇ πρὸς ὅ ποτε λέγεται, περιαιρουμένων μὲν τῶν ἄλλων καταλειπομένου δὲ μόνου τοῦ πρὸς ὃ ἀπεδόθη, οὐ ῥηθήσεται πρὸς αὐτό·

eng

On the other hand, if, of two correlatives, one is not correctly termed, then, when all other attributes are removed and that alone is left in virtue of which it was stated to be correlative, the stated correlation will be found to have disappeared.

grc

ἀποδεδόσθω γὰρ ὁ δοῦλος ἀνθρώπου καὶ τὸ πτερὸν ὄρνιθος, καὶ περιῃρήσθω τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τὸ δεσπότῃ αὐτῷ εἶναι·

eng

For suppose the correlative of 'the slave' should be said to be 'the man', or the correlative of 'the wing' 'the bird'; if the attribute 'master' be withdrawn from' the man',

grc

οὐ γὰρ ἔτι ὁ δοῦλος πρὸς ἄνθρωπον ῥηθήσεται, —μὴ γὰρ ὄντος δεσπότου οὐδὲ δοῦλός ἐστιν·‍

eng

the correlation between 'the man' and 'the slave' will cease to exist, for if the man is not a master, the slave is not a slave.

grc

ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τοῦ ὄρνιθος περιῃρήσθω τὸ πτερωτῷ εἶναι·

eng

Similarly, if the attribute 'winged' be withdrawn from 'the bird',

grc

οὐ γὰρ ἔτι ἔσται τὸ πτερὸν τῶν πρός τι·

eng

the wing' will no longer be relative;

grc

μὴ γὰρ ὄντος πτερωτοῦ οὐδὲ πτερὸν ἔσται τινός.‍

eng

for if the so-called correlative is not winged, it follows that 'the wing' has no correlative.

grc

ὥστε δεῖ μὲν ἀποδιδόναι πρὸς ὅ ποτε οἰκείως λέγεται·

eng

Thus it is essential that the correlated terms should be exactly designated;

grc

κἂν μὲν ὄνομα ᾖ κείμενον ῥᾳδία ἡ ἀπόδοσις γίγνεται, μὴ ὄντος δὲ ἀναγκαῖον ἴσως ὀνοματοποιεῖν.

eng

if there is a name existing, the statement will be easy; if not, it is doubtless our duty to construct names.

grc

οὕτω δὲ ἀποδιδομένων φανερὸν ὅτι πάντα τὰ πρός τι πρὸς ἀντιστρέφοντα ῥηθήσεται.

eng

When the terminology is thus correct, it is evident that all correlatives are interdependent.

grc

Δοκεῖ δὲ τὰ πρός τι ἅμα τῇ φύσει εἶναι.

eng

Correlatives are thought to come into existence simultaneously.

grc

καὶ ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν πλείστων ἀληθές ἐστιν·

eng

This is for the most part true, as in the case of the double and the half.

grc

ἅμα γὰρ διπλάσιόν τέ ἐστι καὶ ἥμισυ, καὶ ἡμίσεος ὄντος διπλάσιόν ἐστιν, καὶ δούλου ὄντος δεσπότης ἐστίν·

eng

The existence of the half necessitates the existence of that of which it is a half. Similarly the existence of a master necessitates the existence of a slave, and that of a slave implies that of a master;

grc

ὁμοίως δὲ τούτοις καὶ τὰ ἄλλα.

eng

these are merely instances of a general rule.

grc

καὶ συναναιρεῖ δὲ ταῦτα ἄλληλα·

eng

Moreover, they cancel one another;

grc

μὴ γὰρ ὄντος διπλασίου οὐκ ἔστιν ἥμισυ, καὶ ἡμίσεος μὴ ὄντος οὐκ ἔστι διπλάσιον·

eng

for if there is no double it follows that there is no half,

grc

ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα τοιαῦτα.

eng

and vice versa; this rule also applies to all such correlatives.

grc

οὐκ ἐπὶ πάντων δὲ τῶν πρός τι ἀληθὲς δοκεῖ τὸ ἅμα τῇ φύσει εἶναι·

eng

Yet it does not appear to be true in all cases that correlatives come into existence simultaneously.

grc

τὸ γὰρ ἐπιστητὸν τῆς ἐπιστήμης πρότερον ἂν δόξειεν εἶναι·

eng

The object of knowledge would appear to exist before knowledge itself,

grc

ὡς γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ προϋπαρχόντων τῶν πραγμάτων τὰς ἐπιστήμας λαμβάνομεν·

eng

for it is usually the case that we acquire knowledge of objects already existing;

grc

ἐπ’ ὀλίγων γὰρ ἢ ἐπ’ οὐδενὸς ἴδοι τις ἂν ἅμα τῷ ἐπιστητῷ τὴν ἐπιστήμην γιγνομένην.

eng

it would be difficult, if not impossible, to find a branch of knowledge the beginning of the existence of which was contemporaneous with that of its object.

grc

ἔτι τὸ μὲν ἐπιστητὸν ἀναιρεθὲν συναναιρεῖ τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ἡ δὲ ἐπιστήμη τὸ ἐπιστητὸν οὐ συναναιρεῖ·

eng

Again, while the object of knowledge, if it ceases to exist, cancels at the same time the knowledge which was its correlative, the converse of this is not true.

grc

ἐπιστητοῦ γὰρ μὴ ὄντος οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη, —οὐδενὸς γὰρ ἔτι ἔσται ἐπιστήμη,— ἐπιστήμης δὲ μὴ οὔσης οὐδὲν κωλύει ἐπιστητὸν εἶναι·

eng

It is true that if the object of knowledge does not exist there can be no knowledge: for there will no longer be anything to know. Yet it is equally true that, if knowledge of a certain object does not exist, the object may nevertheless quite well exist.

grc

οἷον καὶ ὁ τοῦ κύκλου τετραγωνισμὸς εἴγε ἔστιν ἐπιστητόν, ἐπιστήμη μὲν αὐτοῦ οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδέπω, αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ ἐπιστητὸν ἔστιν.

eng

Thus, in the case of the squaring of the circle, if indeed that process is an object of knowledge, though it itself exists as an object of knowledge, yet the knowledge of it has not yet come into existence.

grc

ἔτι ζῴου μὲν ἀναιρεθέντος οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη, τῶν δ’ ἐπιστητῶν πολλὰ ἐνδέχεται εἶναι.

eng

Again, if all animals ceased to exist, there would be no knowledge, but there might yet be many objects of knowledge.

grc

ὁμοίως δὲ τούτοις καὶ τὰ ἐπὶ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἔχει·

eng

This is likewise the case with regard to perception:

grc

τὸ γὰρ αἰσθητὸν πρότερον τῆς αἰσθήσεως δοκεῖ εἶναι·

eng

for the object of perception is, it appears, prior to the act of perception.

grc

τὸ μὲν γὰρ αἰσθητὸν ἀναιρεθὲν συναναιρεῖ τὴν αἴσθησιν, ἡ δὲ αἴσθησις τὸ αἰσθητὸν οὐ συναναιρεῖ.

eng

If the perceptible is annihilated, perception also will cease to exist; but the annihilation of perception does not cancel the existence of the perceptible.

grc

αἱ γὰρ αἰσθήσεις περὶ σῶμα καὶ ἐν σώματί εἰσιν, αἰσθητοῦ δὲ ἀναιρεθέντος ἀνῄρηται καὶ σῶμα, —τῶν γὰρ αἰσθητῶν καὶ τὸ σῶμα,— σώματος δὲ μὴ ὄντος ἀνῄρηται καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις, ὥστε συναναιρεῖ τὸ αἰσθητὸν τὴν αἴσθησιν.

eng

For perception implies a body perceived and a body in which perception takes place. Now if that which is perceptible is annihilated, it follows that the body is annihilated, for the body is a perceptible thing; and if the body does not exist, it follows that perception also ceases to exist. Thus the annihilation of the perceptible involves that of perception.

grc

ἡ δέ γε αἴσθησις τὸ αἰσθητὸν οὔ·

eng

But the annihilation of perception does not involve that of the perceptible.

grc

ζῴου γὰρ ἀναιρεθέντος αἴσθησις μὲν ἀνῄρηται, αἰσθητὸν δὲ ἔσται, οἷον σῶμα, θερμόν, γλυκύ, πικρόν, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα πάντα ὅσα ἐστὶν αἰσθητά.

eng

For if the animal is annihilated, it follows that perception also is annihilated, but perceptibles such as body, heat, sweetness, bitterness, and so on, will remain.

grc

ἔτι ἡ μὲν αἴσθησις ἅμα τῷ αἰσθητικῷ γίγνεται, —ἅμα γὰρ ζῷόν τε γίγνεται καὶ αἴσθησις,— τὸ δέ γε αἰσθητὸν ἔστι καὶ πρὸ τοῦ αἴσθησιν εἶναι, —πῦρ γὰρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἐξ ὧν καὶ τὸ ζῷον συνίσταται, ἔστι καὶ πρὸ τοῦ ζῷον ὅλως εἶναι ἢ αἴσθησιν,— ὥστε πρότερον ἂν τῆς αἰσθήσεως τὸ αἰσθητὸν εἶναι δόξειεν.

eng

Again, perception is generated at the same time as the perceiving subject, for it comes into existence at the same time as the animal. But the perceptible surely exists before perception; for fire and water and such elements, out of which the animal is itself composed, exist before the animal is an animal at all, and before perception. Thus it would seem that the perceptible exists before perception.

grc

Ἔχει δὲ ἀπορίαν πότερον οὐδεμία οὐσία τῶν πρός τι λέγεται, καθάπερ δοκεῖ, ἢ τοῦτο ἐνδέχεται κατά τινας τῶν δευτέρων οὐσιῶν.

eng

It may be questioned whether it is true that no substance is relative, as seems to be the case, or whether exception is to be made in the case of certain secondary substances.

grc

ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τῶν πρώτων οὐσιῶν ἀληθές ἐστιν·

eng

With regard to primary substances, it is quite true that there is no such possibility,

grc

οὔτε γὰρ τὰ ὅλα οὔτε τὰ μέρη πρός τι λέγεται·

eng

for neither wholes nor parts of primary substances are relative.

grc

ὁ γὰρ τὶς ἄνθρωπος οὐ λέγεται τινός τις ἄνθρωπος, οὐδὲ ὁ τὶς βοῦς τινός τις βοῦς·

eng

The individual man or ox is not defined with reference to something external.

grc

ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τὰ μέρη·

eng

Similarly with the parts:

grc

ἡ γὰρ τὶς χεὶρ οὐ λέγεται τινός τις χεὶρ ἀλλὰ τινὸς χείρ, καὶ ἡ τὶς κεφαλὴ οὐ λέγεται τινός τις κεφαλὴ ἀλλὰ τινὸς κεφαλή.

eng

a particular hand or head is not defined as a particular hand or head of a particular person, but as the hand or head of a particular person.

grc

ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν δευτέρων οὐσιῶν, ἐπί γε τῶν πλείστων·

eng

It is true also, for the most part at least, in the case of secondary substances;

grc

οἷον ὁ ἄνθρωπος οὐ λέγεται τινὸς ἄνθρωπος, οὐδὲ ὁ βοῦς τινὸς βοῦς, οὐδὲ τὸ ξύλον τινὸς ξύλον, ἀλλὰ τινὸς κτῆμα λέγεται.

eng

the species 'man' and the species 'ox' are not defined with reference to anything outside themselves. Wood, again, is only relative in so far as it is some one's property, not in so far as it is wood.

grc

ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν τοιούτων φανερὸν ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι τῶν πρός τι, ἐπ’ ἐνίων δὲ τῶν δευτέρων οὐσιῶν ἔχει ἀμφισβήτησιν·

eng

It is plain, then, that in the cases mentioned substance is not relative. But with regard to some secondary substances there is a difference of opinion;

grc

οἷον ἡ κεφαλὴ τινὸς λέγεται κεφαλὴ καὶ ἡ χεὶρ τινὸς λέγεται χεὶρ καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν τοιούτων, ὥστε ταῦτα τῶν πρός τι δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι.

eng

thus, such terms as 'head' and 'hand' are defined with reference to that of which the things indicated are a part, and so it comes about that these appear to have a relative character.

grc

εἰ μὲν οὖν ἱκανῶς ὁ τῶν πρός τι ὁρισμὸς ἀποδέδοται, ἢ τῶν πάνυ χαλεπῶν ἢ τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἐστὶ τὸ λῦσαι ὡς οὐδεμία οὐσία τῶν πρός τι λέγεται·

eng

Indeed, if our definition of that which is relative was complete, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to prove that no substance is relative.

grc

εἰ δὲ μὴ ἱκανῶς, ἀλλ’ ἔστι τὰ πρός τι οἷς τὸ εἶναι ταὐτόν ἐστι τῷ πρός τί πως ἔχειν, ἴσως ἂν ῥηθείη τι πρὸς αὐτά.

eng

If, however, our definition was not complete, if those things only are properly called relative in the case of which relation to an external object is a necessary condition of existence, perhaps some explanation of the dilemma may be found.

grc

ὁ δὲ πρότερος ὁρισμὸς παρακολουθεῖ μὲν πᾶσι τοῖς πρός τι, οὐ μὴν τοῦτό γέ ἐστι τὸ πρός τι αὐτοῖς εἶναι τὸ αὐτὰ ἅπερ ἐστὶν ἑτέρων λέγεσθαι.

eng

The former definition does indeed apply to all relatives, but the fact that a thing is explained with reference to something else does not make it essentially relative.

grc

ἐκ δὲ τούτων δῆλόν ἐστιν ὅτι ἐάν τις εἰδῇ τι ὡρισμένως τῶν πρός τι, κἀκεῖνο πρὸς ὃ λέγεται ὡρισμένως εἴσεται.

eng

From this it is plain that, if a man definitely apprehends a relative thing, he will also definitely apprehend that to which it is relative.

grc

φανερὸν μὲν οὖν καὶ ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἐστίν·

eng

Indeed this is self-evident:

grc

εἰ γὰρ οἶδέ τις τόδε τι ὅτι τῶν πρός τί ἐστιν, ἔστι δὲ τὸ εἶναι τοῖς πρός τι ταὐτὸ τῷ πρός τί πως ἔχειν, κἀκεῖνο οἶδε πρὸς ὃ τοῦτό πως ἔχει·

eng

for if a man knows that some particular thing is relative, assuming that we call that a relative in the case of which relation to something is a necessary condition of existence, he knows that also to which it is related.

grc

εἰ γὰρ οὐκ οἶδεν ὅλως πρὸς ὃ τοῦτό πως ἔχει, οὐδ’ εἰ πρός τί πως ἔχει εἴσεται.

eng

For if he does not know at all that to which it is related, he will not know whether or not it is relative.

grc

καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν καθ’ ἕκαστα δὲ δῆλον τὸ τοιοῦτον·

eng

This is clear, moreover, in particular instances.

grc

οἷον τόδε τι εἰ οἶδεν ἀφωρισμένως ὅτι ἔστι διπλάσιον, καὶ ὅτου διπλάσιόν ἐστιν εὐθὺς ἀφωρισμένως οἶδεν, —εἰ γὰρ μηδενὸς τῶν ἀφωρισμένων οἶδεν αὐτὸ διπλάσιον, οὐδ’ εἰ ἔστι διπλάσιον ὅλως οἶδεν·‍

eng

If a man knows definitely that such and such a thing is 'double', he will also forthwith know definitely that of which it is the double. For if there is nothing definite of which he knows it to be the double, he does not know at all that it is double.

grc

ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τόδε τι εἰ οἶδεν ὅτι κάλλιόν ἐστι, καὶ ὅτου κάλλιόν ἐστιν ἀφωρισμένως ἀναγκαῖον εἰδέναι διὰ ταῦτα, (οὐκ ἀορίστως δὲ εἴσεται ὅτι τοῦτό ἐστι χείρονος κάλλιον·

eng

Again, if he knows that a thing is more beautiful, it follows necessarily that he will forthwith definitely know that also than which it is more beautiful. He will not merely know indefinitely that it is more beautiful than something which is less beautiful,

grc

ὑπόληψις γὰρ τὸ τοιοῦτο γίγνεται, οὐκ ἐπιστήμη·

eng

for this would be supposition, not knowledge.

grc

οὐ γὰρ ἔτι εἴσεται ἀκριβῶς ὅτι ἐστὶ χείρονος κάλλιον·

eng

For if he does not know definitely that than which it is more beautiful,

grc

εἰ γὰρ οὕτως ἔτυχεν, οὐδέν ἐστι χεῖρον αὐτοῦ)·

eng

he can no longer claim to know definitely that it is more beautiful than something else which is less beautiful: for it might be that nothing was less beautiful.

grc

ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν, ὃ ἂν εἰδῇ τις τῶν πρός τι ὡρισμένως, κἀκεῖνο πρὸς ὃ λέγεται ὡρισμένως εἰδέναι.

eng

It is, therefore, evident that if a man apprehends some relative thing definitely, he necessarily knows that also definitely to which it is related.

grc

τὴν δέ γε κεφαλὴν καὶ τὴν χεῖρα καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν τοιούτων αἵ εἰσιν οὐσίαι αὐτὸ μὲν ὅπερ ἐστὶν ὡρισμένως ἔστιν εἰδέναι, πρὸς ὃ δὲ λέγεται οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον·

eng

Now the head, the hand, and such things are substances, and it is possible to know their essential character definitely, but it does not necessarily follow that we should know that to which they are related.

grc

τίνος γὰρ αὕτη ἡ κεφαλὴ ἢ τίνος ἡ χεὶρ οὐκ ἔστιν εἰδέναι ὡρισμένως·

eng

It is not possible to know forthwith whose head or hand is meant.

grc

ὥστε οὐκ ἂν εἴη ταῦτα τῶν πρός τι·

eng

Thus these are not relatives,

grc

εἰ δὲ μή ἐστι τῶν πρός τι, ἀληθὲς ἂν εἴη λέγειν ὅτι οὐδεμία οὐσία τῶν πρός τί ἐστιν.

eng

and, this being the case, it would be true to say that no substance is relative in character.

grc

ἴσως δὲ χαλεπὸν περὶ τῶν τοιούτων σφοδρῶς ἀποφαίνεσθαι μὴ πολλάκις ἐπεσκεμμένον, τὸ μέντοι διηπορηκέναι ἐφ’ ἕκαστον αὐτῶν οὐκ ἄχρηστόν ἐστιν.

eng

It is perhaps a difficult matter, in such cases, to make a positive statement without more exhaustive examination, but to have raised questions with regard to details is not without advantage.

grc

Ποιότητα δὲ λέγω καθ’ ἣν ποιοί τινες λέγονται·

eng

By 'quality' I mean that in virtue of which people are said to be such and such.

grc

ἔστι δὲ ἡ ποιότης τῶν πλεοναχῶς λεγομένων.

eng

Quality is a term that is used in many senses.

grc

ἓν μὲν οὖν εἶδος ποιότητος ἕξις καὶ διάθεσις λεγέσθωσαν.

eng

One sort of quality let us call 'habit' or 'disposition'.

grc

διαφέρει δὲ ἕξις διαθέσεως τῷ μονιμώτερον καὶ πολυχρονιώτερον εἶναι·

eng

Habit differs from disposition in being more lasting and more firmly established.

grc

τοιαῦται δὲ αἵ τε ἐπιστῆμαι καὶ αἱ ἀρεταί·

eng

The various kinds of knowledge and of virtue are habits,

grc

ἥ τε γὰρ ἐπιστήμη δοκεῖ τῶν παραμονίμων εἶναι καὶ δυσκινήτων, ἐὰν καὶ μετρίως τις ἐπιστήμην λάβῃ, ἐάνπερ μὴ μεγάλη μεταβολὴ γένηται ὑπὸ νόσου ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς τοιούτου·

eng

for knowledge, even when acquired only in a moderate degree, is, it is agreed, abiding in its character and difficult to displace, unless some great mental upheaval takes place, through disease or any such cause.

grc

ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀρετή·

eng

The virtues, also,

grc

οἷον ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν τοιούτων οὐκ εὐκίνητον δοκεῖ εἶναι οὐδ’ εὐμετάβολον.

eng

such as justice, self-restraint, and so on, are not easily dislodged or dismissed, so as to give place to vice.

grc

διαθέσεις δὲ λέγονται ἅ ἐστιν εὐκίνητα καὶ ταχὺ μεταβάλλοντα, οἷον θερμότης καὶ κατάψυξις καὶ νόσος καὶ ὑγίεια καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα·

eng

By a disposition, on the other hand, we mean a condition that is easily changed and quickly gives place to its opposite. Thus, heat, cold, disease, health, and so on are dispositions.

grc

διάκειται μὲν γάρ πως κατὰ ταύτας ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ταχὺ δὲ μεταβάλλει ἐκ θερμοῦ ψυχρὸς γιγνόμενος καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν εἰς τὸ νοσεῖν·

eng

For a man is disposed in one way or another with reference to these, but quickly changes, becoming cold instead of warm, ill instead of well.

grc

ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, εἰ μή τις καὶ αὐτῶν τούτων τυγχάνοι διὰ χρόνου πλῆθος ἤδη πεφυσιωμένη καὶ ἀνίατος ἢ πάνυ δυσκίνητος οὖσα, ἣν ἄν τις ἴσως ἕξιν ἤδη προσαγορεύοι.

eng

So it is with all other dispositions also, unless through lapse of time a disposition has itself become inveterate and almost impossible to dislodge: in which case we should perhaps go so far as to call it a habit.

grc

φανερὸν δὲ ὅτι ταῦτα βούλονται ἕξεις λέγειν ἅ ἐστι πολυχρονιώτερα καὶ δυσκινητότερα·

eng

It is evident that men incline to call those conditions habits which are of a more or less permanent type and difficult to displace;

grc

τοὺς γὰρ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν μὴ πάνυ κατέχοντας ἀλλ’ εὐκινήτους ὄντας οὔ φασιν ἕξιν ἔχειν, καίτοι διάκεινταί γέ πως κατὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἢ χεῖρον ἢ βέλτιον.

eng

for those who are not retentive of knowledge, but volatile, are not said to have such and such a 'habit' as regards knowledge, yet they are disposed, we may say, either better or worse, towards knowledge.

grc

ὥστε διαφέρει ἕξις διαθέσεως τῷ τὸ μὲν εὐκίνητον εἶναι τὸ δὲ πολυχρονιώτερόν τε καὶ δυσκινητότερον.

eng

Thus habit differs from disposition in this, that while the latter in ephemeral, the former is permanent and difficult to alter.

grc

εἰσὶ δὲ αἱ μὲν ἕξεις καὶ διαθέσεις, αἱ δὲ διαθέσεις οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἕξεις·

eng

Habits are at the same time dispositions, but dispositions are not necessarily habits.

grc

οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἕξεις ἔχοντες καὶ διάκεινταί πως κατὰ ταύτας, οἱ δὲ διακείμενοι οὐ πάντως καὶ ἕξιν ἔχουσιν.

eng

For those who have some specific habit may be said also, in virtue of that habit, to be thus or thus disposed; but those who are disposed in some specific way have not in all cases the corresponding habit.

grc

Ἕτερον δὲ γένος ποιότητος καθ’ ὃ πυκτικοὺς ἢ δρομικοὺς ἢ ὑγιεινοὺς ἢ νοσώδεις λέγομεν, καὶ ἁπλῶς ὅσα κατὰ δύναμιν φυσικὴν ἢ ἀδυναμίαν λέγεται.

eng

Another sort of quality is that in virtue of which, for example, we call men good boxers or runners, or healthy or sickly: in fact it includes all those terms which refer to inborn capacity or incapacity.

grc

οὐ γὰρ τῷ διακεῖσθαί πως ἕκαστον τῶν τοιούτων λέγεται, ἀλλὰ τῷ δύναμιν ἔχειν φυσικὴν τοῦ ποιῆσαί τι ῥᾳδίως ἢ μηδὲν πάσχειν·

eng

Such things are not predicated of a person in virtue of his disposition, but in virtue of his inborn capacity or incapacity to do something with ease or to avoid defeat of any kind.

grc

οἷον πυκτικοὶ ἢ δρομικοὶ λέγονται οὐ τῷ διακεῖσθαί πως ἀλλὰ τῷ δύναμιν ἔχειν φυσικὴν τοῦ ποιῆσαί τι ῥᾳδίως, ὑγιεινοὶ δὲ λέγονται τῷ δύναμιν ἔχειν φυσικὴν τοῦ μηδὲν πάσχειν ὑπὸ τῶν τυχόντων ῥᾳδίως, νοσώδεις δὲ τῷ ἀδυναμίαν ἔχειν τοῦ μηδὲν πάσχειν.

eng

Persons are called good boxers or good runners, not in virtue of such and such a disposition, but in virtue of an inborn capacity to accomplish something with ease. Men are called healthy in virtue of the inborn capacity of easy resistance to those unhealthy influences that may ordinarily arise; unhealthy, in virtue of the lack of this capacity.

grc

ὁμοίως δὲ τούτοις καὶ τὸ σκληρὸν καὶ τὸ μαλακὸν ἔχει·

eng

Similarly with regard to softness and hardness.

grc

τὸ μὲν γὰρ σκληρὸν λέγεται τῷ δύναμιν ἔχειν τοῦ μὴ ῥᾳδίως διαιρεῖσθαι, τὸ δὲ μαλακὸν τῷ ἀδυναμίαν ἔχειν τοῦ αὐτοῦ τούτου.

eng

Hardness is predicated of a thing because it has that capacity of resistance which enables it to withstand disintegration; softness, again, is predicated of a thing by reason of the lack of that capacity.

grc

Τρίτον δὲ γένος ποιότητος παθητικαὶ ποιότητες καὶ πάθη·

eng

A third class within this category is that of affective qualities and affections.

grc

ἔστι δὲ τὰ τοιάδε οἷον γλυκύτης τε καὶ πικρότης καὶ στρυφνότης καὶ πάντα τὰ τούτοις συγγενῆ, ἔτι δὲ θερμότης καὶ ψυχρότης καὶ λευκότης καὶ μελανία.

eng

Sweetness, bitterness, sourness, are examples of this sort of quality, together with all that is akin to these; heat, moreover, and cold, whiteness, and blackness are affective qualities.

grc

ὅτι μὲν οὖν αὗται ποιότητές εἰσιν φανερόν·

eng

It is evident that these are qualities,

grc

τὰ γὰρ δεδεγμένα ποιὰ λέγεται κατ’ αὐτάς·

eng

for those things that possess them are themselves said to be such and such by reason of their presence.

grc

οἷον τὸ μέλι τῷ γλυκύτητα δεδέχθαι λέγεται γλυκύ, καὶ τὸ σῶμα λευκὸν τῷ λευκότητα δεδέχθαι·

eng

Honey is called sweet because it contains sweetness; the body is called white because it contains whiteness;

grc

ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἔχει.

eng

and so in all other cases.

grc

παθητικαὶ δὲ ποιότητες λέγονται οὐ τῷ αὐτὰ τὰ δεδεγμένα τὰς ποιότητας πεπονθέναι τι·

eng

The term 'affective quality' is not used as indicating that those things which admit these qualities are affected in any way.

grc

οὔτε γὰρ τὸ μέλι τῷ πεπονθέναι τι λέγεται γλυκύ, οὔτε τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν·

eng

Honey is not called sweet because it is affected in a specific way, nor is this what is meant in any other instance.

grc

ὁμοίως δὲ τούτοις καὶ ἡ θερμότης καὶ ἡ ψυχρότης παθητικαὶ ποιότητες λέγονται οὐ τῷ αὐτὰ τὰ δεδεγμένα πεπονθέναι τι, τῷ δὲ κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἑκάστην τῶν εἰρημένων ποιοτήτων πάθους εἶναι ποιητικὴν παθητικαὶ ποιότητες λέγονται·

eng

Similarly heat and cold are called affective qualities, not because those things which admit them are affected. What is meant is that these said qualities are capable of producing an 'affection' in the way of perception.

grc

ἥ τε γὰρ γλυκύτης πάθος τι κατὰ τὴν γεῦσιν ἐμποιεῖ καὶ ἡ θερμότης κατὰ τὴν ἁφήν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι.

eng

For sweetness has the power of affecting the sense of taste; heat, that of touch; and so it is with the rest of these qualities.

grc

λευκότης δὲ καὶ μελανία καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι χροιαὶ οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον τοῖς εἰρημένοις παθητικαὶ ποιότητες λέγονται, ἀλλὰ τῷ αὐτὰς ἀπὸ πάθους γεγενῆσθαι.

eng

Whiteness and blackness, however, and the other colours, are not said to be affective qualities in this sense, but -because they themselves are the results of an affection.

grc

ὅτι μὲν οὖν γίγνονται διὰ πάθος πολλαὶ μεταβολαὶ χρωμάτων, δῆλον·

eng

It is plain that many changes of colour take place because of affections.

grc

αἰσχυνθεὶς γάρ τις ἐρυθρὸς ἐγένετο καὶ φοβηθεὶς ὠχρὸς καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν τοιούτων·

eng

When a man is ashamed, he blushes; when he is afraid, he becomes pale, and so on.

grc

ὥστε καὶ εἴ τις φύσει τῶν τοιούτων τι παθῶν πέπονθεν, τὴν ὁμοίαν χροιὰν εἰκός ἐστιν ἔχειν αὐτόν·

eng

So true is this, that when a man is by nature liable to such affections, arising from some concomitance of elements in his constitution, it is a probable inference that he has the corresponding complexion of skin.

grc

ἥτις γὰρ νῦν ἐν τῷ αἰσχυνθῆναι διάθεσις τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἐγένετο, καὶ κατὰ φυσικὴν σύστασιν ἡ αὐτὴ γένοιτ’ ἂν διάθεσις, ὥστε φύσει καὶ τὴν χροιὰν ὁμοίαν γίγνεσθαι.

eng

For the same disposition of bodily elements, which in the former instance was momentarily present in the case of an access of shame, might be a result of a man's natural temperament, so as to produce the corresponding colouring also as a natural characteristic.

grc

ὅσα μὲν οὖν τῶν τοιούτων συμπτωμάτων ἀπό τινων παθῶν δυσκινήτων καὶ παραμονίμων τὴν ἀρχὴν εἴληφε ποιότητες λέγονται·

eng

All conditions, therefore, of this kind, if caused by certain permanent and lasting affections, are called affective qualities.

grc

εἴτε γὰρ ἐν τῇ κατὰ φύσιν συστάσει ὠχρότης ἢ μελανία γεγένηται, ποιότης λέγεται, —ποιοὶ γὰρ κατὰ ταύτας λεγόμεθα,— εἴτε διὰ νόσον μακρὰν ἢ διὰ καῦμα [τὸ αὐτὸ] συμβέβηκεν ὠχρότης ἢ μελανία, καὶ μὴ ῥᾳδίως ἀποκαθίστανται ἢ καὶ διὰ βίου παραμένουσι, ποιότητες καὶ αὐταὶ λέγονται, —ὁμοίως γὰρ ποιοὶ κατὰ ταύτας λεγόμεθα.‍

eng

For pallor and duskiness of complexion are called qualities, inasmuch as we are said to be such and such in virtue of them, not only if they originate in natural constitution, but also if they come about through long disease or sunburn, and are difficult to remove, or indeed remain throughout life. For in the same way we are said to be such and such because of these.

grc

ὅσα δὲ ἀπὸ ῥᾳδίως διαλυομένων καὶ ταχὺ ἀποκαθισταμένων γίγνεται πάθη λέγεται·

eng

Those conditions, however, which arise from causes which may easily be rendered ineffective or speedily removed, are called, not qualities, but affections:

grc

οὐ γὰρ λέγονται ποιοί τινες κατὰ ταῦτα·

eng

for we are not said to be such virtue of them.

grc

οὔτε γὰρ ὁ ἐρυθριῶν διὰ τὸ αἰσχυνθῆναι ἐρυθρίας λέγεται, οὔτε ὁ ὠχριῶν διὰ τὸ φοβεῖσθαι ὠχρίας, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον πεπονθέναι τι·

eng

The man who blushes through shame is not said to be a constitutional blusher, nor is the man who becomes pale through fear said to be constitutionally pale. He is said rather to have been affected.

grc

ὥστε πάθη μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγεται, ποιότητες δὲ οὔ.

eng

Thus such conditions are called affections, not qualities.

grc

ὁμοίως δὲ τούτοις καὶ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν παθητικαὶ ποιότητες καὶ πάθη λέγεται.

eng

In like manner there are affective qualities and affections of the soul.

grc

ὅσα τε γὰρ ἐν τῇ γενέσει εὐθὺς ἀπό τινων παθῶν γεγένηται ποιότητες λέγονται, οἷον ἥ τε μανικὴ ἔκστασις καὶ ἡ ὀργὴ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα·

eng

That temper with which a man is born and which has its origin in certain deep-seated affections is called a quality. I mean such conditions as insanity, irascibility, and so on:

grc

ποιοὶ γὰρ κατὰ ταύτας λέγονται, ὀργίλοι τε καὶ μανικοί.

eng

for people are said to be mad or irascible in virtue of these.

grc

ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὅσαι ἐκστάσεις μὴ φυσικαί, ἀλλ’ ἀπό τινων ἄλλων συμπτωμάτων γεγένηνται δυσαπάλλακτοι ἢ καὶ ὅλως ἀκίνητοι, ποιότητες καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα·

eng

Similarly those abnormal psychic states which are not inborn, but arise from the concomitance of certain other elements, and are difficult to remove, or altogether permanent, are called qualities,

grc

ποιοὶ γὰρ κατὰ ταύτας λέγονται.

eng

for in virtue of them men are said to be such and such.

grc

ὅσα δὲ ἀπὸ ταχὺ καθισταμένων γίγνεται πάθη λέγεται, οἷον εἰ λυπούμενος ὀργιλώτερός ἐστιν·

eng

Those, however, which arise from causes easily rendered ineffective are called affections, not qualities. Suppose that a man is irritable when vexed:

grc

οὐ γὰρ λέγεται ὀργίλος ὁ ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ πάθει ὀργιλώτερος ὤν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον πεπονθέναι τι·

eng

he is not even spoken of as a bad-tempered man, when in such circumstances he loses his temper somewhat, but rather is said to be affected.

grc

ὥστε πάθη μὲν λέγεται τὰ τοιαῦτα, ποιότητες δὲ οὔ.

eng

Such conditions are therefore termed, not qualities, but affections.

grc

Τέταρτον δὲ γένος ποιότητος σχῆμά τε καὶ ἡ περὶ ἕκαστον ὑπάρχουσα μορφή, ἔτι δὲ πρὸς τούτοις εὐθύτης καὶ καμπυλότης καὶ εἴ τι τούτοις ὅμοιόν ἐστιν·

eng

The fourth sort of quality is figure and the shape that belongs to a thing; and besides this, straightness and curvedness and any other qualities of this type;

grc

καθ’ ἕκαστον γὰρ τούτων ποιόν τι λέγεται·

eng

each of these defines a thing as being such and such.

grc

τῷ γὰρ τρίγωνον ἢ τετράγωνον εἶναι ποιόν τι λέγεται, καὶ τῷ εὐθὺ ἢ καμπύλον.

eng

Because it is triangular or quadrangular a thing is said to have a specific character, or again because it is straight or curved;

grc

καὶ κατὰ τὴν μορφὴν δὲ ἕκαστον ποιόν τι λέγεται.

eng

in fact a thing's shape in every case gives rise to a qualification of it.

grc

τὸ δὲ μανὸν καὶ τὸ πυκνὸν καὶ τὸ τραχὺ καὶ τὸ λεῖον δόξειε μὲν ἂν ποιὸν σημαίνειν, ἔοικε δὲ ἀλλότρια τὰ τοιαῦτα εἶναι τῆς περὶ τὸ ποιὸν διαιρέσεως·

eng

Rarity and density, roughness and smoothness, seem to be terms indicating quality: yet these, it would appear, really belong to a class different from that of quality.

grc

θέσιν γάρ τινα μᾶλλον φαίνεται τῶν μορίων ἑκάτερον δηλοῦν·

eng

For it is rather a certain relative position of the parts composing the thing thus qualified which, it appears, is indicated by each of these terms.

grc

πυκνὸν μὲν γὰρ τῷ τὰ μόρια σύνεγγυς εἶναι ἀλλήλοις, μανὸν δὲ τῷ διεστάναι ἀπ’ ἀλλήλων·

eng

A thing is dense, owing to the fact that its parts are closely combined with one another; rare, because there are interstices between the parts;

grc

καὶ λεῖον μὲν τῷ ἐπ’ εὐθείας πως τὰ μόρια κεῖσθαι, τραχὺ δὲ τῷ τὸ μὲν ὑπερέχειν τὸ δὲ ἐλλείπειν.

eng

smooth, because its parts lie, so to speak, evenly; rough, because some parts project beyond others.

grc

ἴσως μὲν οὖν καὶ ἄλλος ἄν τις φανείη τρόπος ποιότητος, ἀλλ’ οἵ γε μάλιστα λεγόμενοι σχεδὸν τοσοῦτοί εἰσιν.

eng

There may be other sorts of quality, but those that are most properly so called have, we may safely say, been enumerated.

grc

Ποιότητες μὲν οὖν εἰσὶν αἱ εἰρημέναι, ποιὰ δὲ τὰ κατὰ ταύτας παρωνύμως λεγόμενα ἢ ὁπωσοῦν ἄλλως ἀπ’ αὐτῶν.

eng

These, then, are qualities, and the things that take their name from them as derivatives, or are in some other way dependent on them, are said to be qualified in some specific way.

grc

ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν πλείστων καὶ σχεδὸν ἐπὶ πάντων παρωνύμως λέγεται, οἷον ἀπὸ τῆς λευκότητος ὁ λευκὸς καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς γραμματικῆς ὁ γραμματικὸς καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς δικαιοσύνης ὁ δίκαιος, ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων.

eng

In most, indeed in almost all cases, the name of that which is qualified is derived from that of the quality. Thus the terms 'whiteness', 'grammar', 'justice', give us the adjectives 'white', 'grammatical', 'just', and so on.

grc

ἐπ’ ἐνίων δὲ διὰ τὸ μὴ κεῖσθαι ταῖς ποιότησιν ὀνόματα οὐκ ἐνδέχεται παρωνύμως ἀπ’ αὐτῶν λέγεσθαι·

eng

There are some cases, however, in which, as the quality under consideration has no name, it is impossible that those possessed of it should have a name that is derivative.

grc

οἷον ὁ δρομικὸς ἢ ὁ πυκτικὸς ὁ κατὰ δύναμιν φυσικὴν λεγόμενος ἀπ’ οὐδεμιᾶς ποιότητος παρωνύμως λέγεται·

eng

For instance, the name given to the runner or boxer, who is so called in virtue of an inborn capacity, is not derived from that of any quality;

grc

οὐ γὰρ κεῖται ὀνόματα ταῖς δυνάμεσι καθ’ ἃς οὗτοι ποιοὶ λέγονται, ὥσπερ καὶ ταῖς ἐπιστήμαις καθ’ ἃς πυκτικοὶ ἢ παλαιστρικοὶ οἱ κατὰ διάθεσιν λέγονται, —πυκτικὴ γὰρ ἐπιστήμη λέγεται καὶ παλαιστρική, ποιοὶ δὲ ἀπὸ τούτων παρωνύμως οἱ διακείμενοι λέγονται.‍

eng

for lob those capacities have no name assigned to them. In this, the inborn capacity is distinct from the science, with reference to which men are called, e.g. boxers or wrestlers. Such a science is classed as a disposition; it has a name, and is called 'boxing' or 'wrestling' as the case may be, and the name given to those disposed in this way is derived from that of the science.

grc

ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ ὀνόματος κειμένου οὐ λέγεται παρωνύμως τὸ κατ’ αὐτὴν ποιὸν λεγόμενον, οἷον ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς ὁ σπουδαῖος·

eng

Sometimes, even though a name exists for the quality, that which takes its character from the quality has a name that is not a derivative.

grc

τῷ γὰρ ἀρετὴν ἔχειν σπουδαῖος λέγεται, ἀλλ’ οὐ παρωνύμως ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς·

eng

For instance, the upright man takes his character from the possession of the quality of integrity, but the name given him is not derived from the word 'integrity'.

grc

οὐκ ἐπὶ πολλῶν δὲ τὸ τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν.

eng

Yet this does not occur often.

grc

ποιὰ οὖν λέγεται τὰ παρωνύμως ἀπὸ τῶν εἰρημένων ποιοτήτων λεγόμενα ἢ ὁπωσοῦν ἄλλως ἀπ’ αὐτῶν.

eng

We may therefore state that those things are said to be possessed of some specific quality which have a name derived from that of the aforesaid quality, or which are in some other way dependent on it.

grc

Ὑπάρχει δὲ καὶ ἐναντιότης κατὰ τὸ ποιόν, οἷον δικαιοσύνη ἀδικίᾳ ἐναντίον καὶ λευκότης μελανίᾳ καὶ τἆλλα ὡσαύτως, καὶ τὰ κατ’ αὐτὰς δὲ ποιὰ λεγόμενα, οἷον τὸ ἄδικον τῷ δικαίῳ καὶ τὸ λευκὸν τῷ μέλανι.

eng

One quality may be the contrary of another; thus justice is the contrary of injustice, whiteness of blackness, and so on. The things, also, which are said to be such and such in virtue of these qualities, may be contrary the one to the other; for that which is unjust is contrary to that which is just, that which is white to that which is black.

grc

οὐκ ἐπὶ πάντων δὲ τὸ τοιοῦτον·

eng

This, however, is not always the case.

grc

τῷ γὰρ πυῤῥῷ ἢ ὠχρῷ ἢ ταῖς τοιαύταις χροιαῖς οὐδέν ἐστιν ἐναντίον ποιοῖς οὖσιν.

eng

Red, yellow, and such colours, though qualities, have no contraries.

grc

ἔτι ἐὰν τῶν ἐναντίων θάτερον ᾖ ποιόν, καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν ἔσται ποιόν.

eng

If one of two contraries is a quality, the other will also be a quality.

grc

τοῦτο δὲ δῆλον προχειριζομένῳ τὰς ἄλλας κατηγορίας, οἷον εἰ ἔστιν ἡ δικαιοσύνη τῇ ἀδικίᾳ ἐναντίον, ποιὸν δὲ ἡ δικαιοσύνη, ποιὸν ἄρα καὶ ἡ ἀδικία·

eng

This will be evident from particular instances, if we apply the names used to denote the other categories; for instance, granted that justice is the contrary of injustice and justice is a quality, injustice will also be a quality:

grc

οὐδεμία γὰρ τῶν ἄλλων κατηγοριῶν ἐφαρμόζει τῇ ἀδικίᾳ, οὔτε ποσὸν οὔτε πρός τι οὔτε πού, οὐδ’ ὅλως τι τῶν τοιούτων οὐδὲν ἀλλ’ ἢ ποιόν·

eng

neither quantity, nor relation, nor place, nor indeed any other category but that of quality, will be applicable properly to injustice.

grc

ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων κατὰ τὸ ποιὸν ἐναντίων.

eng

So it is with all other contraries falling under the category of quality.

grc

Ἐπιδέχεται δὲ καὶ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον τὰ ποιά·

eng

Qualities admit of variation of degree.

grc

λευκὸν γὰρ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον ἕτερον ἑτέρου λέγεται, καὶ δίκαιον ἕτερον ἑτέρου μᾶλλον.

eng

Whiteness is predicated of one thing in a greater or less degree than of another. This is also the case with reference to justice.

grc

καὶ αὐτὸ δὲ ἐπίδοσιν λαμβάνει, —λευκὸν γὰρ ὂν ἔτι ἐνδέχεται λευκότερον γενέσθαι·‍

eng

Moreover, one and the same thing may exhibit a quality in a greater degree than it did before: if a thing is white, it may become whiter.

grc

οὐ πάντα δέ, ἀλλὰ τὰ πλεῖστα·

eng

Though this is generally the case, there are exceptions.

grc

δικαιοσύνη γὰρ δικαιοσύνης εἰ λέγεται μᾶλλον ἀπορήσειεν ἄν τις, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων διαθέσεων.

eng

For if we should say that justice admitted of variation of degree, difficulties might ensue, and this is true with regard to all those qualities which are dispositions.

grc

ἔνιοι γὰρ διαμφισβητοῦσι περὶ τῶν τοιούτων·

eng

There are some, indeed, who dispute the possibility of variation here.

grc

δικαιοσύνην μὲν γὰρ δικαιοσύνης οὐ πάνυ φασὶ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον λέγεσθαι, οὐδὲ ὑγίειαν ὑγιείας, ἧττον μέντοι ἔχειν ἕτερον ἑτέρου ὑγίειάν φασι, καὶ δικαιοσύνην ἧττον ἕτερον ἑτέρου, ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ γραμματικὴν καὶ τὰς ἄλλας διαθέσεις.

eng

They maintain that justice and health cannot very well admit of variation of degree themselves, but that people vary in the degree in which they possess these qualities, and that this is the case with grammatical learning and all those qualities which are classed as dispositions.

grc

ἀλλ’ οὖν τά γε κατὰ ταύτας λεγόμενα ἀναμφισβητήτως ἐπιδέχεται τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον·

eng

However that may be, it is an incontrovertible fact that the things which in virtue of these qualities are said to be what they are vary in the degree in which they possess them;

grc

γραμματικώτερος γὰρ ἕτερος ἑτέρου λέγεται καὶ δικαιότερος καὶ ὑγιεινότερος, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὡσαύτως.

eng

for one man is said to be better versed in grammar, or more healthy or just, than another, and so on.

grc

τρίγωνον δὲ καὶ τετράγωνον οὐ δοκεῖ τὸ μᾶλλον ἐπιδέχεσθαι, οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων σχημάτων οὐδέν·

eng

The qualities expressed by the terms 'triangular' and 'quadrangular' do not appear to admit of variation of degree, nor indeed do any that have to do with figure.

grc

τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιδεχόμενα τὸν τοῦ τριγώνου λόγον καὶ τὸν τοῦ κύκλου πάνθ’ ὁμοίως τρίγωνα ἢ κύκλοι εἰσίν, τῶν δὲ μὴ ἐπιδεχομένων οὐδὲν ἕτερον ἑτέρου μᾶλλον ῥηθήσεται·

eng

For those things to which the definition of the triangle or circle is applicable are all equally triangular or circular. Those, on the other hand, to which the same definition is not applicable, cannot be said to differ from one another in degree;

grc

οὐδὲν γὰρ μᾶλλον τὸ τετράγωνον τοῦ ἑτερομήκους κύκλος ἐστίν·

eng

the square is no more a circle than the rectangle,

grc

οὐδέτερον γὰρ ἐπιδέχεται τὸν τοῦ κύκλου λόγον.

eng

for to neither is the definition of the circle appropriate.

grc

ἁπλῶς δέ, ἐὰν μὴ ἐπιδέχηται ἀμφότερα τὸν τοῦ προκειμένου λόγον, οὐ ῥηθήσεται τὸ ἕτερον τοῦ ἑτέρου μᾶλλον.

eng

In short, if the definition of the term proposed is not applicable to both objects, they cannot be compared.

grc

οὐ πάντα οὖν τὰ ποιὰ ἐπιδέχεται τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον.

eng

Thus it is not all qualities which admit of variation of degree.

grc

Τῶν μὲν οὖν εἰρημένων οὐδὲν ἴδιον ποιότητος, ὅμοια δὲ καὶ ἀνόμοια κατὰ μόνας τὰς ποιότητας λέγεται·

eng

Whereas none of the characteristics I have mentioned are peculiar to quality, the fact that likeness and unlikeness can be predicated with reference to quality only, gives to that category its distinctive feature.

grc

ὅμοιον γὰρ ἕτερον ἑτέρῳ οὐκ ἔστι κατ’ ἄλλο οὐδὲν ἢ καθ’ ὃ ποιόν ἐστιν.

eng

One thing is like another only with reference to that in virtue of which it is such and such;

grc

ὥστε ἴδιον ἂν εἴη ποιότητος τὸ ὅμοιον ἢ ἀνόμοιον λέγεσθαι κατ’ αὐτήν.

eng

thus this forms the peculiar mark of quality.

grc

Οὐ δεῖ δὲ ταράττεσθαι μή τις ἡμᾶς φήσῃ ὑπὲρ ποιότητος τὴν πρόθεσιν ποιησαμένους πολλὰ τῶν πρός τι συγκαταριθμεῖσθαι·

eng

We must not be disturbed because it may be argued that, though proposing to discuss the category of quality, we have included in it many relative terms.

grc

τὰς γὰρ ἕξεις καὶ τὰς διαθέσεις τῶν πρός τι εἶναι.

eng

We did say that habits and dispositions were relative.

grc

σχεδὸν γὰρ ἐπὶ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων τὰ γένη πρός τι λέγεται, τῶν δὲ καθ’ ἕκαστα οὐδέν·

eng

In practically all such cases the genus is relative, the individual not.

grc

ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιστήμη, γένος οὖσα, αὐτὸ ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἑτέρου λέγεται, —τινὸς γὰρ ἐπιστήμη λέγεται.‍

eng

Thus knowledge, as a genus, is explained by reference to something else, for we mean a knowledge of something.

grc

τῶν δὲ καθ’ ἕκαστα οὐδὲν αὐτὸ ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἑτέρου λέγεται, οἷον ἡ γραμματικὴ οὐ λέγεται τινὸς γραμματικὴ οὐδ’ ἡ μουσικὴ τινὸς μουσική, ἀλλ’ εἰ ἄρα κατὰ τὸ γένος καὶ αὗται πρός τι λέγεται·

eng

But particular branches of knowledge are not thus explained. The knowledge of grammar is not relative to anything external, nor is the knowledge of music, but these, if relative at all, are relative only in virtue of their genera;

grc

οἷον ἡ γραμματικὴ λέγεται τινὸς ἐπιστήμη, οὐ τινὸς γραμματική, καὶ ἡ μουσικὴ τινὸς ἐπιστήμη, οὐ τινὸς μουσική·

eng

thus grammar is said be the knowledge of something, not the grammar of something; similarly music is the knowledge of something, not the music of something.

grc

ὥστε αἱ καθ’ ἕκαστα οὐκ εἰσὶ τῶν πρός τι.

eng

Thus individual branches of knowledge are not relative.

grc

λεγόμεθα δὲ ποιοὶ ταῖς καθ’ ἕκαστα·

eng

And it is because we possess these individual branches of knowledge that we are said to be such and such.

grc

ταύτας γὰρ καὶ ἔχομεν, —ἐπιστήμονες γὰρ λεγόμεθα τῷ ἔχειν τῶν καθ’ ἕκαστα ἐπιστημῶν τινά·‍

eng

It is these that we actually possess: we are called experts because we possess knowledge in some particular branch.

grc

ὥστε αὗται ἂν καὶ ποιότητες εἴησαν αἱ καθ’ ἕκαστα, καθ’ ἅς ποτε καὶ ποιοὶ λεγόμεθα·

eng

Those particular branches, therefore, of knowledge, in virtue of which we are sometimes said to be such and such,

grc

αὗται δὲ οὐκ εἰσὶ τῶν πρός τι.‍

eng

are themselves qualities, and are not relative.

grc

ἔτι εἰ τυγχάνει τὸ αὐτὸ ποιὸν καὶ πρός τι ὄν, οὐδὲν ἄτοπον ἐν ἀμφοτέροις τοῖς γένεσιν αὐτὸ καταριθμεῖσθαι.

eng

Further, if anything should happen to fall within both the category of quality and that of relation, there would be nothing extraordinary in classing it under both these heads.

grc

<. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .>

grc

Ἐπιδέχεται δὲ καὶ τὸ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν ἐναντιότητα καὶ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον·

eng

Action and affection both admit of contraries and also of variation of degree.

grc

τὸ γὰρ θερμαίνειν τῷ ψύχειν ἐναντίον καὶ τὸ θερμαίνεσθαι τῷ ψύχεσθαι καὶ τὸ ἥδεσθαι τῷ λυπεῖσθαι·

eng

Heating is the contrary of cooling, being heated of being cooled, being glad of being vexed.

grc

ὥστε ἐπιδέχεται ἐναντιότητα.

eng

Thus they admit of contraries.

grc

καὶ τὸ μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἧττον·

eng

They also admit of variation of degree:

grc

θερμαίνειν γὰρ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον ἔστι, καὶ θερμαίνεσθαι μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον, καὶ λυπεῖσθαι μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον·

eng

for it is possible to heat in a greater or less degree; also to be heated in a greater or less degree.

grc

ἐπιδέχεται οὖν τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον τὸ ποιεῖν καὶ τὸ πάσχειν.

eng

Thus action and affection also admit of variation of degree.

grc

<. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .>

grc

Ὑπὲρ μὲν οὖν τούτων τοσαῦτα λέγεται·

eng

So much, then, is stated with regard to these categories.

grc

εἴρηται δὲ καὶ ὑπὲρ τοῦ κεῖσθαι ἐν τοῖς πρός τι, ὅτι παρωνύμως ἀπὸ τῶν θέσεων λέγεται.

eng

We spoke, moreover, of the category of position when we were dealing with that of relation, and stated that such terms derived their names from those of the corresponding attitudes.

grc

ὑπὲρ δὲ τῶν λοιπῶν, τοῦ τε ποτὲ καὶ τοῦ ποὺ καὶ τοῦ ἔχειν, διὰ τὸ προφανῆ εἶναι οὐδὲν ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἄλλο λέγεται ἢ ὅσα ἐν ἀρχῇ ἐῤῥήθη, ὅτι τὸ ἔχειν μὲν σημαίνει τὸ ὑποδεδέσθαι, τὸ ὡπλίσθαι, τὸ δὲ ποὺ οἷον ἐν Λυκείῳ, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα δὲ ὅσα ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἐῤῥήθη.

eng

As for the rest, time, place, state, since they are easily intelligible, I say no more about them than was said at the beginning, that in the category of state are included such states as 'shod', 'armed', in that of place 'in the Lyceum' and so on, as was explained before.

grc

ὑπὲρ μὲν οὖν τῶν προτεθέντων γενῶν ἱκανὰ τὰ εἰρημένα·

eng

The proposed categories have, then, been adequately dealt with.

grc

περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀντικειμένων, ποσαχῶς εἴωθε ἀντιτίθεσθαι, ῥητέον.]

eng

We must next explain the various senses in which the term 'opposite' is used.

grc

Λέγεται δὲ ἕτερον ἑτέρῳ ἀντικεῖσθαι τετραχῶς, ἢ ὡς τὰ πρός τι, ἢ ὡς τὰ ἐναντία, ἢ ὡς στέρησις καὶ ἕξις, ἢ ὡς κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις.

eng

Things are said to be opposed in four senses: (i) as correlatives to one another, (ii) as contraries to one another, (iii) as privatives to positives, (iv) as affirmatives to negatives.

grc

ἀντίκειται δὲ ἕκαστον τῶν τοιούτων, ὡς τύπῳ εἰπεῖν, ὡς μὲν τὰ πρός τι οἷον τὸ διπλάσιον τῷ ἡμίσει, ὡς δὲ τὰ ἐναντία οἷον τὸ κακὸν τῷ ἀγαθῷ, ὡς δὲ κατὰ στέρησιν καὶ ἕξιν οἷον τυφλότης καὶ ὄψις, ὡς δὲ κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις οἷον κάθηται—οὐ κάθηται.

eng

Let me sketch my meaning in outline. An instance of the use of the word 'opposite' with reference to correlatives is afforded by the expressions 'double' and 'half'; with reference to contraries by 'bad' and 'good'. Opposites in the sense of 'privatives' and 'positives' are' blindness' and 'sight'; in the sense of affirmatives and negatives, the propositions 'he sits', 'he does not sit'.

grc

Ὅσα μὲν οὖν ὡς τὰ πρός τι ἀντίκειται αὐτὰ ἅπερ ἐστὶ τῶν ἀντικειμένων λέγεται ἢ ὁπωσοῦν ἄλλως πρὸς αὐτά·

eng

i) Pairs of opposites which fall under the category of relation are explained by a reference of the one to the other, the reference being indicated by the preposition 'of' or by some other preposition.

grc

οἷον τὸ διπλάσιον τοῦ ἡμίσεος αὐτὸ ὅπερ ἐστὶ διπλάσιον λέγεται·

eng

Thus, double is a relative term, for that which is double is explained as the double of something.

grc

καὶ ἡ ἐπιστήμη δὲ τῷ ἐπιστητῷ ὡς τὰ πρός τι ἀντίκειται, καὶ λέγεταί γε ἡ ἐπιστήμη αὐτὸ ὅπερ ἐστὶ τοῦ ἐπιστητοῦ·

eng

Knowledge, again, is the opposite of the thing known, in the same sense;

grc

καὶ τὸ ἐπιστητὸν δὲ αὐτὸ ὅπερ ἐστὶ πρὸς τὸ ἀντικείμενον λέγεται τὴν ἐπιστήμην·

eng

and the thing known also is explained by its relation to its opposite, knowledge.

grc

τὸ γὰρ ἐπιστητὸν τινὶ λέγεται ἐπιστητὸν τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ.

eng

For the thing known is explained as that which is known by something, that is, by knowledge.

grc

Ὅσα οὖν ἀντίκειται ὡς τὰ πρός τι αὐτὰ ἅπερ ἐστὶ τῶν ἀντικειμένων ἢ ὁπωσδήποτε πρὸς ἄλληλα λέγεται·

eng

Such things, then, as are opposite the one to the other in the sense of being correlatives are explained by a reference of the one to the other.

grc

τὰ δὲ ὡς τὰ ἐναντία, αὐτὰ μὲν ἅπερ ἐστὶν οὐδαμῶς πρὸς ἄλληλα λέγεται, ἐναντία μέντοι ἀλλήλων λέγεται·

eng

ii) Pairs of opposites which are contraries are not in any way interdependent, but are contrary the one to the other.

grc

οὔτε γὰρ τὸ ἀγαθὸν τοῦ κακοῦ λέγεται ἀγαθόν, ἀλλ’ ἐναντίον, οὔτε τὸ λευκὸν τοῦ μέλανος λευκόν, ἀλλ’ ἐναντίον.

eng

The good is not spoken of as the good of the had, but as the contrary of the bad, nor is white spoken of as the white of the black, but as the contrary of the black.

grc

ὥστε διαφέρουσιν αὗται αἱ ἀντιθέσεις ἀλλήλων.

eng

These two types of opposition are therefore distinct.

grc

ὅσα δὲ τῶν ἐναντίων τοιαῦτά ἐστιν ὥστε ἐν οἷς πέφυκε γίγνεσθαι ἢ ὧν κατηγορεῖται ἀναγκαῖον αὐτῶν θάτερον ὑπάρχειν, τούτων οὐδέν ἐστιν ἀνὰ μέσον·

eng

Those contraries which are such that the subjects in which they are naturally present, or of which they are predicated, must necessarily contain either the one or the other of them, have no intermediate,

grc

ὧν δέ γε μὴ ἀναγκαῖον θάτερον ὑπάρχειν, τούτων ἔστι τι ἀνὰ μέσον πάντως.]

eng

but those in the case of which no such necessity obtains, always have an intermediate.

grc

οἷον νόσος καὶ ὑγίεια ἐν σώματι ζῴου πέφυκε γίγνεσθαι, καὶ ἀναγκαῖόν γε θάτερον ὑπάρχειν τῷ τοῦ ζῴου σώματι ἢ νόσον ἢ ὑγίειαν·

eng

Thus disease and health are naturally present in the body of an animal, and it is necessary that either the one or the other should be present in the body of an animal.

grc

καὶ περιττὸν δὲ καὶ ἄρτιον ἀριθμοῦ κατηγορεῖται, καὶ ἀναγκαῖόν γε θάτερον τῷ ἀριθμῷ ὑπάρχειν ἢ περιττὸν ἢ ἄρτιον·

eng

Odd and even, again, are predicated of number, and it is necessary that the one or the other should be present in numbers.

grc

καὶ οὐκ ἔστι γε τούτων οὐδὲν ἀνὰ μέσον, οὔτε νόσου καὶ ὑγιείας οὔτε περιττοῦ καὶ ἀρτίου.

eng

Now there is no intermediate between the terms of either of these two pairs.

grc

ὧν δέ γε μὴ ἀναγκαῖον θάτερον ὑπάρχειν, τούτων ἔστι τι ἀνὰ μέσον·

eng

On the other hand, in those contraries with regard to which no such necessity obtains, we find an intermediate.

grc

οἷον μέλαν καὶ λευκὸν ἐν σώματι πέφυκε γίγνεσθαι, καὶ οὐκ ἀναγκαῖόν γε θάτερον αὐτῶν ὑπάρχειν τῷ σώματι, — οὐ γὰρ πᾶν ἤτοι λευκὸν ἢ μέλαν ἐστίν·‍

eng

Blackness and whiteness are naturally present in the body, but it is not necessary that either the one or the other should be present in the body, inasmuch as it is not true to say that everybody must be white or black.

grc

καὶ φαῦλον δὲ καὶ σπουδαῖον κατηγορεῖται μὲν καὶ κατ’ ἀνθρώπου καὶ κατ’ ἄλλων πολλῶν, οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον δὲ θάτερον αὐτῶν ὑπάρχειν ἐκείνοις ὧν κατηγορεῖται·

eng

Badness and goodness, again, are predicated of man, and of many other things, but it is not necessary that either the one quality or the other should be present in that of which they are predicated:

grc

οὐ γὰρ πάντα ἤτοι φαῦλα ἢ σπουδαῖά ἐστιν.

eng

it is not true to say that everything that may be good or bad must be either good or bad.

grc

καὶ ἔστι γέ τι τούτων ἀνὰ μέσον, οἷον τοῦ μὲν λευκοῦ καὶ τοῦ μέλανος τὸ φαιὸν καὶ ὠχρὸν καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα χρώματα, τοῦ δὲ φαύλου καὶ τοῦ σπουδαίου τὸ οὔτε φαῦλον οὔτε σπουδαῖον.

eng

These pairs of contraries have intermediates: the intermediates between white and black are grey, sallow, and all the other colours that come between; the intermediate between good and bad is that which is neither the one nor the other.

grc

ἐπ’ ἐνίων μὲν οὖν ὀνόματα κεῖται τοῖς ἀνὰ μέσον, οἷον λευκοῦ καὶ μέλανος τὸ φαιὸν καὶ ὠχρόν·

eng

Some intermediate qualities have names, such as grey and sallow and all the other colours that come between white and black;

grc

ἐπ’ ἐνίων δὲ ὀνόματι μὲν οὐκ εὔπορον τὸ ἀνὰ μέσον ἀποδοῦναι, τῇ δὲ ἑκατέρου τῶν ἄκρων ἀποφάσει τὸ ἀνὰ μέσον ὁρίζεται, οἷον τὸ οὔτε ἀγαθὸν οὔτε κακὸν καὶ οὔτε δίκαιον οὔτε ἄδικον.

eng

in other cases, however, it is not easy to name the intermediate, but we must define it as that which is not either extreme, as in the case of that which is neither good nor bad, neither just nor unjust.

grc

Στέρησις δὲ καὶ ἕξις λέγεται μὲν περὶ ταὐτόν τι, οἷον ἡ ὄψις καὶ ἡ τυφλότης περὶ ὀφθαλμόν·

eng

iii) 'privatives' and 'Positives' have reference to the same subject. Thus, sight and blindness have reference to the eye.

grc

καθόλου δὲ εἰπεῖν, ἐν ᾧ πέφυκεν ἡ ἕξις γίγνεσθαι, περὶ τοῦτο λέγεται ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν.

eng

It is a universal rule that each of a pair of opposites of this type has reference to that to which the particular 'positive' is natural.

grc

ἐστερῆσθαι δὲ τότε λέγομεν ἕκαστον τῶν τῆς ἕξεως δεκτικῶν, ὅταν ἐν ᾧ πέφυκεν ὑπάρχειν καὶ ὅτε πέφυκεν ἔχειν μηδαμῶς ὑπάρχῃ·

eng

We say that that is capable of some particular faculty or possession has suffered privation when the faculty or possession in question is in no way present in that in which, and at the time at which, it should naturally be present.

grc

νωδόν τε γὰρ λέγομεν οὐ τὸ μὴ ἔχον ὀδόντας, καὶ τυφλὸν οὐ τὸ μὴ ἔχον ὄψιν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὴ ἔχον ὅτε πέφυκεν ἔχειν·

eng

We do not call that toothless which has not teeth, or that blind which has not sight, but rather that which has not teeth or sight at the time when by nature it should.

grc

τινὰ γὰρ ἐκ γενετῆς οὔτε ὄψιν οὔτε ὀδόντας ἔχει, ἀλλ’ οὐ λέγεται νωδὰ οὐδὲ τυφλά.

eng

For there are some creatures which from birth are without sight, or without teeth, but these are not called toothless or blind.

grc

τὸ δὲ ἐστερῆσθαι καὶ τὸ ἔχειν τὴν ἕξιν οὐκ ἔστι στέρησις καὶ ἕξις·

eng

To be without some faculty or to possess it is not the same as the corresponding 'privative' or 'positive'.

grc

ἕξις μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ἡ ὄψις, στέρησις δὲ ἡ τυφλότης, τὸ δὲ ἔχειν τὴν ὄψιν οὐκ ἔστιν ὄψις, οὐδὲ τὸ τυφλὸν εἶναι τυφλότης·

eng

Sight' is a 'positive', 'blindness' a 'privative', but 'to possess sight' is not equivalent to 'sight', 'to be blind' is not equivalent to 'blindness'.

grc

στέρησις γάρ τις ἡ τυφλότης ἐστίν, τὸ δὲ τυφλὸν εἶναι ἐστερῆσθαι, οὐ στέρησίς ἐστιν.

eng

Blindness is a 'privative', to be blind is to be in a state of privation, but is not a 'privative'.

grc

ἔτι εἰ ἦν ἡ τυφλότης ταὐτὸν τῷ τυφλὸν εἶναι, κατηγορεῖτο ἂν ἀμφότερα κατὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ·

eng

Moreover, if 'blindness' were equivalent to 'being blind', both would be predicated of the same subject;

grc

ἀλλὰ τυφλὸς μὲν λέγεται ὁ ἄνθρωπος, τυφλότης δὲ ὁ ἄνθρωπος οὐδαμῶς λέγεται.

eng

but though a man is said to be blind, he is by no means said to be blindness.

grc

ἀντικεῖσθαι δὲ καὶ ταῦτα δοκεῖ, τὸ ἐστερῆσθαι καὶ τὸ τὴν ἕξιν ἔχειν ὡς στέρησις καὶ ἕξις·

eng

To be in a state of 'possession' is, it appears, the opposite of being in a state of 'privation', just as 'positives' and 'privatives' themselves are opposite.

grc

ὁ γὰρ τρόπος τῆς ἀντιθέσεως ὁ αὐτός·

eng

There is the same type of antithesis in both cases;

grc

ὡς γὰρ ἡ τυφλότης τῇ ὄψει ἀντίκειται, οὕτω καὶ τὸ τυφλὸν εἶναι τῷ ὄψιν ἔχειν ἀντίκειται.

eng

for just as blindness is opposed to sight, so is being blind opposed to having sight.

grc

οὐκ ἔστι δὲ οὐδὲ τὸ ὑπὸ τὴν κατάφασιν καὶ ἀπόφασιν κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις·

eng

That which is affirmed or denied is not itself affirmation or denial.

grc

ἡ μὲν γὰρ κατάφασις λόγος ἐστὶ καταφατικὸς καὶ ἡ ἀπόφασις λόγος ἀποφατικός, τῶν δὲ ὑπὸ τὴν κατάφασιν ἢ ἀπόφασιν οὐδέν ἐστι λόγος.

eng

By 'affirmation' we mean an affirmative proposition, by 'denial' a negative. Now, those facts which form the matter of the affirmation or denial are not propositions;

grc

λέγεται δὲ καὶ ταῦτα ἀντικεῖσθαι ἀλλήλοις ὡς κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις·

eng

yet these two are said to be opposed in the same sense as the affirmation and denial, for in this case also the type of antithesis is the same.

grc

καὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ τούτων ὁ τρόπος τῆς ἀντιθέσεως ὁ αὐτός·

eng

For as the affirmation is opposed to the denial, as in the two propositions 'he sits', 'he does not sit',

grc

ὡς γάρ ποτε ἡ κατάφασις πρὸς τὴν ἀπόφασιν ἀντίκειται, οἷον τὸ κάθηται—οὐ κάθηται, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ὑφ’ ἑκάτερον πρᾶγμα ἀντίκειται, τὸ καθῆσθαι—μὴ καθῆσθαι.)

eng

so also the fact which constitutes the matter of the proposition in one case is opposed to that in the other, his sitting, that is to say, to his not sitting.

grc

ὅτι δὲ ἡ στέρησις καὶ ἡ ἕξις οὐκ ἀντίκειται ὡς τὰ πρός τι, φανερόν·

eng

It is evident that 'positives' and 'privatives' are not opposed each to each in the same sense as relatives.

grc

οὐ γὰρ λέγεται αὐτὸ ὅπερ ἐστὶ τοῦ ἀντικειμένου·

eng

The one is not explained by reference to the other;

grc

ἡ γὰρ ὄψις οὐκ ἔστι τυφλότητος ὄψις, οὐδ’ ἄλλως οὐδαμῶς πρὸς αὐτὸ λέγεται·

eng

sight is not sight of blindness, nor is any other preposition used to indicate the relation.

grc

ὡσαύτως δὲ οὐδὲ ἡ τυφλότης λέγοιτ’ ἂν τυφλότης ὄψεως, ἀλλὰ στέρησις μὲν ὄψεως ἡ τυφλότης λέγεται, τυφλότης δὲ ὄψεως οὐ λέγεται.

eng

Similarly blindness is not said to be blindness of sight, but rather, privation of sight.

grc

ἔτι τὰ πρός τι πάντα πρὸς ἀντιστρέφοντα λέγεται, ὥστε καὶ ἡ τυφλότης εἴπερ ἦν τῶν πρός τι, ἀντέστρεφεν ἂν κἀκεῖνο πρὸς ὃ λέγεται·

eng

Relatives, moreover, reciprocate; if blindness, therefore, were a relative, there would be a reciprocity of relation between it and that with which it was correlative.

grc

ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἀντιστρέφει·

eng

But this is not the case.

grc

οὐ γὰρ λέγεται ἡ ὄψις τυφλότητος ὄψις.

eng

Sight is not called the sight of blindness.

grc

Ὅτι δὲ οὐδ’ ὡς τὰ ἐναντία ἀντίκειται τὰ κατὰ στέρησιν λεγόμενα καὶ ἕξιν ἐκ τῶνδε δῆλον.

eng

That those terms which fall under the heads of 'positives' and 'privatives' are not opposed each to each as contraries, either, is plain from the following facts:

grc

τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἐναντίων, ὧν μηδέν ἐστιν ἀνὰ μέσον, ἀναγκαῖον, ἐν οἷς πέφυκε γίγνεσθαι ἢ ὧν κατηγορεῖται, θάτερον αὐτῶν ὑπάρχειν ἀεί·

eng

Of a pair of contraries such that they have no intermediate, one or the other must needs be present in the subject in which they naturally subsist, or of which they are predicated;

grc

τούτων γὰρ οὐδὲν ἦν ἀνὰ μέσον, ὧν θάτερον ἀναγκαῖον ἦν τῷ δεκτικῷ ὑπάρχειν, οἷον ἐπὶ νόσου καὶ ὑγιείας καὶ περιττοῦ καὶ ἀρτίου·

eng

for it is those, as we proved,' in the case of which this necessity obtains, that have no intermediate. Moreover, we cited health and disease, odd and even, as instances.

grc

ὧν δὲ ἔστι τι ἀνὰ μέσον, οὐδέποτε ἀνάγκη παντὶ ὑπάρχειν θάτερον·

eng

But those contraries which have an intermediate are not subject to any such necessity.

grc

οὔτε γὰρ λευκὸν ἢ μέλαν ἀνάγκη πᾶν εἶναι τὸ δεκτικόν, οὔτε θερμὸν ἢ ψυχρόν, —τούτων γὰρ ἀνὰ μέσον τι οὐδὲν κωλύει ὑπάρχειν·‍

eng

It is not necessary that every substance, receptive of such qualities, should be either black or white, cold or hot, for something intermediate between these contraries may very well be present in the subject.

grc

ἔτι δὲ καὶ τούτων ἦν τι ἀνὰ μέσον ὧν μὴ ἀναγκαῖον ἦν θάτερον ὑπάρχειν τῷ δεκτικῷ, εἰ μὴ οἷς φύσει τὸ ἓν ὑπάρχει, οἷον τῷ πυρὶ τὸ θερμῷ εἶναι καὶ τῇ χιόνι τὸ λευκῇ·

eng

We proved, moreover, that those contraries have an intermediate in the case of which the said necessity does not obtain. Yet when one of the two contraries is a constitutive property of the subject, as it is a constitutive property of fire to be hot, of snow to be white,

grc

ἐπὶ δὲ τούτων ἀφωρισμένως ἀναγκαῖον θάτερον ὑπάρχειν, καὶ οὐχ ὁπότερον ἔτυχεν·

eng

it is necessary determinately that one of the two contraries, not one or the other, should be present in the subject;

grc

οὐ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται τὸ πῦρ ψυχρὸν εἶναι οὐδὲ τὴν χιόνα μέλαιναν·‍

eng

for fire cannot be cold, or snow black.

grc

ὥστε παντὶ μὲν οὐκ ἀνάγκη τῷ δεκτικῷ θάτερον αὐτῶν ὑπάρχειν, ἀλλὰ μόνον οἷς φύσει τὸ ἓν ὑπάρχει, καὶ τούτοις ἀφωρισμένως τὸ ἓν καὶ οὐχ ὁπότερον ἔτυχεν.

eng

Thus, it is not the case here that one of the two must needs be present in every subject receptive of these qualities, but only in that subject of which the one forms a constitutive property. Moreover, in such cases it is one member of the pair determinately, and not either the one or the other, which must be present.

grc

ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς στερήσεως καὶ τῆς ἕξεως οὐδέτερον τῶν εἰρημένων ἀληθές·

eng

In the case of 'positives' and 'privatives', on the other hand, neither of the aforesaid statements holds good.

grc

οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀεὶ τῷ δεκτικῷ ἀναγκαῖον θάτερον αὐτῶν ὑπάρχειν, —τὸ γὰρ μήπω πεφυκὸς ὄψιν ἔχειν οὔτε τυφλὸν οὔτε ὄψιν ἔχειν λέγεται, ὥστε οὐκ ἂν εἴη ταῦτα τῶν τοιούτων ἐναντίων ὧν οὐδέν ἐστιν ἀνὰ μέσον·‍

eng

For it is not necessary that a subject receptive of the qualities should always have either the one or the other; that which has not yet advanced to the state when sight is natural is not said either to be blind or to see. Thus 'positives' and 'privatives' do not belong to that class of contraries which consists of those which have no intermediate.

grc

ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ ὧν τι ἔστιν ἀνὰ μέσον·

eng

On the other hand, they do not belong either to that class which consists of contraries which have an intermediate.

grc

ἀναγκαῖον γάρ ποτε παντὶ τῷ δεκτικῷ θάτερον αὐτῶν ὑπάρχειν·

eng

For under certain conditions it is necessary that either the one or the other should form part of the constitution of every appropriate subject.

grc

ὅταν γὰρ ἤδη πεφυκὸς ᾖ ἔχειν ὄψιν, τότε ἢ τυφλὸν ἢ ἔχον ὄψιν ῥηθήσεται, καὶ τούτων οὐκ ἀφωρισμένως θάτερον, ἀλλ’ ὁπότερον ἔτυχεν, —οὐ γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον ἢ τυφλὸν ἢ ὄψιν ἔχον εἶναι, ἀλλ’ ὁπότερον ἔτυχεν·‍

eng

For when a thing has reached the stage when it is by nature capable of sight, it will be said either to see or to be blind, and that in an indeterminate sense, signifying that the capacity may be either present or absent; for it is not necessary either that it should see or that it should be blind, but that it should be either in the one state or in the other.

grc

ἐπὶ δέ γε τῶν ἐναντίων, ὧν ἔστιν ἀνὰ μέσον τι, οὐδέποτε ἀναγκαῖον ἦν παντὶ θάτερον ὑπάρχειν, ἀλλὰ τισίν, καὶ τούτοις ἀφωρισμένως τὸ ἕν.

eng

Yet in the case of those contraries which have an intermediate we found that it was never necessary that either the one or the other should be present in every appropriate subject, but only that in certain subjects one of the pair should be present, and that in a determinate sense.

grc

ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι κατ’ οὐδέτερον τῶν τρόπων ὡς τὰ ἐναντία ἀντίκειται τὰ κατὰ στέρησιν καὶ ἕξιν ἀντικείμενα.

eng

It is, therefore, plain that 'positives' and 'privatives' are not opposed each to each in either of the senses in which contraries are opposed.

grc

ἔτι ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ἐναντίων ὑπάρχοντος τοῦ δεκτικοῦ δυνατὸν εἰς ἄλληλα μεταβολὴν γενέσθαι, εἰ μή τινι φύσει τὸ ἓν ὑπάρχει, οἷον τῷ πυρὶ τὸ θερμῷ εἶναι·

eng

Again, in the case of contraries, it is possible that there should be changes from either into the other, while the subject retains its identity, unless indeed one of the contraries is a constitutive property of that subject, as heat is of fire.

grc

καὶ γὰρ τὸ ὑγιαῖνον δυνατὸν νοσῆσαι καὶ τὸ λευκὸν μέλαν γενέσθαι καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν θερμόν, καὶ ἐκ σπουδαίου γε φαῦλον καὶ ἐκ φαύλου σπουδαῖον δυνατὸν γενέσθαι·

eng

For it is possible that that that which is healthy should become diseased, that which is white, black, that which is cold, hot, that which is good, bad, that which is bad, good.

grc

ὁ γὰρ φαῦλος εἰς βελτίους διατριβὰς ἀγόμενος καὶ λόγους κἂν μικρόν γέ τι ἐπιδοίη εἰς τὸ βελτίω εἶναι·

eng

The bad man, if he is being brought into a better way of life and thought, may make some advance, however slight,

grc

ἐὰν δὲ ἅπαξ κἂν μικρὰν ἐπίδοσιν λάβῃ, φανερὸν ὅτι ἢ τελείως ἂν μεταβάλοι ἢ πάνυ πολλὴν ἂν ἐπίδοσιν λάβοι·

eng

and if he should once improve, even ever so little, it is plain that he might change completely, or at any rate make very great progress;

grc

ἀεὶ γὰρ εὐκινητότερος πρὸς ἀρετὴν γίγνεται, κἂν ἡντινοῦν ἐπίδοσιν εἰληφὼς ἐξ ἀρχῆς ᾖ, ὥστε καὶ πλείω εἰκὸς ἐπίδοσιν λαμβάνειν·

eng

for a man becomes more and more easily moved to virtue, however small the improvement was at first. It is, therefore, natural to suppose that he will make yet greater progress than he has made in the past;

grc

καὶ τοῦτο ἀεὶ γιγνόμενον τελείως εἰς τὴν ἐναντίαν ἕξιν ἀποκαθίστησιν, ἐάνπερ μὴ χρόνῳ ἐξείργηται·‍

eng

and as this process goes on, it will change him completely and establish him in the contrary state, provided he is not hindered by lack of time.

grc

ἐπὶ δέ γε τῆς στερήσεως καὶ τῆς ἕξεως ἀδύνατον εἰς ἄλληλα μεταβολὴν γενέσθαι·

eng

In the case of 'positives' and 'privatives', however, change in both directions is impossible.

grc

ἀπὸ μὲν γὰρ τῆς ἕξεως ἐπὶ τὴν στέρησιν γίγνεται μεταβολή, ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς στερήσεως ἐπὶ τὴν ἕξιν ἀδύνατον·

eng

There may be a change from possession to privation, but not from privation to possession.

grc

οὔτε γὰρ τυφλὸς γενόμενός τις πάλιν ἔβλεψεν, οὔτε φαλακρὸς ὢν κομήτης ἐγένετο, οὔτε νωδὸς ὢν ὀδόντας ἔφυσεν.

eng

The man who has become blind does not regain his sight; the man who has become bald does not regain his hair; the man who has lost his teeth does not grow his grow a new set.

grc

Ὅσα δὲ ὡς κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις ἀντίκειται, φανερὸν ὅτι κατ’ οὐδένα τῶν εἰρημένων τρόπων ἀντίκειται·

eng

iv) Statements opposed as affirmation and negation belong manifestly to a class which is distinct,

grc

ἐπὶ μόνων γὰρ τούτων ἀναγκαῖον ἀεὶ τὸ μὲν ἀληθὲς τὸ δὲ ψεῦδος αὐτῶν εἶναι.

eng

for in this case, and in this case only, it is necessary for the one opposite to be true and the other false.

grc

οὔτε γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐναντίων ἀναγκαῖον ἀεὶ θάτερον μὲν ἀληθὲς εἶναι θάτερον δὲ ψεῦδος, οὔτε ἐπὶ τῶν πρός τι, οὔτε ἐπὶ τῆς ἕξεως καὶ στερήσεως·

eng

Neither in the case of contraries, nor in the case of correlatives, nor in the case of 'positives' and 'privatives', is it necessary for one to be true and the other false.

grc

οἷον ὑγίεια καὶ νόσος ἐναντία, καὶ οὐδέτερόν γε οὔτε ἀληθὲς οὔτε ψεῦδός ἐστιν·

eng

Health and disease are contraries: neither of them is true or false.

grc

ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τὸ διπλάσιον καὶ τὸ ἥμισυ ὡς τὰ πρός τι ἀντίκειται, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτῶν οὐδέτερον οὔτε ἀληθὲς οὔτε ψεῦδος·

eng

Double' and 'half' are opposed to each other as correlatives: neither of them is true or false.

grc

οὐδέ γε τὰ κατὰ στέρησιν καὶ ἕξιν, οἷον ἡ ὄψις καὶ ἡ τυφλότης·

eng

The case is the same, of course, with regard to 'positives' and 'privatives' such as 'sight' and 'blindness'.

grc

ὅλως δὲ τῶν κατὰ μηδεμίαν συμπλοκὴν λεγομένων οὐδὲν οὔτε ἀληθὲς οὔτε ψεῦδός ἐστιν·

eng

In short, where there is no sort of combination of words, truth and falsity have no place,

grc

πάντα δὲ τὰ εἰρημένα ἄνευ συμπλοκῆς λέγεται.

eng

and all the opposites we have mentioned so far consist of simple words.

grc

οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ μάλιστα δόξειεν ἂν τὸ τοιοῦτο συμβαίνειν ἐπὶ τῶν κατὰ συμπλοκὴν ἐναντίων λεγομένων, —τὸ γὰρ ὑγιαίνειν Σωκράτη τῷ νοσεῖν Σωκράτη ἐναντίον ἐστίν,— ἀλλ’ οὐδ’ ἐπὶ τούτων ἀναγκαῖον ἀεὶ θάτερον μὲν ἀληθὲς θάτερον δὲ ψεῦδος εἶναι·

eng

At the same time, when the words which enter into opposed statements are contraries, these, more than any other set of opposites, would seem to claim this characteristic. 'Socrates is ill' is the contrary of 'Socrates is well', but not even of such composite expressions is it true to say that one of the pair must always be true and the other false.

grc

ὄντος μὲν γὰρ Σωκράτους ἔσται τὸ μὲν ἀληθὲς τὸ δὲ ψεῦδος, μὴ ὄντος δὲ ἀμφότερα ψευδῆ·

eng

For if Socrates exists, one will be true and the other false, but if he does not exist, both will be false;

grc

οὔτε γὰρ τὸ νοσεῖν Σωκράτη οὔτε τὸ ὑγιαίνειν ἀληθὲς αὐτοῦ μὴ ὄντος ὅλως τοῦ Σωκράτους.

eng

for neither 'Socrates is ill' nor 'Socrates is well' is true, if Socrates does not exist at all.

grc

ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς στερήσεως καὶ τῆς ἕξεως μὴ ὄντος γε ὅλως οὐδέτερον ἀληθές, ὄντος δὲ οὐκ ἀεὶ θάτερον ἀληθές·

eng

In the case of 'positives' and 'privatives', if the subject does not exist at all, neither proposition is true, but even if the subject exists, it is not always the fact that one is true and the other false.

grc

τὸ γὰρ ὄψιν ἔχειν Σωκράτη τῷ τυφλὸν εἶναι Σωκράτη ἀντίκειται ὡς στέρησις καὶ ἕξις, καὶ ὄντος γε οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον θάτερον ἀληθὲς εἶναι ἢ ψεῦδος, —ὅτε γὰρ μήπω πέφυκεν ἔχειν, ἀμφότερα ψευδῆ,— μὴ ὄντος δὲ ὅλως τοῦ Σωκράτους καὶ οὕτω ψευδῆ ἀμφότερα, καὶ τὸ ὄψιν αὐτὸν ἔχειν καὶ τὸ τυφλὸν εἶναι.

eng

For 'Socrates has sight' is the opposite of 'Socrates is blind' in the sense of the word 'opposite' which applies to possession and privation. Now if Socrates exists, it is not necessary that one should be true and the other false, for when he is not yet able to acquire the power of vision, both are false, as also if Socrates is altogether non-existent.

grc

ἐπὶ δέ γε τῆς καταφάσεως καὶ τῆς ἀποφάσεως ἀεί, ἐάν τε ᾖ ἐάν τε μὴ ᾖ, τὸ μὲν ἕτερον ἔσται ψεῦδος τὸ δὲ ἕτερον ἀληθές·

eng

But in the case of affirmation and negation, whether the subject exists or not, one is always false and the other true.

grc

τὸ γὰρ νοσεῖν Σωκράτη καὶ τὸ μὴ νοσεῖν Σωκράτη, ὄντος τε αὐτοῦ φανερὸν ὅτι τὸ ἕτερον αὐτῶν ἀληθὲς ἢ ψεῦδος, καὶ μὴ ὄντος ὁμοίως·

eng

For manifestly, if Socrates exists, one of the two propositions 'Socrates is ill', 'Socrates is not ill', is true, and the other false.

grc

τὸ μὲν γὰρ νοσεῖν μὴ ὄντος ψεῦδος, τὸ δὲ μὴ νοσεῖν ἀληθές·

eng

This is likewise the case if he does not exist; for if he does not exist, to say that he is ill is false, to say that he is not ill is true.

grc

ὥστε ἐπὶ μόνων τούτων ἴδιον ἂν εἴη τὸ ἀεὶ θάτερον αὐτῶν ἀληθὲς ἢ ψεῦδος εἶναι, ὅσα ὡς κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις ἀντίκειται.

eng

Thus it is in the case of those opposites only, which are opposite in the sense in which the term is used with reference to affirmation and negation, that the rule holds good, that one of the pair must be true and the other false.

grc

Ἐναντίον δέ ἐστιν ἀγαθῷ μὲν ἐξ ἀνάγκης κακόν, —τοῦτο δὲ δῆλον τῇ καθ’ ἕκαστον ἐπαγωγῇ, οἷον ὑγιείᾳ νόσος καὶ δικαιοσύνῃ ἀδικία καὶ ἀνδρείᾳ δειλία, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων,— κακῷ δὲ ὁτὲ μὲν ἀγαθὸν ἐναντίον ἐστίν, ὁτὲ δὲ κακόν·

eng

That the contrary of a good is an evil is shown by induction: the contrary of health is disease, of courage, cowardice, and so on. But the contrary of an evil is sometimes a good, sometimes an evil.

grc

τῇ γὰρ ἐνδείᾳ κακῷ ὄντι ἡ ὑπερβολὴ ἐναντίον κακὸν ὄν·

eng

For defect, which is an evil, has excess for its contrary, this also being an evil,

grc

ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ μεσότης ἐναντία ἑκατέρῳ οὖσα ἀγαθόν.

eng

and the mean, which is a good, is equally the contrary of the one and of the other.

grc

ἐπ’ ὀλίγων δ’ ἂν τὸ τοιοῦτον ἴδοι τις, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν πλείστων ἀεὶ τῷ κακῷ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐναντίον ἐστίν.

eng

It is only in a few cases, however, that we see instances of this: in most, the contrary of an evil is a good.

grc

ἔτι τῶν ἐναντίων οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον, ἐὰν θάτερον ᾖ, καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν εἶναι·

eng

In the case of contraries, it is not always necessary that if one exists the other should also exist:

grc

ὑγιαινόντων γὰρ ἁπάντων ὑγίεια μὲν ἔσται, νόσος δὲ οὔ·

eng

for if all become healthy there will be health and no disease,

grc

ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ λευκῶν ὄντων ἁπάντων λευκότης μὲν ἔσται, μελανία δὲ οὔ.

eng

and again, if everything turns white, there will be white, but no black.

grc

ἔτι εἰ τὸ Σωκράτη ὑγιαίνειν τῷ Σωκράτη νοσεῖν ἐναντίον ἐστίν, μὴ ἐνδέχεται δὲ ἅμα ἀμφότερα τῷ αὐτῷ ὑπάρχειν, οὐκ ἂν ἐνδέχοιτο τοῦ ἑτέρου τῶν ἐναντίων ὄντος καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν εἶναι·

eng

Again, since the fact that Socrates is ill is the contrary of the fact that Socrates is well, and two contrary conditions cannot both obtain in one and the same individual at the same time, both these contraries could not exist at once: for if that

grc

ὄντος γὰρ τοῦ Σωκράτη ὑγιαίνειν οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ νοσεῖν Σωκράτη.

eng

Socrates was well was a fact, then that Socrates was ill could not possibly be one.

grc

Δῆλον δὲ ὅτι καὶ περὶ ταὐτὸν ἢ εἴδει ἢ γένει πέφυκε γίγνεσθαι τὰ ἐναντία·

eng

It is plain that contrary attributes must needs be present in subjects which belong to the same species or genus.

grc

νόσος μὲν γὰρ καὶ ὑγίεια ἐν σώματι ζῴου, λευκότης δὲ καὶ μελανία ἁπλῶς ἐν σώματι, δικαιοσύνη δὲ καὶ ἀδικία ἐν ψυχῇ.

eng

Disease and health require as their subject the body of an animal; white and black require a body, without further qualification; justice and injustice require as their subject the human soul.

grc

ἀνάγκη δὲ πάντα τὰ ἐναντία ἢ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει εἶναι ἢ ἐν τοῖς ἐναντίοις γένεσιν, ἢ αὐτὰ γένη εἶναι·

eng

Moreover, it is necessary that pairs of contraries should in all cases either belong to the same genus or belong to contrary genera or be themselves genera.

grc

λευκὸν μὲν γὰρ καὶ μέλαν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει, —χρῶμα γὰρ αὐτῶν τὸ γένος,— δικαιοσύνη δὲ καὶ ἀδικία ἐν τοῖς ἐναντίοις γένεσιν, —τοῦ μὲν γὰρ ἀρετή, τοῦ δὲ κακία τὸ γένος,— ἀγαθὸν δὲ καὶ κακὸν οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν γένει, ἀλλ’ αὐτὰ τυγχάνει γένη τινῶν ὄντα.

eng

White and black belong to the same genus, colour; justice and injustice, to contrary genera, virtue and vice; while good and evil do not belong to genera, but are themselves actual genera, with terms under them.

grc

Πρότερον ἕτερον ἑτέρου λέγεται τετραχῶς·

eng

There are four senses in which one thing can be said to be 'prior' to another.

grc

πρῶτον μὲν καὶ κυριώτατα κατὰ χρόνον, καθ’ ὃ πρεσβύτερον ἕτερον ἑτέρου καὶ παλαιότερον λέγεται, —τῷ γὰρ τὸν χρόνον πλείω εἶναι καὶ πρεσβύτερον καὶ παλαιότερον λέγεται·‍

eng

Primarily and most properly the term has reference to time: in this sense the word is used to indicate that one thing is older or more ancient than another, for the expressions 'older' and 'more ancient' imply greater length of time.

grc

δεύτερον δὲ τὸ μὴ ἀντιστρέφον κατὰ τὴν τοῦ εἶναι ἀκολούθησιν, οἷον τὸ ἓν τῶν δύο πρότερον·

eng

Secondly, one thing is said to be 'prior' to another when the sequence of their being cannot be reversed.

grc

δυεῖν μὲν γὰρ ὄντων ἀκολουθεῖ εὐθὺς τὸ ἓν εἶναι, ἑνὸς δὲ ὄντος οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον δύο εἶναι, ὥστε οὐκ ἀντιστρέφει ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑνὸς ἡ ἀκολούθησις τοῦ εἶναι τὸ λοιπόν, πρότερον δὲ δοκεῖ τὸ τοιοῦτον εἶναι ἀφ’ οὗ μὴ ἀντιστρέφει ἡ τοῦ εἶναι ἀκολούθησις.

eng

In this sense 'one' is 'prior' to 'two'. For if 'two' exists, it follows directly that 'one' must exist, but if 'one' exists, it does not follow necessarily that 'two' exists: thus the sequence subsisting cannot be reversed. It is agreed, then, that when the sequence of two things cannot be reversed, then that one on which the other depends is called 'prior' to that other.

grc

τρίτον δὲ κατά τινα τάξιν πρότερον λέγεται, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν καὶ τῶν λόγων·

eng

In the third place, the term 'prior' is used with reference to any order, as in the case of science and of oratory.

grc

ἔν τε γὰρ ταῖς ἀποδεικτικαῖς ἐπιστήμαις ὑπάρχει τὸ πρότερον καὶ τὸ ὕστερον τῇ τάξει, —τὰ γὰρ στοιχεῖα πρότερα τῶν διαγραμμάτων τῇ τάξει, καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς γραμματικῆς τὰ στοιχεῖα πρότερα τῶν συλλαβῶν,— ἐπί τε τῶν λόγων ὁμοίως, —τὸ γὰρ προοίμιον τῆς διηγήσεως πρότερον τῇ τάξει ἐστίν.

eng

For in sciences which use demonstration there is that which is prior and that which is posterior in order; in geometry, the elements are prior to the propositions; in reading and writing, the letters of the alphabet are prior to the syllables. Similarly, in the case of speeches, the exordium is prior in order to the narrative.

grc

ἔτι παρὰ τὰ εἰρημένα τὸ βέλτιον καὶ τὸ τιμιώτερον πρότερον εἶναι τῇ φύσει δοκεῖ·

eng

Besides these senses of the word, there is a fourth. That which is better and more honourable is said to have a natural priority.

grc

εἰώθασι δὲ καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ τοὺς ἐντιμοτέρους καὶ μᾶλλον ἀγαπωμένους ὑπ’ αὐτῶν προτέρους φάσκειν εἶναι·

eng

In common parlance men speak of those whom they honour and love as 'coming first' with them.

grc

ἔστι μὲν δὴ σχεδὸν ἀλλοτριώτατος τῶν τρόπων οὗτος.

eng

This sense of the word is perhaps the most far-fetched.

grc

Οἱ μὲν οὖν λεγόμενοι τοῦ προτέρου τρόποι τοσοῦτοί εἰσιν.

eng

Such, then, are the different senses in which the term 'prior' is used.

grc

δόξειε δ’ ἂν καὶ παρὰ τοὺς εἰρημένους ἕτερος εἶναι προτέρου τρόπος·

eng

Yet it would seem that besides those mentioned there is yet another.

grc

τῶν γὰρ ἀντιστρεφόντων κατὰ τὴν τοῦ εἶναι ἀκολούθησιν τὸ αἴτιον ὁπωσοῦν θατέρῳ τοῦ εἶναι πρότερον εἰκότως φύσει λέγοιτ’ ἄν.

eng

For in those things, the being of each of which implies that of the other, that which is in any way the cause may reasonably be said to be by nature 'prior' to the effect.

grc

ὅτι δ’ ἔστι τινὰ τοιαῦτα, δῆλον·

eng

It is plain that there are instances of this.

grc

τὸ γὰρ εἶναι ἄνθρωπον ἀντιστρέφει κατὰ τὴν τοῦ εἶναι ἀκολούθησιν πρὸς τὸν ἀληθῆ περὶ αὐτοῦ λόγον·

eng

The fact of the being of a man carries with it the truth of the proposition that he is, and the implication is reciprocal:

grc

εἰ γὰρ ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος, ἀληθὴς ὁ λόγος ᾧ λέγομεν ὅτι ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος·

eng

for if a man is, the proposition wherein we allege that he is true,

grc

καὶ ἀντιστρέφει γε, —εἰ γὰρ ἀληθὴς ὁ λόγος ᾧ λέγομεν ὅτι ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος, ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος·‍

eng

and conversely, if the proposition wherein we allege that he is true, then he is.

grc

ἔστι δὲ ὁ μὲν ἀληθὴς λόγος οὐδαμῶς αἴτιος τοῦ εἶναι τὸ πρᾶγμα, τὸ μέντοι πρᾶγμα φαίνεταί πως αἴτιον τοῦ εἶναι ἀληθῆ τὸν λόγον·

eng

The true proposition, however, is in no way the cause of the being of the man, but the fact of the man's being does seem somehow to be the cause of the truth of the proposition,

grc

τῷ γὰρ εἶναι τὸ πρᾶγμα ἢ μὴ ἀληθὴς ὁ λόγος ἢ ψευδὴς λέγεται.

eng

for the truth or falsity of the proposition depends on the fact of the man's being or not being.

grc

ὥστε κατὰ πέντε τρόπους πρότερον ἕτερον ἑτέρου λέγοιτ’ ἄν.

eng

Thus the word 'prior' may be used in five senses.

grc

Ἅμα δὲ λέγεται ἁπλῶς μὲν καὶ κυριώτατα ὧν ἡ γένεσις ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χρόνῳ·

eng

The term 'simultaneous' is primarily and most appropriately applied to those things the genesis of the one of which is simultaneous with that of the other;

grc

οὐδέτερον γὰρ πρότερον οὐδὲ ὕστερόν ἐστιν·

eng

for in such cases neither is prior or posterior to the other.

grc

ἅμα δὲ κατὰ τὸν χρόνον ταῦτα λέγεται.

eng

Such things are said to be simultaneous in point of time.

grc

φύσει δὲ ἅμα ὅσα ἀντιστρέφει μὲν κατὰ τὴν τοῦ εἶναι ἀκολούθησιν, μηδαμῶς δὲ αἴτιον θάτερον θατέρῳ τοῦ εἶναί ἐστιν, οἷον ἐπὶ τοῦ διπλασίου καὶ τοῦ ἡμίσεος·

eng

Those things, again, are 'simultaneous' in point of nature, the being of each of which involves that of the other, while at the same time neither is the cause of the other's being.

grc

ἀντιστρέφει μὲν γὰρ ταῦτα, —διπλασίου γὰρ ὄντος ἐστὶν ἥμισυ, καὶ ἡμίσεος ὄντος διπλάσιόν ἐστιν,— οὐδέτερον δὲ οὐδετέρῳ αἴτιον τοῦ εἶναί ἐστιν.

eng

This is the case with regard to the double and the half, for these are reciprocally dependent, since, if there is a double, there is also a half, and if there is a half, there is also a double, while at the same time neither is the cause of the being of the other.

grc

καὶ τὰ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ γένους ἀντιδιῃρημένα ἀλλήλοις ἅμα τῇ φύσει λέγεται.

eng

Again, those species which are distinguished one from another and opposed one to another within the same genus are said to be 'simultaneous' in nature.

grc

ἀντιδιῃρῆσθαι δὲ λέγεται ἀλλήλοις τὰ κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν διαίρεσιν, οἷον τὸ πτηνὸν τῷ πεζῷ καὶ τῷ ἐνύδρῳ·

eng

I mean those species which are distinguished each from each by one and the same method of division. Thus the 'winged' species is simultaneous with the 'terrestrial' and the 'water' species.

grc

ταῦτα γὰρ ἀλλήλοις ἀντιδιῄρηται ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ γένους ὄντα·

eng

These are distinguished within the same genus, and are opposed each to each,

grc

τὸ γὰρ ζῷον διαιρεῖται εἰς ταῦτα, εἴς τε τὸ πτηνὸν καὶ τὸ πεζὸν καὶ τὸ ἔνυδρον, καὶ οὐδέν γε τούτων πρότερον ἢ ὕστερόν ἐστιν, ἀλλ’ ἅμα τῇ φύσει τὰ τοιαῦτα δοκεῖ εἶναι·

eng

for the genus 'animal' has the 'winged', the 'terrestrial', and the 'water' species, and no one of these is prior or posterior to another; on the contrary, all such things appear to be 'simultaneous' in nature.

grc

διαιρεθείη δ’ ἂν καὶ ἕκαστον τούτων εἰς εἴδη πάλιν, οἷον τὸ πεζὸν καὶ τὸ πτηνὸν καὶ τὸ ἔνυδρον.)

eng

Each of these also, the terrestrial, the winged, and the water species, can be divided again into subspecies.

grc

ἔσται οὖν κἀκεῖνα ἅμα τῇ φύσει, ὅσα ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ γένους κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν διαίρεσίν ἐστιν·

eng

Those species, then, also will be 'simultaneous' point of nature, which, belonging to the same genus, are distinguished each from each by one and the same method of differentiation.

grc

τὰ δὲ γένη τῶν εἰδῶν ἀεὶ πρότερα·

eng

But genera are prior to species,

grc

οὐ γὰρ ἀντιστρέφει κατὰ τὴν τοῦ εἶναι ἀκολούθησιν·

eng

for the sequence of their being cannot be reversed.

grc

οἷον ἐνύδρου μὲν ὄντος ἔστι ζῷον, ζῴου δὲ ὄντος οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἔνυδρον εἶναι.

eng

If there is the species 'water-animal', there will be the genus 'animal', but granted the being of the genus 'animal', it does not follow necessarily that there will be the species 'water-animal'.

grc

ἅμα οὖν τῇ φύσει λέγεται ὅσα ἀντιστρέφει μὲν κατὰ τὴν τοῦ εἶναι ἀκολούθησιν, μηδαμῶς δὲ αἴτιον τὸ ἕτερον τῷ ἑτέρῳ τοῦ εἶναί ἐστιν, καὶ τὰ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ γένους ἀντιδιῃρημένα ἀλλήλοις·

eng

Those things, therefore, are said to be 'simultaneous' in nature, the being of each of which involves that of the other, while at the same time neither is in any way the cause of the other's being; those species, also, which are distinguished each from each and opposed within the same genus.

grc

ἁπλῶς δὲ ἅμα, ὧν ἡ γένεσις ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χρόνῳ.

eng

Those things, moreover, are 'simultaneous' in the unqualified sense of the word which come into being at the same time.

grc

Κινήσεως δέ ἐστιν εἴδη ἕξ·

eng

There are six sorts of movement:

grc

γένεσις, φθορά, αὔξησις, μείωσις, ἀλλοίωσις, κατὰ τόπον μεταβολή.

eng

generation, destruction, increase, diminution, alteration, and change of place.

grc

αἱ μὲν οὖν ἄλλαι κινήσεις φανερὸν ὅτι ἕτεραι ἀλλήλων εἰσίν·

eng

It is evident in all but one case that all these sorts of movement are distinct each from each.

grc

οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἡ γένεσις φθορὰ οὐδέ γε ἡ αὔξησις μείωσις οὐδὲ ἡ κατὰ τόπον μεταβολή†, ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι·

eng

Generation is distinct from destruction, increase and change of place from diminution, and so on.

grc

ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ἀλλοιώσεως ἔχει τινὰ ἀπορίαν, μήποτε ἀναγκαῖον ᾖ τὸ ἀλλοιούμενον κατά τινα τῶν λοιπῶν κινήσεων ἀλλοιοῦσθαι.

eng

But in the case of alteration it may be argued that the process necessarily implies one or other of the other five sorts of motion.

grc

τοῦτο δὲ οὐκ ἀληθές ἐστιν·

eng

This is not true,

grc

σχεδὸν γὰρ κατὰ πάντα τὰ πάθη ἢ τὰ πλεῖστα ἀλλοιοῦσθαι συμβέβηκεν ἡμῖν οὐδεμιᾶς τῶν ἄλλων κινήσεων κοινωνοῦσιν·

eng

for we may say that all affections, or nearly all, produce in us an alteration which is distinct from all other sorts of motion,

grc

οὔτε γὰρ αὔξεσθαι ἀναγκαῖον τὸ κατὰ πάθος κινούμενον οὔτε μειοῦσθαι, ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ὥσθ’ ἑτέρα ἂν εἴη παρὰ τὰς ἄλλας κινήσεις ἡ ἀλλοίωσις·

eng

for that which is affected need not suffer either increase or diminution or any of the other sorts of motion. Thus alteration is a distinct sort of motion;

grc

εἰ γὰρ ἦν ἡ αὐτή, ἔδει τὸ ἀλλοιούμενον εὐθὺς καὶ αὔξεσθαι ἢ μειοῦσθαι ἤ τινα τῶν ἄλλων ἀκολουθεῖν κινήσεων·

eng

for, if it were not, the thing altered would not only be altered, but would forthwith necessarily suffer increase or diminution or some one of the other sorts of motion in addition;

grc

ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἀνάγκη.

eng

which as a matter of fact is not the case.

grc

ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τὸ αὐξόμενον ἤ τινα ἄλλην κίνησιν κινούμενον ἀλλοιοῦσθαι·

eng

Similarly that which was undergoing the process of increase or was subject to some other sort of motion would, if alteration were not a distinct form of motion, necessarily be subject to alteration also.

grc

ἀλλ’ ἔστι τινὰ αὐξανόμενα ἃ οὐκ ἀλλοιοῦται·

eng

But there are some things which undergo increase but yet not alteration.

grc

οἷον τὸ τετράγωνον γνώμονος περιτεθέντος ηὔξηται μέν, ἀλλοιότερον δὲ οὐδὲν γεγένηται·

eng

The square, for instance, if a gnomon is applied to it, undergoes increase but not alteration,

grc

ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων.

eng

and so it is with all other figures of this sort.

grc

ὥσθ’ ἕτεραι ἂν εἴησαν αἱ κινήσεις ἀλλήλων.

eng

Alteration and increase, therefore, are distinct.

grc

Ἔστι δὲ ἁπλῶς μὲν κίνησις ἠρεμίᾳ ἐναντίον·

eng

Speaking generally, rest is the contrary of motion.

grc

ταῖς δὲ καθ’ ἕκαστα, γενέσει μὲν φθορά, αὐξήσει δὲ μείωσις·

eng

But the different forms of motion have their own contraries in other forms; thus destruction is the contrary of generation, diminution of increase,

grc

τῇ δὲ κατὰ τόπον μεταβολῇ ἡ κατὰ τόπον ἠρεμία μάλιστα ἔοικεν ἀντικεῖσθαι, καὶ εἰ ἄρα ἡ εἰς τὸν ἐναντίον τόπον μεταβολή, οἷον τῇ κάτωθεν ἡ ἄνω, τῇ ἄνωθεν ἡ κάτω.

eng

rest in a place, of change of place. As for this last, change in the reverse direction would seem to be most truly its contrary; thus motion upwards is the contrary of motion downwards and vice versa.

grc

τῇ δὲ λοιπῇ τῶν ἀποδοθεισῶν κινήσεων οὐ ῥᾴδιον ἀποδοῦναι τί ποτέ ἐστιν ἐναντίον, ἔοικε δὲ οὐδὲν εἶναι αὐτῇ ἐναντίον, εἰ μή τις καὶ ἐπὶ ταύτης τὴν κατὰ τὸ ποιὸν ἠρεμίαν ἀντιθείη <ἢ> τὴ<ν> εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον τοῦ ποιοῦ μεταβολή<ν>, καθάπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς κατὰ τόπον μεταβολῆς τὴν κατὰ τόπον ἠρεμίαν ἢ τὴν εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον τόπον μεταβολήν, —ἔστι γὰρ ἡ ἀλλοίωσις μεταβολὴ κατὰ τὸ ποιόν·‍

eng

In the case of that sort of motion which yet remains, of those that have been enumerated, it is not easy to state what is its contrary. It appears to have no contrary, unless one should define the contrary here also either as 'rest in its quality' or as 'change in the direction of the contrary quality', just as we defined the contrary of change of place either as rest in a place or as change in the reverse direction.

grc

ὥστε ἀντίκειται τῇ <κατὰ τὸ ποιὸν κινήσει ἡ> κατὰ τὸ ποιὸν ἠρεμία <ἢ> ἡ εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον τοῦ ποιοῦ μεταβολή, οἷον τὸ λευκὸν γίγνεσθαι τῷ μέλαν γίγνεσθαι·

eng

For a thing is altered when change of quality takes place; therefore either rest in its quality or change in the direction of the contrary may be called the contrary of this qualitative form of motion. In this way becoming white is the contrary of becoming black;

grc

ἀλλοιοῦται γὰρ εἰς τὰ ἐναντία τοῦ ποιοῦ μεταβολῆς γιγνομένης.

eng

there is alteration in the contrary direction, since a change of a qualitative nature takes place.

grc

Τὸ ἔχειν κατὰ πλείονας τρόπους λέγεται·

eng

The term 'to have' is used in various senses.

grc

ἢ γὰρ ὡς ἕξιν καὶ διάθεσιν ἢ ἄλλην τινὰ ποιότητα, —λεγόμεθα γὰρ ἐπιστήμην ἔχειν καὶ ἀρετήν·‍

eng

In the first place it is used with reference to habit or disposition or any other quality, for we are said to 'have' a piece of knowledge or a virtue.

grc

ἢ ὡς ποσόν, οἷον ὃ τυγχάνει τις ἔχων μέγεθος, —λέγεται γὰρ τρίπηχυ μέγεθος ἔχειν ἢ τετράπηχυ·‍

eng

Then, again, it has reference to quantity, as, for instance, in the case of a man's height; for he is said to 'have' a height of three or four cubits.

grc

ἢ ὡς τὰ περὶ τὸ σῶμα, οἷον ἱμάτιον ἢ χιτῶνα·

eng

It is used, moreover, with regard to apparel, a man being said to 'have' a coat or tunic;

grc

ἢ ὡς ἐν μορίῳ, οἷον ἐν χειρὶ δακτύλιον·

eng

or in respect of something which we have on a part of ourselves, as a ring on the hand:

grc

ἢ ὡς μέρος, οἷον χεῖρα ἢ πόδα·

eng

or in respect of something which is a part of us, as hand or foot.

grc

ἢ ὡς ἐν ἀγγείῳ, οἷον ὁ μέδιμνος τοὺς πυροὺς ἢ τὸ κεράμιον τὸν οἶνον, —οἶνον γὰρ ἔχειν τὸ κεράμιον λέγεται, καὶ ὁ μέδιμνος πυρούς·

eng

The term refers also to content, as in the case of a vessel and wheat, or of a jar and wine; a jar is said to 'have' wine, and a corn-measure wheat.

grc

ταῦτ’ οὖν ἔχειν λέγεται ὡς ἐν ἀγγείῳ·‍

eng

The expression in such cases has reference to content.

grc

ἢ ὡς κτῆμα·

eng

Or it refers to that which has been acquired;

grc

ἔχειν γὰρ οἰκίαν καὶ ἀγρὸν λεγόμεθα.

eng

we are said to 'have' a house or a field.

grc

λεγόμεθα δὲ καὶ γυναῖκα ἔχειν καὶ ἡ γυνὴ ἄνδρα·

eng

A man is also said to 'have' a wife, and a wife a husband,

grc

ἔοικε δὲ ἀλλοτριώτατος ὁ νῦν ῥηθεὶς τρόπος τοῦ ἔχειν εἶναι·

eng

and this appears to be the most remote meaning of the term,

grc

οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο τῷ ἔχειν γυναῖκα σημαίνομεν ἢ ὅτι συνοικεῖ.

eng

for by the use of it we mean simply that the husband lives with the wife.

grc

ἴσως δ’ ἂν καὶ ἄλλοι τινὲς φανείησαν τοῦ ἔχειν τρόποι, οἱ δὲ εἰωθότες λέγεσθαι σχεδὸν ἅπαντες κατηρίθμηνται.

eng

Other senses of the word might perhaps be found, but the most ordinary ones have all been enumerated.

Alignment of Aristotle's Categories

Aristotle, Categories